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EN
My paper regards Stanisław Lem’s view on the future of the Christian doctrine. Lem is considered here primarily as a philosopher. In his works-both essayistic and fictional-he presents a certain concept of culture, religious faith, and relation between faith and science. Against the trend prevailing among other commentators of the writer’s thought, I do not focus on his idea of “lame God,” but on the prediction of the future development of the Christian doctrine expressed in The Twenty-first Voyage from The Star Diaries. It may be said that the standpoint presented there is not far from Lem’s own view. It is hard to call this standpoint atheistic, for it leaves open the possibility of the existence of transcendence. However, it is hard to call it theistic as well, for the author builds it on the so-called “generalized principle of Job” which denies ontic, epistemic, linguistic or even ethical relation between the world and God.
PL
W artykule prezentuję poglądy Stanisława Lema na przyszłość doktryny chrześcijańskiej. Lem traktowany jest tu przede wszystkim jako filozof, który w swoich dziełach – zarówno eseistycznych jak i beletrystycznych – przedstawia pewną wizję kultury, wiary religijnej i relacji między wiarą a nauką. Wbrew dominującej u innych komentatorów myśli autora Solaris tendencji nie skupiam się na jego koncepcji „ułomnego Boga”, lecz na przedstawionej w Podróży dwudziestej pierwszej z Dzienników gwiazdowych prognozie przyszłego rozwoju doktryny chrześcijańskiej. Jak można sądzić, Lem wyraża w niej stanowisko, które jemu samemu jest bliskie. Stanowisko to trudno nazwać ateizmem, ponieważ jest otwarte na możliwość istnienia transcendencji. Nie jest to jednak teizm, gdyż krakowski pisarz buduje swoją wizję na gruncie tak zwanej „zgeneralizowanej reguły Hioba” zaprzeczającej ontycznemu, poznawczemu, językowemu czy nawet etycznemu związkowi świata i Boga.
EN
My article deals with the problem of consciousness in the contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. In its fi rst part I present the historical background of the problem, namely the Cartesian dualism, and the rise and development of cognitive sciences and neurosciences. I explain Ned Block’s «phenomenal consciousness» / «access consciousness» dichotomy, the concept of «explanatory gap» and, of course, the famous concept of qualia. The second part concerns the arguments for and against the irreducibility of (phenomenal) consciousness and qualia like Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument and its critique by David Lewis and Daniel Dennett. The third part is devoted to the idea of so-called “new mysterians” (e.g. Colin McGinn). In my opinion McGinn’s standpoint offers a tempting «middle way» between reductionism and anti-reductionism. However, I fi nd his solution unacceptable due to its rampant idealistic assumption that there can be a physical theory unavailable for our cognitive abilities. Such a position can be dubbed «an sich physicalism» – after Kantian concept of Ding an sich – and it must be rejected for any thinker who rejects the possibility that the latter concept can be intelligible. Abstracts275Therefore at the end of my paper I introduce an idea of «meta-mysterianism,» another conception of the «third way» avoiding both reductionism and antireductionism in the analytic philosophy of mind.
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