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PL
Celem artykułu jest pogłębiona analiza jakości podstawowego aktu fenomenologicznego poznania. Zestawiając ze sobą argumenty Jana Patočki i Paula Ricoeura, autor dochodzi do wniosku, że ani negacja (jak twierdzi Patočka), ani afirmacja (jak sądzi Ricoeur), lecz wyprzedzające oba te akty zapytywanie jest podstawowym doświadczeniem fenomenologicznym. Z tej perspektywy „rzecz myślenia” nie jest ani niebytem (nicością), ani byciem, lecz pytajnością. Filozoficzne akty afirmacji i negacji, których korelatami są byt i niebyt, są odpowiedziami na źródłowe doświadczenie pytajności. Wytrzymanie w nim nie tylko kwestionuje prymat sądu w filozofii, lecz także hegemonię pisma jako jedynego środka wyrazu myślenia filozoficznego.
EN
Martin Heidegger’s texts are among the most difficult in the philosophical literature throughout the world. Paradoxically, despite they are commonly considered as untranslatable, they belong to the most frequently translated twentieth-century philosophical texts. High availability of translations makes the thought of Heidegger still enjoy great interest and result in a number of comments. The constantly growing number of translations of his texts affects shapes of national philosophies and their issues. It is particularly clearly visible in Poland where for a long time the philosophy of Heidegger was available only to the narrow circle of the German-speaking philosophers. The situation has changed significantly since the early nineties, when there rapidly began to appear translations of his major works. However, a different problem occurred – namely the problem of translation. It is nowhere so much invisible as in the case of two basic words: bycie (Being) and byt (being). This text follows various ways of translating and interpreting of Heidegger’s terms, asking about their philosophical relevance and relationship to the established philosophical tradition. Not denying any previous choices, it tries to develop a relevant criterion for understanding the two concepts. In order to do this, it tries to reveal the most important idea of Heidegger’s philosophy.
EN
In his original phenomenology of law Adolf Reinach distinguishes among experiences the so-called “social acts”. These include acts directed towards other persons that require that the latter acknowledge the communicated contents and assume certain attitudes. Among these acts Reinach mentions there are promises, orders, requests and questions. He argues the promise is the special act that creates the a priori grounds of law. It is to be noted that Reinach’s phenomenology of law is of static character (in the Husserlian sense of the word) and therefore it shares all its advantages and disadvantages. In my paper I would like to draw attention to another social act, which can also be attributed to certain law-making activities, especially from the perspective of the genetic phenomenology. It is questioning. At the same time when Reinach was working on his theory of law, his Munich friend, Johannes Daubert (1877–1947), also a student of Theodor Lipps and a friend of Edmund Husserl, who together with Reinach made an “invasion of the Munichs at Göttingen”, worked on the first phenomenology of the question. Although he did not refer his research to the phenomenon of law, we can ask whether, like Reinach’s deliberations about promises and obligation, it cannot be done. That this is possible to some extent, for example, is evinced by the Hannah Arendt and Klaus Held’s phenomenology of the political world. He points out that the public world as such arises from the primordial openness of man, understood as “zoon politikon”. This openness might be interpreted as the question which is not so much a single act as it is an attitude. The purpose of the paper is to outline how, while starting with the phenomenological reflection over various types of utterances, one can specify their certain forms and the acts constituting them as well as the attitudes which allow for a priori grounding the phenomenon of law from the perspective of static and genetic phenomenology.
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