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MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM BY RICHARD HARE

100%
EN
Ethics of Richard M. Hare is widely considered as a classical example of the strong internalistic theory of motivation: he is thought to believe that having a moral motive is a sufficient condition to act accordingly. However, strong internalism has difficulties with explaining the phenomenon of acrasia and amoralism. For this reason some critics charge him with developing a false theory of moral motivation. In the article The author presents Hare's answer to these questions by dividing the discussion about motivation into three levels: semantical, epistemological, and ontological. He also explains his concept of internal motivation and argues that his theory, contrary to what his critics assume, may be called a weak motivational internalism.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2008
|
vol. 36
|
issue 1
27-47
EN
In this paper the author presents and criticizes the classical typology of metaethics, which is based on the distinction between cognitivism and noncognitivism. Using this typology, which emerged in the first half of the twentieth century, one cannot classify many contemporary metaethical position adequately. This is due to the fact that these concepts confuse the contents of four independent metaethical domain: semantics, epistemology, psychology and ontology of ethics. Therefore, he proposes an alternative typology, which respects this independence and is useful in contemporary debates. Additionally, he introduces the concept of quasi-cognitivism, which can grasp important aspects of the metaethical views of such philosophers as Richard Hare, Simon Blackburn, Allan Gibbard, Mark Timmons or Terry Horgan.
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