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Analiza zjawiska wczesnych nieformalnych porozumień legislacyjnych w zwykłej procedurze ustawodawczej

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Kirpsza A.
Studia Europejskie-Studies in European Affairs
|
2013
|
issue 4
s.101-132
EN
The article explores a new phenomenon that has recently emerged in the ordinary legislative procedure: the early informal legislative agreements. They can be defined as legislative acts which are negotiated informally in restricted and secluded trilogues by a group of representatives from the European Parliament the Council and the European Commission, and then adopted formally without any change under the first or early second reading. The aim of the article is to identify and explain the conditions under which early first reading agreements are likely to occur. Based on social constructivism assumptions, a series of hypotheses are posed. They are complemented by control factors emphasized by rationalist theories. The hypotheses and factors are tested on an original and manually collected database consisting of 615 legislative acts (regulations, directives, decisions and framework decisions) adopted between 1999 and 2009 under the codecision procedure (at present, ordinary legislative procedure) and subjected to at least one amendment proposed by the European Parliament. The results show that early agreements are better explained by constructivism than rationalism. First, early agreements are the result of socialization into cooperative norms, as their likelihood increases with the time informal trilogues have been in use. Second, early agreements are more likely when legislative acts are negotiated during the 20 months preced-ing the 2004 and 2009 elections to the European Parliament. Third, European Parliament committees have a profound impact on early agreements. They are likely in the LIBE and ECON whereas unlikely in TRAN and CULT. Fourth, there is no evidence that distributional, regulatory, formal or complex character of the legislative file affects the early conclusion. The only exception is the saliency of the act, although it loses its role when taking into account early sec-ond-reading agreements.
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Rada Ministrów bez ministrów? Wpływ struktury organizacyjnej Rady Unii Europejskiej na kształt procesu podejmowania decyzji: perspektywa konstruktywizmu społecznego

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Kirpsza A.
Studia Europejskie-Studies in European Affairs
|
2011
|
issue 4
9-32
EN
The Council of the European Union is the main EU’s legislative body. To deal with overwhelming amount of legislation, it created an organizational structure made up of working groups at the bottom, special senior committees in the middle and ministers at the top. Although many studies exist about the division of labour between them, little explains the conditions under which these formations play important role in decision-making. The study fills this lacuna. By implementing social constructivist approach, it investigates the impact of the Council’s structure on direct involvement of ministers in law-making. A statistical analysis is conducted to examine this question, based on legislative proposals endorsed in the Council during 2000-2004 period. Four findings emerge from the analysis. Firstly, formal aspects of decision-making, such as legislative procedure, voting rule and legal instrument, do not affect ministers activity. Secondly, no effect of preference divergence between ministers is identified. Thirdly, the substance of legislative act plays important role as salience and European Parliament amendments increase ministers involvement. Lastly, the Council formation to which ministers belong has impact on their great activity. It is likely in TTE Council whereas unlikely in AGRIFISH, JHA and ECOFIN Councils.
3
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Czy współpraca się opłaca? Wpływ koalicji z Niemcami na sukces Polski w procesie legislacyjnym Unii Europejskiej

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Kirpsza A.
Przegląd Politologiczny
|
2018
|
issue 2
121-138
EN
The purpose of the article is to analyze whether building a coalition with Germany affects Poland’s success in the EU’s legislative process. Two hypotheses are tested: (1) when Polish and German preferences are homogenous, Poland’s legislative success is greater; (2) the coalition with Germany ensures Poland’s greater success in the areas of particular significance to Warsaw, that is in agriculture, energy, environment, home affairs and the single market. The above hypotheses are tested using a quantitative method of a linear regression. Regression calculations are based on the DEU II dataset. The results are as follows. First, forming a Polish-German coalition in the EU’s lawmaking is extremely tricky due to strong divergences of both countries’ preferences. Second, building a coalition with Germany is particularly beneficial for Poland, nevertheless. The analysis shows that when Poland enters an alliance with Germany, its success in the EU’s legislative process significantly increases. Third, building a coalition with Germany is very profitable for Poland in these policy areas which are crucial from the perspective of Poland’s interests, namely in agriculture, energy, home affairs and the single market. The only exception is the environment.
PL
Celem artykułu jest analiza, czy zawieranie koalicji z Niemcami wpływa na sukces Polski w procesie legislacyjnym UE. Przetestowano dwie hipotezy: 1) jeśli preferencje Polski oraz Niemiec są zgodne, to sukces Polski jest większy; 2) koalicja z Niemcami zapewnia Polsce większy sukces w obszarach o szczególnym znaczeniu dla Warszawy, to jest: w rolnictwie, energii, środowisku, sprawach wewnętrznych oraz wspólnym rynku. Hipotezy przetestowano za pomocą metody ilościowej – regresji liniowej na bazie DEU II. Uzyskano następujące wnioski. Po pierwsze, budowanie koalicji polsko-niemieckiej w UE jest niezmiernie skomplikowane ze względu na wyraźną sprzeczność preferencji obu państw. Po drugie, mimo to budowanie koalicji z Niemcami jest dla Polski niezmiernie opłacalne. Analiza wykazała, że gdy Polska zawiera sojusz z Niemcami, to jej sukces w procesie legislacyjnym UE widocznie wzrasta. Po trzecie, zawiązywanie koalicji z Niemcami jest szczególnie opłacalne w politykach UE, które są kluczowe z punktu widzenia interesów Polski, czyli w rolnictwie, energii, sprawach wewnętrznych oraz wspólnym rynku. Jedynym wyjątkiem jest obszar ochrony środowiska.
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Legislacyjne problemy Unii Europejskiej po wejściu w życie traktatu z Lizbony

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Kirpsza A.
Przegląd Zachodni
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2012
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issue 2(343)
187-212
EN
The purpose of the article is to identify the legislative challenges of the European Union that became apparent after implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon provisions. At least six such threats are diagnosed. Firstly, the Treaty of Lisbon has deepened the European Parliament legislative exclusion by increasing the number of areas where it does not have any formal powers. Secondly, more than half of the treaty basis for enacting legislation includes procedures other than the ordinary legislative procedure which relatively weakens the position of the Parliament. Thirdly, the habit of trilogues - informal meetings between the Council, Commission and Parliament in the early stages of the legislative procedure - generates serious consequences for the status of institutions and democracy in the EU. Fourthly, the custom of so-called early agreements results in almost complete disappearance of the second and third reading and quicken the decision-making process at the expense of its transparency. Fifthly, trilogues and early agreements degraded the role of the European Parliament’s committees in legislative proceedings. Sixthly, there is a declining involvement of ministers in the legislative process, resulting in technocratic and secret decision making.
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