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THE THEORY OF INTENTIONAL OBJECTS VERSUS THE ADVERBIAL THEORY

100%
Chrudzimski A.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2005
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issue 1
117-130
EN
AIn this paper the author presents a sketch of a theory of intentionality introducing special entities called intentional objects which can be found in the works of Franz Brentano and Roman Ingarden. Nowadays the philosophers that are sympathetic to intentional objects are accused of planting an ontological jungle. All the problems of the theory of intentionality, it is claimed, can be resolved within the framework of a theory assuming a much more parsimonious ontology, like the adverbial theory, a version of which is typically associated with Chisholm. However, he shows that this competitor of the theory of intentional objects faces serious difficulties. The most serious of them is that within the framework of the adverbial theory the relation between the representing entity ('adverbially specified' mental property of the subject) and the external target object has to be construed as primitive, while in the theory of intentional objects it can be easily defined. The consequence is that within the framework of the adverbial theory we are forced to require a distinguished kind of epistemic access not only to the representing entity but also to this 'representing relation'. This consequence, which is very seldom made explicit, seems indeed to be fatal. Intentional objects appear in this light not as products of an ontological extravagance but instead as entities that are indispensable, if we are to be able to explain the phenomenon of intentionality at all.
2

INTENTIONAL OBJECTS AND CAUSAL SEMANTICS

100%
Chrudzimski A.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2008
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vol. 36
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issue 2
25-35
EN
The central thesis of the theory of intentional objects, as developed by Brentano and Ingarden, is that to be in an intentional state consists basically in having before one's mind a special intentional object. Such an intentional object encodes certain identifying properties that in turn must be exemplified by any entity which is intended to play the role of the reference object of the intentional state in question. This means that the theory of intentional objects operates within the framework of the so-called 'identifying description theory of intentionality'. The partisans of this view claim that an intentional reference always consists in employing a certain 'identifying description' of a putative reference object. Every adept of philosophy knows today that after the seminal works by Kripke and Putnam this approach is generally regarded to be highly implausible. It has been argued that neither the semantics of (i) demonstrative pronouns, nor that of (ii) proper names or (iii) so-called natural kind terms can be explained in terms of the identifying description theory of intentionality. In this paper the author wants to show that the theory of intentional objects can deal with this critique. It turns out that all the above points (i-iii) can be explained if we make a certain extension of the theory. It consists basically in the assumption that an intentional object can encode not only so-called 'purely qualitative' properties but also 'relational' ones.
3

Ontological Commitments

100%
Chrudzimski A.
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2008
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vol. 17
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issue 4(68)
146-152
EN
Quine's criterion of ontological commitments is probably the best known among his ideas. In the society of analytic philosophers it is often referred to as a brilliant example of how a serious philosophical analysis can cast light on obscure metaphysical matters. According to Quine our theories force us to acknowledge exactly those entities that we allow to be semantic values of our quantified variables. At first sight it sounds well but it turns out that both the impression of its particular clarity as well the hope that it would free us from the traditional metaphysical problems of existence and non-existence are highly exaggerated. In the very first place it is far from clear why Quine's criterion should be regarded as plausible, and even if we take it for granted it is still not obvious what exactly it is intended to say.
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