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The article explores the political-economic mechanisms that lead to economic reforms even if the state is 'captured' with the rent-seeking interests, as was the case in Ukraine in 1990th. The authors argue that unless the social capital is strong enough to solve the coordination problems, the rent seeking can be sustainable for a long time only if the players are coordinated forcedly by an authoritarian arbiter. Such arrangement is mutually associated with peoples' passivity, and inability of comprehending the virtues of market coordination based on the private property rights. Until this public consciousness will change such way, that already emerged market institutions will start crowding out the rent-seeking ones, the deterioration of authoritarian control and coordination due to the technical and societal progress remains the main long-term factor of reforms. Although such deterioration does not cease the rent seeking and can even release it, a lack of control makes it unsustainable, so replacing of the forced coordination with the market one based on universal protection of the property rights is required. Due to this mechanism the market reforms may occur despite absence of either a benevolent reformist government, or even vested group's interests.
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