Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie genezy i ewolucji instytucji mężów zaufania w polskim prawie wyborczym okresu międzywojennego. Jej utworzenie wynikało z faktu, iż w komisjach wyborczych w tamtym okresie obok sędziów byli przedstawiciele administracji rządowej i samorządowej, nie było natomiast przedstawicieli wyborców lub podmiotów zgłaszających listy kandydatów. Mężowie zaufania reprezentowali tych, którzy wysuwali kandydatów. Ich zadaniem było obserwowanie przebiegu głosowania i liczenia głosów. Ich zgłaszanie było prawem podmiotu zgłaszającego listę kandydatów, nie był to jednak obowiązek. Przepisy regulujące ich działanie były bardzo lakoniczne, co musiało utrudniać ich pracę. Mogli jednak zawsze składać uwagi do protokołu komisji wyborczej odnośnie do wyników głosowania i wyborów.
EN
The aim of the article is to present the genesis and evolution of the institution of the poll watcher in the Polish electoral law of the interwar period. Its creation resulted from the fact that in the electoral commissions there were representatives of government and self-government administration along with the judges, while there were no representatives of voters or entities reporting the lists of candidates. The poll watcher represented those who put forward candidates. Their task was to observe the course of voting and counting votes. Their submission was the right of the entity submitting the list of candidates, but it was not an obligation. The regulations regulating their operation were very laconic, which made their work difficult. However, they could always comment on the minutes of the electoral commission regarding the results of voting and elections.
Artykuł analizuje instytucję Senatu jako jednej z izb Parlamentu Republiki Czeskiej. Przyjęta w 1992 roku konstrukcja bikameralizmu asymetrycznego nawiązuje do rozwiązania z Konstytucji 1920 roku. Organizacja wewnętrzna i tryb pracy, jak i mandat parlamentarny są typowe dla demokratycznego państwa. Podstawową funkcją Senatu jest ustawodawstwo, jednak ostateczne decyzje należą do Izby Poselskiej. Zrównanie pozycji obu izb jest wyjątkiem. Druga izba nie pełni funkcji kontrolnej, zaś funkcja kreacyjna jest symboliczna. Senat utrwalił się w systemie organów państwa.
EN
The article analyses the institution of the Senate as one of the chambers of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. The asymmetrical bicameralism conception adopted in 1992 refers to the solution of the Constitution of 1920. The internal organisation and the manner of work as well as the parliamentary mandate are typical for a democratic state. The basic function of the Senate is legislation, but the final decisions belong to the Chamber of Deputies. The equalisation of the position of both chambers is an exception. The second chamber does not have a control function, and the creative function is symbolic. The Senate has become established in the system of state organs.
In 2019, 52 Deputies to the European Parliament shall be elected to the European Parliament in Poland. If, however, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland does not withdraw from the European Union, the number of mandates shall be reduced to 51. National Electoral Commission suggests difficulty with establishing which of the candidates shall take the 52nd seat. This seems to be a potential threat. Hence, there is the need to amend the Electoral Code. The Commission suggests a solution similar to the one applied in 2010, when an incidental act was passed. This is not the only possible solution.
The article presents an institution of countersignature in the Czech Republic. In view of the clear link to the structures existing in the past, its evolution is also shown, starting with the Constitution of 1920. Initially, countersignature by the chief of government or minister authorized by him/her was required in relation to all the activities of the President. Today, there exist prerogatives and countersignature is obligatory only for the exercise of the powers of head of state which have the nature of decision, i.e. those by which the legal status is changed or confi rmed. Only written decisions can be countersigned. Countersignature is to be made by chairman of the government or member of the govern ment authorized by him/her, who does not have to be a minister competent for a given matter. Such authorizations in practice are rare and always individual and specifi c in nature. Countersignature may be made either before or after the decision is given by the President. This depends on how both parties signing a document agree. However, the date of its adoption by the President is always considered the date of the decision. Before making countersignature, chairman of the government may apply to the government with the question whether or not to countersign the President’s decision. This approach has been established in practice, but there are no rules determining when the Prime Minister must use it. When the functions of the President in constitutionally defi ned situations and extent are exercised by the chairman of the government, countersignature is not made. Countersigning of the President’s decision does not absolve the head of state from responsibility for treason. Decisions of the President, for which countersignature by chairman of the government or an authorized member of the government are required are null and void without it.
Creation of the second Chambers of Parliament in Poland and in the Czech Republic wasn’t the result of well-thought vision of these organs, but was made to deal with immediate problems. Their constitutional model is different. In Poland it’s term is connected with Sejm’s term whereas in the Czech Republic there is no connection between them. In Poland it lasts 4 years and in the Czech Republic 6 years and it can’t be dissolved. Moreover, the frame of Czech’s Senate is renewed in 1/3 of it’s frame every 2 years, which makes it more representative. Candidates for senators besides the traditional requirements such as citizenship, full active capacity and full public rights, have to be at least: 30 years old in Poland and 40 in the Czech Republic at the day of poll. There are majority elections, but in Poland constituencies are plurinominal (from 2 to 4), whereas in the Republic of Czech uninominal. In Poland the candidate with the highest number of votes gets the mandate whereas in the Czech Republic there is the requirement of the absolute majority of votes which is why the second round takes place that often. Both Senates work permanently but the Czech one may be put on hold. In both countries the model of asimetrical bicameralism was introduced. Second Chambers take part mainly in the legislative procedure but the main role is being played by the first Chambers. The most important right of the Senate of the Czech Republic is the possibility to create (when the Chamber of Parlament is dissolved) the decree-law. The creative competences of both Chambers are very random and it’s hard to find any particular idea in it. Similar situation takes place when we discuss other rights even though there is not many of them. Generally speaking, Czech construction seems to let the Senate run it’s duties in a better way. Disconnection of the Chamber’s commision and temporary ability to renew the frame of Senate are these ideas which should be taken into account when discussing the reform of the second Chamber.
The paper presents remarks referring to some amendments of 10 March 1988 to the People’s Councils electoral regulations of 13 February 1984. It has been pointed out that passing of the amendments was preceded by a too short period of public consultation about the changes in the People’s Councils electoral regulations, published by the Council of State. As a result a part of the community thought the changes were only formal. Besides, the Constitution in force provides in art. 102 that electoral regulations must be passed jointly for the Parliament and the People’s Councils. Separate regulations should follow the answer to the question what the representation is, and what is the role of local representative organs in the social, political and economic life. The author’s option is one-member constituencies and preservation of district lists from which a limited number of councillors will be elected. The way of appointing candidates for councillors and members of parliament is particularly important in the electoral procedure, as it crucially decides about the degree of democracy of the whole electoral system. It should be considered to give the right to appoint candidates by workers’ selfgovernments of institutions situated within the district of a people’s council, as well as by groups of citizens large enough to confirm confidence in suggested candidates. Electoral Conventions and Boards should be abolished, and the role of the committee of political parties and the Patriotic Movement of National Revival (PRON) should be clearly determined. The election of 19 June 1984 proved that alphabetical arrangement of candidates’ names on the ballot-papers was unreasonable. Ignorance of the system and old habits of the voters resulted in voting for the candidates who were on the top of the ballot-papers, that is whose names begin with the first letters of the alphabet. Also the question of repeated election should be resolved in the new electoral regulations, because now when the results of voting repeat, the seat remains unoccupied for the term.
The Election Code was adopted on January 5, 2011 and entered into force on August 1, 2011 replacing five existing laws governing elections. It has unified the electoral system and implemented some new solutions aimed at changing considerably the electoral process or providing only an arrangement of the existing regulations. The authors describe and provide assessment of some novelties implemented by the Code, including single-member constituencies in elections to the Senate and in local self-government elections, the requirement for candidates to have no criminal convictions, obligation to apply gender quotas on electoral lists, changes in the election campaigning procedures, possibility of two-day voting, correspondence voting, as well as the powers of international election observers. They discuss the advantages and disadvantages of these institutions, at the same time identifying those solutions which may cause problems in practice. As regards single-member constituencies the authors claim that their introduction in elections to the Senate mostly shows a continued lack of vision for the second chamber and, in relation to local self-government elections, it may tempt municipal councils to determine the boundaries based mostly on the results of elections in former polling districts. Concerning gender quotas, the authors pointed out doubts as to their compliance with several constitutional provisions. Constitutional and interpretative doubts also appear in relation to the provision requiring candidates to have no criminal convictions. Regulations concerning election campaigning are also criticized, showing lack of preciseness of the provisions the Code which may cause a lot of doubts in practice. Discussing the possibility of a two-day voting, the authors conclude that it is no inconsistent with Poland's constitution. They support the idea of correspondence voting for citizens staying abroad and introduction of a statutory basis for activities performed by international election observers. Finally, the authors conclude that the changes introduced in electoral law mostly result from the practice of its application and are of arranging nature; therefore they should rather be approved. However, there are provisions that should be considered as imperfectly prepared, which prove the continued existence of a tendency to treat electoral law as an instrument for political dominance.
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