In this paper the author presents Suarez's conception on material substance in connection with two main aspects of his theory. The first aspect is 'reification' of the intrinsic principles of a composite, which has led some interpreters to the claim that Suarez significantly prepared the way for the accession of Cartesian anthropological dualism. The second one is Suarez's emphasis on the substantial unity of material composites. The analysis of the second aspect is conceived as a counterbalance to some uncharitable interpretations of Suarez's hylemorphism. In the second part of the paper the relevance of Suarez's arguments to the contemporary debates on the ontological constitution of individuals is presented.
Suarez's conception of the principle of individuation of accidents and its relationship to the Thomistic solution is the main theme of the paper. In the first part, the author briefly recapitulates Suarez solution to the individuality and individuation of substances. In the second part he presents two main conceptions of the principle of individuation of accidents: substance and entitative theory of individuation. He presents four reasons for the entitative theory which are given by Suarez. In the third, the most ample part, he shows that Suarez argues that the Thesis of simultaneous co-existence of two mere numerically different accidents in the same subject can be valid, at least, in the case of respective accidents (relations). If it is not valid in the case of absolute accidents, then it is, according to Suarez, not because of the incompatible principle of individuation of accidents, but because of the fact that 'nature abhors futility'. Besides, he shows that God's absolute potence towards numerical multiplication of qualities cannot be restricted by certain natural principles of intensification and remission of qualities. In the last part, the author shows that if it is not contradictory that two mere numerically different accidents can co-exist in the same subject, it is 'a fortiori' valid about the Thesis of successive existence of the two mere numerically different accidents in the same subject.
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