Results found: 2

Search results

Sort By:

Limit search:

Three candidates for first philosophy in Nietzsche’s Beyond good and evil 20–22

100%

Wood W.

ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal

2022

vol. 12

issue 1

147-166

Friedrich Nietzsche is not generally regarded as a “first philosopher”, but rather as a radical critic of the traditional aspiration of philosophy to be a “master science”, in relation to which the other sciences are subordinate or dependent. In this respect, he seems to have had more in common with the logical positivists and post-structuralists who came after him than with the whole galaxy of “first philosophers” who preceded him, from Aristotle and John Duns Scotus to René Descartes, Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. However, in a famous aphorism in Beyond good and evil, Nietzsche proposes that psychology ought to be recognised as “queen of the sciences”, a traditional formula for first philosophy. Although this passage is well known, it is more often taken as a rhetorical flourish than as a serious statement of intent. In this article, I focus on the three aphorisms (BGE 20–22) that lead up to this statement. I argue that these aphorisms form an interconnected sequence, in which Nietzsche considers and rejects three traditional candidates for first philosophy - cosmology (BGE 20), theology (BGE 21) and general ontology (BGE 22). By rejecting these traditional candidates for first philosophy one by one, this sequence clears the way for Nietzsche’s proposal in BGE 23 that psychology ought to be recognised as the true candidate for first philosophy. These aphorisms, then, form a crucial sub-section in the developing argument of the book as a whole, which is far more systematically organised than Nietzsche’s aphoristic manner of writing would appear to suggest.

Leo Strauss on Religion as the Fundamental Alternative to Philosophy

100%

Wood W.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

2023

vol. 71

issue 2

289-311

Leo Strauss jest autorem znanej tezy o istnieniu nierozwiązywalnego konfliktu między filozofią a „objawieniem”, tj. monoteistyczną religią objawioną. Filozof jako filozof nie może być osobą wierzącą, zaś osoba wierząca jako wierząca nie może być filozofem. Mniej znane jest natomiast to, że myśl Straussa o religii jako podstawowej alternatywie dla filozofii podąża dwiema rozbieżnymi torami. Pierwszy z nich podkreśla wyjątkowe znaczenie religii objawionej, podczas gdy drugi kładzie nacisk na konflikt między filozofią a tym, co nazywa on „religią w ogóle”. Czasami Strauss sugeruje, że objawienie stanowi szczególne „wyzwanie” dla filozofii i filozof musi podważyć samą możliwość objawienia, aby uzasadnić prawomocność filozofii. Czasami jednak sugeruje on, że objawienie jest po prostu jedną z religii, nie różniącą się w swej istocie np. od starożytnego politeizmu i w związku z tym nie stanowi, jak się wydaje, szczególnego „wyzwania”. Twierdzę, że Straussowi ostatecznie nie udaje się pogodzić tych dwóch wątków i że to niepowodzenie jest związane zarówno z napięciami wewnątrz jego pozytywnej koncepcji samej filozofii jako drogi pośredniej między dogmatyzmem a sceptycyzmem, jak i z tym, że przesądza on z góry sprawę, zakładając bez uzasadnienia, że z „samej idei objawienia” wynika w sposób konieczny, iż nie da się jej zharmonizować z filozofią.

Leo Strauss is well known for his thesis that there is an irreconcilable conflict between philosophy and “revelation,” i.e. monotheistic revealed religion, which cannot be harmonized. The philosopher qua philosopher cannot be a believer, while the believer qua believer cannot be a philosopher. However, it is less widely recognized that Strauss’ thought about religion as the fundamental alternative to philosophy follows two divergent trajectories. The first emphasizes the unique importance of revealed religion, while the other emphasizes the conflict between philosophy and what he calls “religion in general.” Sometimes, Strauss suggests that revelation poses a unique “challenge” to philosophy, such that the philosopher must refute the mere possibility of revelation in order to justify the legitimacy of philosophy itself. Sometimes, however, he suggests rather that revelation is a religion like any other, not essentially different from e.g. ancient polytheism, which would seem therefore to pose no unique “challenge.” I argue that Strauss ultimately fails to reconcile these two strands of this thought and that this failure is related both to tensions internal to his positive conception of philosophy itself as a middle path between dogmatism and skepticism and to the fact that he begs the question by assuming, rather than proving, that it follows necessarily from “the very idea of revelation” that it cannot be harmonized with philosophy.

Refine search results

1 ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal

1 Roczniki Filozoficzne

2 Wood W.

1 2023

1 2022

Search results

Three candidates for first philosophy in Nietzsche’s Beyond good and evil 20–22

Leo Strauss on Religion as the Fundamental Alternative to Philosophy