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EN
Polish-German relations are an example of good collaboration. They also offer considerable potential for even closer cooperation. The crises in the euro zone brought Warsaw and Berlin closer to one another, especially during the Polish presidency of the EU. The present conflict with Russia, however, has resulted in complications. Ironically, it may contribute to Germany’s better understanding Polish expectations regarding security. From Poland’s point of view, the partnership with Germany is being significantly tested within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance. Germany is trying to accommodate Polish postulates by becoming involved in NATO spearhead forces and facilitating closer military contacts. Polish-German relations will long continue to depend on the nature of German leadership and the role of Poland in the EU, which is not ultimately defined.
PL
Stosunki polsko-niemieckie charakteryzuje dobra współpraca. Dysponują one wysokim potencjałem kooperacji i mogłyby się stać się jeszcze bliższe. Kryzys w strefie euro zwłaszcza w okresie polskiej prezydencji w UE zbliżył Warszawę i Berlin. Jednak obecny konflikt z Rosja przyniósł komplikacje. Paradoksalnie może on przyczynić się do lepszego zrozumienia przez Niemcy polskich oczekiwań w zakresie polityki bezpieczeństwa. Z polskiego punktu widzenia partnerstwo z Niemcami podlega obecnie ważnemu sprawdzianowi w ramach Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego. Niemcy starają się wyjść naprzeciw polskim postulatom, angażując się w tworzenie szpicy NATO i zacieśnianie kontaktów wojskowych. Stosunki polsko - niemieckie jeszcze długo będą uwarunkowane charakterem niemieckiego przywództwa i nie do końca zdefiniowaną rolą Polski w UE.
EN
The strategic assumptions of German Ostpolitik have been undermined by the aggressive activities of Russia during the Ukraine crisis. The tight economic relations between Germany and Russia have not brought about domestic transformations in the political system in Russia, and have not reduced its interest in regaining its imperial position in Eastern Europe, i.e. in the area of the former Soviet Union. Germany’s support for both the reform program in Ukraine and deepening its relations with the EU has shown that it is ready to critically evaluate its strategy toward Eastern Europe and review its ‘Russia first’ approach.
PL
Agresywne zachowania Rosji w trakcie konfliktu na Ukrainie w 2014 r. podważyły strategiczne założenia polityki Niemiec. Powiązania gospodarcze nie doprowadziły do przemian wewnętrznych w Rosji oraz nie ograniczyły jej nastawienia na rewindykowanie wpływów imperialnych. Gotowość Niemiec do poparcia Ukrainy w reformach wewnętrznych i jej zbliżenia do UE oznaczała, że są one skłonne bardziej zniuansować założenia swojej strategii wobec Europy Wschodniej i tym samym ograniczyć priorytet Russia first.
EN
In the aftermath of the Iraq crisis, the North Atlantic Alliance faced its most serious predicament since the ColdWar. Its mission in Afghanistan revealed growing discrepancies between the member states. The Georgian crisis of 2008, the missile defence project and the enlargement showed a lack of coherence. NATO has split up into two or more factions. A crucial question arose as to NATO’s ability to resolve the three main strategic dilemmas which have grown more pressing since the end of the ColdWar: (1) the choice between collective defence as the key role of NATO (Art. 5) and its out-of-area role of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism; (2) the choice between the transatlantic nature of NATO and its global partnerships; (3) the choice between the concept of the global military engagement of NATO and the so called comprehensive approach involving the cooperation of NATO with other security organizations such as the UN, the EU and the OSCE in reconstructing post-conflict regions. NATO’s performance in managing these challenges will bear critically on its future. The Strategic Concept from Lisbon 2010 has helped to clarify many controversial issues within the organization. NATO has managed to mitigate the risk of developing into a multi-tier organization. Relations between the factions have relaxed although interests appear to remain as diverse as they were before.
EN
In the discourse of Polish intellectuals, references to Germany are central to disputes about Europe and Poland’s place in the Union. The line that separates advocates of Poland’s integration with the EU from Euro-skeptics coincides with different understandings of Germany’s role and significance for Polish-German relations and for the development of the EU. In the former (prevailing) approach, the authors stressed the key significance of Poland’s collaboration with Germany (regarding the CSDP, eastern policy and the future structure of the EU). The latter critical approach supported by the political right wing tended to focus on Poland’s geopolitical security and the need for Central Europe’s autonomy, both of 6 Acta Politica Polonica Krzysztof Malinowski which are seen as alternatives to cooperation with Germany. A closer cooperation between Germany and the EU was treated as rather contrary to Poland’s interests and as a barrier to Poland’s empowerment.
PL
W dyskursie polskich intelektualistów odniesienia do Niemiec są integralnym składnikiem rozważań o miejscu Polski w Europie. Oś podziału, która przebiega między zwolennikami integracji i zakorzenienia Polski w Unii Europejskiej a rzecznikami sceptycznej postawy wobec UE, odzwierciedla odmienne rozumienie znaczenia Niemiec dla Polski oraz rozwoju Unii. W pierwszym – bardziej znaczącym – nurcie podkreśla się kluczową rolę współpracy Polski z Niemcami (w zakresie WPBiO, polityki wschodniej czy tworzenia przyszłej konstrukcji UE). Drugi nurt, krytyczny, sprzyjający prawicy, artykułuje raczej aspekty geopolitycznego bezpieczeństwa Polski i potrzebę podmiotowości Europy Środkowej, w której upatruje alternatywy dla współpracy z Niemcami. Wzmacnianie współpracy z Niemcami w UE traktuje raczej jako działania niezgodne z polskimi interesami i blokadę podmiotowej roli Polski.
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EN
Consolidation of the North Atlantic Alliance based on a new division of tasks and responsibilities is currently a key issue for the future of transatlantic relations. The new Strategic Concept of Lisbon (2010) was supposed to curb the discrepancies between the member states on crucial matters pertaining to the future of the Alliance and restore its unity. Those discrepancies resulted from a tension between NATO’s original functions, i.e. collective defense and a deepening of transatlantic cooperation on the one hand and tasks connected with the post-Cold War role of the Alliance on non-Treaty area on the other. The Concept was to prepare the Alliance to react more efficiently to a new type of challenges like rocket weapons attack or cyberterrorist attacks, or challenges concerning energy security. Implementation of the Concept was hindered by such adverse factors as the effects of the financial crisis in the USA and the EU or the USA’s strategic turn towards the Pacific. The Chicago summit (2012) launched a closer military integration of the member states and a new division of burdens between Europe and the USA as indispensable requisites of the Alliance’s further existence.
EN
The debt crisis in the eurozone has triggered a heated debate on the FRG’s new role in Europe. Germany’s growing significance in the remedies enacted within the eurozone was an impulse for deliberations about the optimal strategies that would take into account the domestic economic interests of particular countries on the one hand and the cohesion of European integration on the other as well as the expectations of the countries experiencing the effects of the crisis. German political scientists unanimously claim that the expectations of Germany’s partners and allies as to its engagement in solving problems within the EU are instrumental in compelling Germany to assume some kind of “co-leadership” role in the EU.
EN
Polish presidency of the European Union in the second half of 2011 was determined by the context of relations with Germany. Poland’s significance to Germany as a valuable and important EU partner was perceptible in the friendly declarations of Merkel’s government. One of the crucial elements of this encouraging atmosphere was the pro-European attitude of the Polish public opinion and the ruling coalition PO-PSL. Poland relied on Germany’s support to engage in closer cooperation on the EU arena and possibly even create EU policy in certain areas. However, during EU presidency Poland’s significance for Germany was limited by the following factors: Poland stays outside the eurozone; Germany prefers close cooperation with France at the expense of Poland’s postulates on participation in shaping remedial measures within the eurozone; divisions within the EU and the emergence of a two-speed economy; unfavorable situation in Eastern Europe viz. lack of progress in the democratization of Belarus and of clearly pro-EU orientation of Ukraine accompanied by regress in democratization of this country; a tendency on the part of France and Great Britain to individually reinforce their military role within the EU.
EN
The transformations of the North Atlantic Alliance in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and its mission in Afghanistan have proceeded hand in hand with the redefining of security interests in individual member states. Poland and Germany have also been affected by a polarization of views, particularly on the nature, place and role of NATO in today’s world. The countries’ geopolitics and their varying visions of European security have significantly affected their positions.
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EN
The material consists of excerpts from expert analyses prepared by scholars from the Institute for Western Affairs, commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (founding organ). The first part contains an assessment of the impact of reforms launched under Agenda 2010 on German economy in 2013 and its future development. Crucial characteristics of the German economic model are identified and compared with the French vision of the functioning of economy especially in the context of the European Union and specifically in the eurozone. The authors of the second expert analysis focus on changes in Germany’s foreign trade and direct investments identifiable after 2007 which lead to increased importance of economic cooperation with countries outside the European Union. However, it must be emphasized that the readiness to broaden global economic contacts does not cause a re-evaluation of the foundations of German foreign policy nor its greater independence that would result in new possibilities of exerting influence in international relations.
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