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EN
The aim of the article is to present Marek Siemek’s interpretation of modernity, fo-cusing on problems related to understanding of the modern subject that arose (and still arise) from the reading of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. Siemek seems to endorse a general drive of Habermas’ theory of inter-subjective communication intended to overcome the dialectics of Enlightenment and to complete the project of modernity. However, his position is that its foundation can be traced back to the philosophies of Fichte and Hegel and their mutually complementary intersubjectivity models. Siemek seeks to reconcile the idea of the philosophy of inter-subjectivity underlying Fichte’s and Hegel’s philosophies with the tenets of the philo-sophy of consciousness.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2012
|
vol. 40
|
issue 4
25 - 48
EN
The paper is devoted to the interpretation of proposition 4.014 of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, which tackles „the…internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world”. Three different approaches to interpreting Wittgenstein’s early work are distinguished. First, there is a metaphysical approach in which the “internal relation” is to be understood as a substantial relation of isomorphism between language and the world. Secondly, there is an anti-metaphysical approach which denies that Wittgenstein intended to offer any explanation of how language connects with the world. In this account the “internal relation” does not have anything genuinely relational. It is only by using a sign with sense that both the logical form of a symbol and the logical form of what it signifies are simultaneously constituted. Thirdly, there is a so-called therapeutic interpretation in which observations on an internal relation, as well as the whole discourse referring to correspondence, are no more than a reflection of how we actually employ expressions and have nothing to do with the metaphysical problem of the relation between language and the world. The paper endorses the anti-metaphysical approach and elaborates its argument by resorting to the notion of “logical space” and including an interpretation of 1.13 (“The facts in logical space are the world”). It is argued that the concept of “the world” and, likewise, those of “fact” and “language”, are formal concepts which, as such, constitute conditions of all representation.
EN
The paper is devoted to the history of the notion of nihilism which was introduced to German philosophy in the 18th century by Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) as a critique of transcendental philosophy of Kant and Fichte. The Kantian subject and the Fichtean 'I' are both pure intellectual constructs that turn everything outside of themselves into nothing, which is why their theories are nihilism. In his critique of Kant and Fichte, Jacobi rejects the idea of philosophy as a science that deduces all its content from one subjective principle. Philosophy should be based on something what cannot be reduced to thought.
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