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Problém přechodu od teoretické sféry k praktické v „Kritice soudnosti“

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Vacura M.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2015
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vol. 63
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issue 1
3-16
EN
Interpretations of Kant’s Critique of Judgement often focus on the problematic of beauty and taste which a large part of the first part of his book is devoted to, or on questions of teleology connected with living nature analysed in the context of the second part. This article attempts to show that Kant in the third Critique tries to include the question of the relation of the theoretical and practical sphere in his treatment of this problematic. The crystallisation of Kant’s thought in this respect began to take place from the First Critique onwards. In clarifying this question we put to use the central concept of the Third Critique – purposefulness. The development of this concept in Kant’s thinking is traced. In the concluding part of the study we attempt to show that in employing the newly-formulated conception of purposefulness, Kant tackles the question of how the two spheres are connected by means of a thesis concerning the unity of the super-sensory substrate of nature and freedom.
2
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Carnapova logická syntax jazyka a problém kategoriální chyby

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Vacura M.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2019
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vol. 67
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issue 1
69-88
EN
A significant part of neo-positivist philosophy was Carnap’s project of the elimination of metaphysics by the logical analysis of language, pronounced in the article with that title. This project was aimed, among other things, at the creation of a so-called logical syntax of language which would enable metaphysical sentences to be revealed as senseless and thus their elimination from scientific discourse. In this text we first of all focus on Carnap’s definition of logical syntax in its historical context. We then analyse Carnap’s unsuccessful attempts to construct the logical syntax of language, showing that his difficulties in seeking logical syntax are not accidental, but have a systemic character, for they are connected with the way in which Carnap defined the problem. In conclusion we formulate the consequences of Carnap’s failure for his philosophical project of the elimination of metaphysics and for neo-positivism in general.
DE
Ein bedeutender Bestandteil der neopositivistischen Philosophie war Carnaps Projekt der im gleichnamigen Artikel angekündigten Eliminierung der Metaphysik durch die logische Sprachanalyse. Dieses Projekt hatte u. a. die Schaffung einer sog. Sprachsyntax zum Inhalt, mit der metaphysische Sätze als sinnlos identifiziert werden und vom wissenschaftlichen Diskurs ausgeschlossen werden könnten. Im vorliegenden Text widmen wir uns zunächst Carnaps Definition der logischen Syntax im historischen Kontext. Anschließend analysieren wir Carnaps erfolglose Versuche der Konstruktion einer logischen Sprachsyntax, wobei wir aufzeigen, dass seine Schwierigkeiten bei der Suche nach einer logischen Syntax nicht zufällig, sondern systemimmanent sind und mit der Art und Weise zusammenhängen, in der Carnap das Problem definiert hatte. Abschließend formulieren wir die Folgen von Carnaps Versagen für sein philosophisches Projekt der Eliminierung der Metaphysik und für den Neopositivismus als solchem.
3
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Lacey’s concept of value-free science

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Vacura M.
Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)
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2018
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vol. 40
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issue 2
211-229
EN
Many philosophers of science have maintained that science should be value-free; still others believe that such ideal is neither achievable nor desirable for science. Hugh Lacey is presently one of the main supporters of the idea of value-free science and his theory is probably the most debated today and attracts the most attention and criticism. Th erefore, in this text, I will primarily analyze his theory of value-free science. Aft er briefl y defi ning the notion of value I highlight which strategy Lacey chooses to lay a fi rm foundation for the concept of science without value, with his starting point being the diff erentiation between cognitive and non-cognitive values. Th en I describe three basic characteristics of Lacey’s value-free science: impartiality, neutrality, and autonomy. However, the overall plan and design of his project, together with some concrete steps he takes, are not without problems in our view. I will try to point out some of these problematic issues and provide brief suggestions for alleviating them.
CS
Mnoho fi losofů vědy hájí názor, že věda by neměla být zatížena hodnotami; jiní jsou nicméně přesvědčeni, že takový ideál je nejen nedosažitelný, ale není ani žádoucí. Hugh Lacey je v současnosti jedním z hlavních zastánců ideje vědy bez hodnot a jeho teorie je dnes pravděpodobně nejdiskutovanější a přitahuje nejvíce zájmu i kritiky. V předkládaném textu se proto primárně věnujeme jeho koncepci vědy nezatížené hodnotami. Poté, co v krátkosti charakterizujeme pojem hodnoty, vykreslujeme strategii, kterou Lacey volí, aby položil pevné základy své koncepce. Výchozím bodem je rozlišení mezi kognitivními a nekognitivními hodnotami, následuje popis tří základních charakteristik vědy bez hodnot: nestrannosti, neutrality a autonomie. Nicméně celkový rozvrh a výstavba tohoto projektu nejsou z našeho pohledu bez nedostatků, proto v závěru textu na některé z těchto problematických aspektů poukazujeme a pokoušíme se podat stručné návrhy na jejich odstranění.
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Analytický tomismus Krakovského kruhu

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Vacura M.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2011
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vol. 59
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issue 5
689-705
EN
The traditional picture of the development of analytical philosophy, represented especially by such thinkers as G. Frege, G. E. Moore, B. Russell or R. Carnap, whose attitude was generally anti-metaphysical, can, on closer study, be shown to be incomplete. This article treats of the Cracow circle a group of Polish philosophers among whom are, above all, to be counted J. Salamucha, J. M. Bocheński, J. F. Drewnowski, and B. Sobociński, who were, at the beginning of the twentieth century, fascinated by the development of modern formal logic and its application to philosophical thinking. They also attempted to apply it to Catholic philosophy. The result of their endeavours were many remarkable works introducing not only a defence of the use of modern philosophical approaches in Christian thought, but also the reconstruction, by means of formal logic, of significant proofs given by Scholastic authors.
5
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Pojem svobody u Thomase Hobbese

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Vacura M.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2017
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vol. 65
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issue 3
385-401
EN
The aim of this text is to show that, for Hobbes, the problem of freedom in the political sphere is of fundamental importance, and that it presents one of the central motifs of his political philosophy. The point of departure is Hobbes’s definition of the concept of freedom as the non-existence of external obstacles. Following this, the author turns to the concept of metaphysical freedom which Hobbes, as a determinist, rejects, and to the problem of the relation of fear and freedom, and thus, above all, to the question of to what extent fear of repression means a restriction of freedom. The following sections of the article bring into play the second significant concept of freedom to be found in Hobbes, freedom as exemption from laws, and the third concept of freedom, the freedom of the subject. In conclusion, attention is also given to the less important and derivative forms of freedom, that is, to freedom of expression and freedom of the state. At the same time, an enquiry is made into the question of whether, given the different definitions, Hobbes’s linking of these various conceptions of freedom is consistent and to what extent Hobbes succeeds in achieving the philosophical goals which he set himself.
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Longino’s concept of values in science

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Vacura M.
Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)
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2021
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vol. 43
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issue 1
3-31
EN
While classical neo-positivists reject any role for traditionally understood values in science, Kuhn identifies five specific values as criteria for assessing a scientific theory; this approach has been further developed by several other authors. This paper focuses on Helen Longino, who presents a significant contemporary critique of Kuhn’s concept. The most controversial aspect of Longino’s position is arguably her claim that the criterion of empirical adequacy is the least defensible basis for assessing theories. The de- -emphasizing of the importance of external consistency as a value and the introduction of socio-political considerations into the processes of an assessment of scientific theories are also considered problematic issues. I provide arguments against Longino’s conception, identify some of its problems, and argue for refusal of her approach.
CS
Zatímco klasičtí novopozitivisté odmítají jakoukoli roli tradičně chápaných hodnot ve vědě, Kuhn identifikuje pět konkrétních hodnot jako kritéria pro hodnocení vědeckých teorií a jeho přístup byl dále rozvinut několika dalšími autory. Tento příspěvek se zaměřuje na Helen Longino, která představila jednu z nejvýznamnějších současných kritik Kuhnova pojetí. Nejkontroverznějším aspektem její koncepce je pravděpodobně tvrzení, že kritérium empirické adekvátnosti je nejméně obhájitelným základem pro hodnocení teorií. Za problematické je považováno také snížení významu externí konzistence jako hodnoty a zavedení sociálně-politických úvah do procesu hodnocení vědeckých teorií. V příspěvku přináším argumenty proti koncepci Helen Longino, identifikuji některé slabiny jejího přístupu a argumentuji pro jeho odmítnutí.
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