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XX
Okres drugiej wojny światowej jest niewątpliwie jednym z najważniejszych w dziejach norweskiej floty handlowej. Norweski fracht morski dzięki swemu zaangażowaniu w morskie transporty i płynącym stąd dochodom umożliwiał działalność norweskiego rządu na emigracji, a także, wobec niewielkich sił zbrojnych Norwegii, stanowił rzeczywisty wkład w działania wojenne Norwegów. Jednakże zanim tonaż ten dostał się pod zarząd norweskich władz państwowych, należało wpierw ochronić norweską flotę handlową przed zakusami nie tylko III Rzeszy, ale i aliantów. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie działań norweskich dyplomatów, a także rządu norweskiego, zmierzających do wprowadzenia norweskiej floty handlowej w służbę państwa norweskiego, a następnie aliantów. Omówiono więc założenie Nortraship, największej organizacji żeglugi morskiej podczas drugiej wojny światowej, wraz z towarzyszącymi temu przesłankami, oraz wydanie, jak i okoliczności przygotowania Tymczasowego rozporządzenia ze Stuguflåten, na mocy którego rząd norweski zarekwirował rodzimy fracht morski. Zasięg chronologiczny prezentowanej pracy obejmuje okres od 9 kwietnia 1940 r., a więc od niemieckiej agresji na Danię i Norwegię, do 26 kwietnia, czyli założenia norweskiej organizacji żeglugowej Nortraship.
EN
SummaryIn the interwar period the Norwegian merchant fleet was ranked fourth-sixth in the world. That is why Norway was an attractive economic partner for Poland, which in 1919 did not possess any merchant fleet. In the same year the Norwegian government sent to Poland an economic mission headed by Samuel Eyde, the Norwegian shipowners and their Union were represented by Thor Thoresen. Regrettably, at the beginning of the 1920s financial problems of Poland resulted in the lack of interest in operating the port of Gdańsk on the part of the Norwegian shipowners.In 1921 one of the biggest Norwegian shipowners, Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab (BDS), took up transporting herring to Gdańsk purchased within the so called second Polish-Norwegian Herring Contract. In the same year BDS set up a branch in Gdańsk, and in 1928 – in Gdynia, Bergenske Baltic Transport plc (‘Bergenske’ or BBT). In 1921 BDS set up a navigational line to the Baltic ports and London, and in 1931 – together with Det Stavangerske Dampskibsselskab – another line to the ports of western Norway. BDS participated in the creation of smaller shipping companies (Nord Ost-See Reederei A-G, Standard Line Reederei A-G, Bellmore Reederei A-G, Norna Reederei-Gesellschaft mbH). The BDS ships also sailed in the South-American line, Den Norske Syd-Amerikalinjen (SAL). Among the Norwegian shipowners the biggest line to Gdańsk and Gdynia was operated by Wilhelm Wilhelmsen (Gulf-Gdynia Line, GGL). Thanks to that line a huge quantities of American cotton were delivered to the ports of the Polish customs area. Navigational lines were operated also by Fred Olsen & CO. (a line to the ports of eastern Norway) and Gunstein Stray & Sønn (Vore-Line to Antwerp). The Norwegian shipowners in many cases used tramps, which dominated in Gdańsk, and so were they in Gdynia with the exception of the years 1934–1936. An essential element of the activity of BBT was broking and forwarding. BBT was one of the biggest brokers in Gdańsk and Gdynia. In addition, thanks to the fact that ‘Bergford’ Holz-Speditions und Lager GmbH and ‘Berghof’ Lager und Warrant GmbH remained in the same hands, BBT exported a large quantity of wood from Gdańsk. ‘Bergenske’ cooperated also with Polish forwarding companies, the Polish Lloyd and C. Hartwig. All those companies had branches in Poland and abroad, which enabled BBT to run complementary transport, i.e. using sea and land transport.
PL
W okresie dwudziestolecia międzywojennego norweska flota handlowa pod względem wielkości plasowała się na 4–6 miejscu na świecie. Z tych względów Norwegia była atrakcyjnym partnerem gospodarczym dla Polski, która w 1919 roku nie miała floty handlowej. W tym samym roku norweski rząd wysłał do Polski misję gospodarczą pod kierownictwem Samuela Eydego, a także z udziałem m.in. norweskiego armatora i reprezentanta Norweskiego Związku Armatorów – Thora Thoresena. Niestety na początku lat dwudziestych ubiegłego wieku problemy finansowe Polski spowodowały brak większego zainteresowania norweskich armatorów obsługą portu gdańskiego. W 1921 roku jeden z największych norweskich armatorów, Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab (BDS), zaangażował się w transporty śledzi do Gdańska zakupionych w ramach tzw. drugiej polsko-norweskiej umowy śledziowej. W tym samym roku BDS utworzyło filię w Gdańsku, a w 1928 roku w Gdyni – Bergenske Baltic Trasnport Ltd. („Bergenske” lub BBT). W 1921 roku BDS założył linię żeglugową do portów bałtyckich i Londynu, zaś w 1931 roku wraz ze Det Stavangerske Dampskibsselskab – linię do portów zachodnio-norweskich. BDS współtworzył również mniejsze przedsiębiorstwa żeglugowe (Nord Ost-See Reederei A.-G., Standard Line Reederei A.-G., Bellmore Reederei A.-G., Norna Reederei-Gesellschaft m.b.H.). Statki BDS uczestniczyły także w linii południowo-amerykańskiej linii żeglugowej – Den Norske Syd-Amerikalinjen (SAL). Spośród norweskich armatorów największą linię żeglugową do Gdańska i Gdyni utrzymywał Wilhelm Wilhelmsen (Gulf-Gdynia Line – GGL), dzięki której dostarczano do portów polskiego obszaru celnego duże ilości amerykańskiej bawełny. Linie żeglugowe utrzymywali również Fred Olsen & CO. (linia do wschodnich portów norweskich) oraz Gunstein Stray & Sønn (Vore-Line do Antwerpii). Norwescy armatorzy w wielu przypadkach korzystali z żeglugi trampowej (nieregularnej), która dominowała w Gdańsku, natomiast w Gdyni przeważała z wyjątkiem lat 1934–1936. Istotnym aspektem aktywności BBT była działalność maklerska oraz spedycyjna. BBT było jednym z największych maklerów w Gdańsku i Gdyni. Ponadto dzięki posiadaniu „Bergford” Holz-Speditions und Lager G.m.b.H. oraz „Berghof” Lager und Warrant G.m.b.H. eksportowało duże ilości drewna z Gdańska. „Bergenske” współpracowało także z polskimi firmami spedycyjnymi – Polski Lloyd SA i C. Hartwig SA. Wszystkie te firmy miały filie w Polsce i zagranicą, co pozwoliło BBT prowadzić transport komplementarny, a więc z użyciem transportu morskiego i lądowego.
EN
On the outbreak of the Second World War, Norway’s merchant marine was the fourth largest in the world with its gross register tonnage of 4,8 million. It played substantial role in the state economy as it generated more than one third of the national income in the balance of payments. Yet, the conflict put the Norwegian sea transport in a difficult situation as it dependent on the two warring nations, i.e. Great Britainand Hitler’s Third Reich. To make matters worse, any case of tipping the balance by the Norwegian fleet in a favour of any of the two belligerents might lead to the suspicion that Norwayhad departed from the policy of neutrality. Aware of its perplexing situation, the Norwegian government issued the Provisional decree on the regulation of the conditions of charter during the war, which effectively strengthened its control of the national merchant marine, thus laying sound foundation for a tonnage agreement withGreat Britain which was eventually signed on November 1939. On the strength of this agreement,Norway placed 150 tankers at the disposal of the allies and paved the way for further agreements of this kind. 
Zapiski Historyczne
|
2013
|
vol. 78
|
issue 4
119-143
EN
The Polish Society of Maritime Navigation “Sarmacja” S.A. in Warsaw was the first successful Polish shipping company in the Second Rzeczpospolita. The company was set up in 1919 when the former captain of the Austrian navy Bogumił Nowotny and representatives of the Bank of Lesser Poland and the Polish Commercial Society decided to establish a maritime shipping company in Cracow. Originally, in 1920, the company had one ship the Kraków at its disposal, but a year later, during a transshipment of Norwegian herring in the harbour of Gdańsk, it undertook cooperation with a Norwegian shipowner Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab and an English shipowner Walford Baltic Line Ltd. In 1921 both companies merged creating Bergenske & Walford Baltic Transports Line Ltd., thanks to which their cooperation with “Sarmacja” became even stronger. After the collapse of the English-Norwegian company in May 1922, a company called Bergenske Baltic Transports Ltd. based in Gdańsk was created; it owned 45% of “Sarmacja” shares. The Norwegian party, which had a casting vote in the Polish shipping company, started to run a policy of one-sided profi ts aiming at the elimination of the Polish competitor from the mouth of the Vistula river. “Sarmacja” had only 5 obsolete ships at its disposal, which gave rise to an inconvenient situation aggravated by a lack of possibility to establish regular shipping lines. The development of the Polish company did not take place even aft er the Ministry of Treasure had exempted it from paying revenue tax, industrial tax and property tax. Unfortunately, the company was liquidated in 1929 owing to the breakdown of the ship Wisła in 1926 and the fact that the Ministry of Industry and Commerce insisted that the role of Polish representatives in the board of the company should expand.
EN
Lloyd Bydgoski Inc. was the largest inland shipping company in Poland during the interwar period. It was established in 1891 on the foundations of a pre-existing German shipping company. After the end of the First World War, the development of the company accelerated through the use of the Bydgoszcz Canal and the timber port in Bydgoszcz. However, the transition from Prussian jurisdiction to the re-established Polish state caused considerable problems for the company. The aim of this article is to analyse and evaluate the management policy of Lloyd Bydgoski Inc. under new conditions, namely in the Second Polish Republic. As it turned out, almost throughout the entire interwar period, the company from Bydgoszcz was in serious financial trouble, which cannot be entirely accounted for by the world economic crisis of 1929–1933. This raises the question about the purpose of the company’s activity in the face of considerable financial losses. To conduct the analysis, various archival documents kept in the Central Archives of Modern Records in Warsaw and in the State Archives in Bydgoszcz, which have not been given sufficient consideration so far, were studied. It has been proven that the management of Lloyd Bydgoski Inc. took the right steps in the years 1926–1929, that is the only period when the company made a profit. The company from Bydgoszcz was forced to face two economic crises: global and internal. The latter was caused by incompetence and wastefulness on the part of the company’s management. The company survived until the outbreak of the Second World War. Unfortunately, the decline in importance of the Bydgoszcz Canal and Bydgoszcz itself in favour of Toruń meant that Lloyd Bydgoski Inc. did not manage to regain its former significance during the interwar period.
EN
The Norwegian merchant shipping, which at the beginning of World War II measured 4.8 million GRT, occupied the fourth place in the world ranking. When the Germans invaded Norway as many as four bodies attempted to keep the Norwegian merchant shipping for their own use. They were: the Norwegian government, the British government, a group of Norwegian diplomats conducting activities outside Norway (particularly diplomats residing in London and Stockholm), and the authorities of the third Reich. The fact that Norway possessed a significant tonnage of modern tankers was of great importance to countries fighting in WW II. Erik Andreas Colban, a Norwegian diplomat in London, made the greatest effort to protect the Norwegian merchant shipping against the British and Germans. A Norwegian shipowner, Ingolf Hysing Olsen, joined him and both of them started a very close cooperation with the British authorities. Both E. A. Colban and I. Hysing Olsen worked to guarantee the Norwegian flag for native ships and to establish the Norwegian navigational organization which would play the role of headquarters for the Norwegian sea freight. Eventually, on 26 April 1940 such a sea association was set up and it was called the Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission, known also as Nortraship. At the same time, the Norwegian government, escaping to the north of Norway, started significant actions in favour of the Norwegian freight, which led to issuing the Temporary Order of Stuguflåt, thanks to which the Norwegian government commandeered all Norwegian ships with the cargo capacity over 500 GRT, and it decided to establish a Norwegian navigational organization in London with Øivind Lorentz as its head. Øivind Lorentz, who had all the government’s instructions and letters of authorization, went together with his staff to London, where he found Nortraship already thriving.
EN
The article presents the recommendations of Jan Amos Komenský, with special emphasis placed on moral teachings for the residents of Leszno during an epidemic in 1631, included in his work Zprávakratičká o mornímnakažení, published in 1632.
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