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Filozofia Nauki
|
2013
|
vol. 21
|
issue 3
143-155
PL
Recent studies concerning folk concept of intentional action reveal interesting asymmetry: people have tendency to claim that an action is intentional when the side effect is harmful, and as unintentional when the side effect is beneficial. Based on this research, some experimental philosophers claim that our judgments about intentionality of action are affected by moral considerations. The goal of this paper is to show a series of empirical data which refer to asymmetry in assessing the intentionality and to analyze various theories and their interpretations of the above phenomenon. In particular, the article presents a theoretically promising hypothesis that explains asymmetry by appealing to the responsibility of agents.
EN
Birch & Bloom (2007) suggest that adults’ reasoning about other people’s mental states is influenced by their privileged knowledge about reality. When asked where a person described in a story would search for a missing object, participants tend to judge with higher probability that the person would search in a particular box when they know that the object is indeed in that box. However, the results of that experiment could be an effect of unintended priming in the experimental materials. The increased attention towards the box might be caused by reading about it in the task instructions. In a new version of the experiment, we controlled for this factor by priming different locations in the instructions. The results show that it is unlikely that priming is the source of Birch and Bloom’s observations: only knowledge about reality changed the participants’ strategies in reasoning about the actions of others.
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