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EN
The Arab Spring, which was initiated by the events taking place at the end of 2010 in Tunisia, gripped much of the Middle East, including Iran. However, demonstration of support for revolutionaries in Tunisia and Egypt, which began in Iran in February 2011 were doomed from the start to failure. On the one hand, the regime had taken all possible measures to prevent development of similar scenario, as in Tunisia and Egypt. On the other hand, the conflict in the conservative camp, between the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei and the president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad attracted growing attention of the Iranian public. The article aims to analyze the causes of the conflict in the conservative camp, to characterize the rival political groups and will attempt to answer the question about possible consequences of this conflict, not only for the reformists, but for the Iranian political system, as a whole. As the results of elections to the 9th Majles show, Ali Khamenei continues to have the greatest impact on the balance of power in the Islamic Republic, but taking into account the growing influence of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, they may become much greater threat for Supreme Leader than the reformists.
PL
Protesty w Bahrajnie, które rozpoczęły się 14 lutego 2011 roku, w rocznicę przyjęcia Karty Działania Narodowego w ogólnonarodowym referendum, spotkały się ze zdecydowanie mniejszym zainteresowaniem zarówno ze strony przywódców państw Zachodu, jak i społeczności międzynarodowej niż wydarzenia, które od grudnia 2010 roku rozgrywały się między innymi w krajach Afryki Północnej. Powody wybuchu społecznego niezadowolenia wydawały się nie do końca zrozumiałe dla zewnętrznych obserwatorów. Próbowali oni poznać je na podstawie analizy ekonomicznych wskaźników, które w okresie poprzedzającym Arabską Wiosnę były zdecydowanie bardziej korzystne dla Bahrajnu niż pozostałych krajów, gdzie doszło do masowych demonstracji. Celem artykułu jest zatem zwrócenie uwagi na wewnętrzne przyczyny wybuchu protestów w Bahrajnie w perspektywie historycznej, analiza ich przebiegu i wysuwanych przez grupy opozycyjne żądań, oraz próba oceny, jakie są szanse rozwiązania tego wieloletniego konfliktu w najbliższej przyszłości.
EN
Bahraini uprisings, which broke out on 14 February 2011 during the anniversary of the National Action Charter referendum, were met with much lower interest from Western leaders and international societies than events taking place since December 2010 in North Africa, among others. Sources of social discontent were not entirely clear to outward observers who based their opinion on the analysis of economic data which, at the time before the Arab Spring, were much more optimistic for Bahrain than for other countries where mass demonstrations had been taking place. The aim of the paper is, therefore, to draw attention to historical perspective on inner causes of Bahraini uprisings, a time course analysis or else opposition demands. It also attempts to provide proposals for the resolution of the year-long conflict in the nearest future.
EN
Middle Eastern peace talks, which were resumed between representatives of the State of Israel and State of Palestine at the end of July 2013 again sparked hopes that conflict, which roots go back to the beginning of the 20th century, has a chance for a peaceful solution. This optimism was tempered, however, by previous experiences, when talks ended without bringing expected results and brought only disappointment for both sides of the conflict. One of the biggest obstacles to reaching an agreement is the presence of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories, which number and size undermine the possibility of establishment of a sovereign and territorially homogeneous Palestinian State. The aim of the article is to analyse the Israeli settlement policy in the Occupied Territories from historical perspective, allowing to trace its development during the periods of leftist and rightist governments, and also in the context of the Middle Eastern Peace Process and international law. Special attention will be given to the ideological base of Israeli policy towards occupied territories and how ideological changes in Israeli society can affect prospect for peace.
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EN
Six years of the Fu'ad Chehab's presidency and first half of his successor's term can be regarded as a one of the most important and interesting periods in the Lebanon's history. Fu'ad Chehab was not only the first maronite president that gained large support among Muslim part of the Lebanese society but under his leadership the state was also able to gain for the first time some autonomy in relations to other social groups, especially the traditional political representatives of the religious segments. However, Fu'ad Chehab's efforts to modernize the state, to build effective administration and open the political process to young, educated and not related to traditional establishment people had failed. The aim of this paper is to analyze this part of Lebanon's history and give answer to question about the reasons of the failure of president Chehab's modernizing project. The point of reference in the discussion of this problem is the state in society approach proposed by Joel Migdal. According to him, in order to understand the complex 'nature' of the state and its actions, the reasons of strength or weakness of states, it is necessary to concentrate on processes and relations among different parts of the state and between the state and various social groups, the state itself being a coherent organization with clearly defined goals that stands apart from society; it is necessary to grasp the duality between the image and practice of the state and the ongoing conflict over domination, the imposition of rules that would be binding to the whole society.
EN
One of the results of the Arab Spring, both in Egypt and Tunisia, was rise in popularity of the ultraconservative Salafi movement. Despite one-sided media coverage, Salafists cannot be equated only with violence, because the vast majority of its members have taken a quietist approach rejecting not only violence, but any form of political commitment. This does not change the fact, however, that due to the doctrine adopted by Salafists, the boundary between quietism and political activity, and finally the use of violence is not clearly defined. It means that members of the movement, who previously declared themselves to be apolitical, can easily decide to engage in radical actions. The aim of this article is to draw attention to the ideological roots of Salafism, its internal divisions with regard to political commitment, and to analyse the development of the Salafi movement in Egypt and Tunisia before and after Arab Spring. It will also attempt to assess the possible development of this movement in the near future.
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