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PL
For meaning normativism to hold, meaning must have a constitutive part which is obligation-producing. I claim in this paper that linguistic communication is such a constitutive part. I try to show this by means of appeal to Davidson’s triangulation thesis. If I am successful, it may fairly be said that “a Davidsonian can rescue the normativity of meaning”.
PL
In his causal theory of reference, Kripke holds that for the causal chain between the name dubbing ceremony and its current use to be maintained, every name borrower should intend to use the borrowed name to refer to the same thing to which the lender used that name to refer. Evans's Madagascar objection shows that merely having such an intention does not explain cases of referent change. I think that the problem can be solved by requiring that the borrower fix her intended referent with the lender's (or with that of the linguistic community to which the lender belongs). For this requirement to be satisfied, I argue, the borrower must triangulate with the lender to determine the common referent, much in the way Davidson suggests in the case of determining the common content. I claim that a similar strategy is adopted by Kroon in his epistemic warrant theory of reference.
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