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EN
The paper aims at outlining the EU policy – including Poland’s role in its development – towards the Union’s eastern neighbours encompassed by the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership. The situation of the EU’s eastern neighbours has become considerably complicated in the last two years (2014-2015). The Euromaidan revolution and war in the Donbas have led the EU Member States to direct their efforts towards stabilising the situation in Ukraine. As a consequence, discussions of future prospects and the EU policy towards Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus have been set aside. In addition, wars and conflicts occurring in the south of Europe along with the immigrants flooding southern EU Member States have led to the eastern neighbours and their problems being neglected (despite the fact that Ukraine is engulfed in war).
PL
W niniejszym artykule podjęto próbę spojrzenia – w sposób bardzo ogólny – na sytuację państw Partnerstwa Wschodniego (PW) Unii Europejskiej w warunkach trwającego na Ukrainie konfliktu zbrojnego (inaczej tzw. kryzysu ukraińskiego). Konflikt zbrojny trwający na Ukrainie powoduje, że zmianie uległa nie tylko sytuacja geopolityczna Europy Wschodniej, ale również warunki, w jakich realizowana jest polityka wschodnia Unii Europejskiej. Dość często Partnerstwo Wschodnie postrzegane jest jako polityka mało skuteczna, a nawet polityka, która straciła rację bytu. Pojawiają się też opinie o upadku projektu PW. Czy na pewno możemy mówić, że projekt PW nie spełnił oczekiwań? Czy działania Rosji wobec państw PW przyczynią się do tego, że osiągnięcie celów PW będzie niemożliwe? Unia Europejska w 2017 roku obchodzi 60-lecie bezprecedensowego wydarzenia w dziejach Europy – podpisania Traktatów Rzymskich. Należy jednak pamiętać, że UE boryka się z szeregiem trudności (w szczególności z kryzysem migracyjnym) oraz Brexitem. Czy w takich warunkach Wspólnota będzie w stanie myśleć o państwach PW? Czy Polska – wspierana przez państwa Grupy Wyszehradzkiej (V4) – będzie w stanie przekonać państwa członkowskie UE do aktywnego zaangażowania się w sprawy Wschodu?
EN
The present paper constitutes a general review of the situation the European Union’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries are in with regards to the armed conflict in Ukraine (the so-called Ukrainian crisis). The conflict results in geopolitical changes in Eastern Europe, but also influences conditions the European Union’s eastern policy is implemented in. The Eastern Partnership is quite frequently considered an inefficient policy. Some go as far as to claim it has lost its raison d'etre. Observations claiming a decline of the EaP project are also made. Is it really true that the EaP project has failed to meet its objectives? Will Russia’s actions towards EaP states prevent the objectives from being reached? In 2017, the European Union celebrates the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, which is unprecedented in the history of the continent. However, the fact that the EU is struggling with a series of crises (migration crisis in particular) and Brexit, cannot be forgotten. Will the EU be able to consider the position of EaP states in such a predicament? Will Poland, supported by the countries of the Visegrad Group (the V4), be able to convince EU member states to become actively involved in the matters of the East?
EN
Eastern Europe (especially Ukraine) struggles with a significant number of problems, both internal and external in character. Euromaidan in Ukraine complicated the situation of the country even further. Some researchers believe the aftermath of Euromaidan sent the strongest shockwave since the fall of the USSR. In addition, the conflict results in geopolitical changes in Eastern Europe, but also infl uences conditions the European Union’s eastern policy is implemented in. The Eastern Partnership (EaP) is quite frequently considered an ineffi cient policy. Some go as far as to claim it has lost its raison d’etre. Observations claiming a decline of the EaP project are also made. Is it really true that the EaP project has failed to meet its objectives? The present paper constitutes a general review of the situation the European Union’s Eastern Partnership countries are in with regards to the armed conflict in Ukraine (the so-called Ukrainian crisis). The paper attempts to offers answers to the following questions: Will the EU be able to consider the position of EaP states in such a predicament? Will Poland, supported by the countries of the Visegrad Group (the V4), be able to convince EU member states to become actively involved in the matters of the East? Will Russia’s actions towards EaP states prevent the objectives from being reached?
EN
International public opinion, especially European one, is focused on the issue of migrants reaching Europe from the Near East. Due to the scale of migration, southern neighborhood draws attention of decision-makers and the public of individual EU member states. For some countries, the number of migrants has become a problem of social nature (e.g. approximately a million migrants reaching Germany in 2015). However, the fact that a war rages on in Donbas, right beyond the EU’s eastern border, cannot be disregarded as the conflict fosters further migration problems (internal and international migration). Russo-Ukrainian conflict in Donbas has changed the perception of Ukraine’s internal situation. The conflict pertains not only to the issue of hard security (e.g. military capabilities), but touches upon soft security as well i.e. in this case, the issue of migration (both international, and one associated with Internally Displaced Persons, IDPs). It is noteworthy that events of the Euromaidan revolution resulted in one of the more violent transformations, not only in the post-Soviet space, but also continental Europe. In addition, Russia’s destabilization of eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea undeniably constitute the greatest European security crisis since the Balkan war of 1990s. Undeniably, when faced with economic, military and social problems (e.g. IDPs), Ukraine will not be able to manage the situation on its own without external financial aid.
EN
The objective of the present paper is to discuss the Three Seas Initiative (TSI) as a project in statu nascendi. The TSI aims to tighten the cooperation of states located between the Baltic, the Black, and the Adriatic seas. The initiative was inaugurated during the Dubrovnik summit (Croatia) in August 2016. The TSI encompasses EU member states. The second summit was held in Warsaw on 6th May 2017. In 2018, the third summit will be held in Romania. The paper will outline objectives the initiative aims to achieve and its determinants. Subsequently, challenges and threats for the EU associated with the initiative will be discussed. Will the TSI fall hostage to thinking in geopolitical categories, or will it constitute a new model of regional cooperation?
EN
The paper analyses the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian confl ict from the point of view of the struggle for remembrance and identity between two post-Soviet states. Will the war of the brotherly nations wreck Russia’s long-term policy towards Ukraine? Will the confl ict ruin Russia’s plans of post-Soviet space reintegration whose pivot is set on Ukraine? Will the war stimulate Ukraine to deal with the issue of its identity, post-Soviet legacy and collective memory? Ukrainian crisis is also a challenge for the transformation of Ukraine’s political system. The relations between Ukraine and Russia are extremely complex as they are built on a shared history, religion, language and culture and they should not be gauged with Western standards. Evaluating the current situation from a broader perspective, the fact that Ukraine plays a signifi cant role in Russia’s foreign policy needs to be emphasised. Ukraine is considered as the key post-Soviet state, a significant ‘near abroad’ country whose position, potential and geopolitical location are vital for the balance of power in both Eastern Europe and Europe in general.
EN
When public protests broke out in Ukraine towards the end of 2013, it seemed that these were doomed to fail. The aftermath of Orange Revolution of 2004/2005 did not offer hope for a change of political situation in Ukraine. However, it turned out that the Euromaidan, as opposed to previous events associated with the Orange Revolution, led to a geopolitical shift in Ukraine and a broader change in international order in Europe. Russia annexed Crimea and the Donbas confl ict broke out. This essay analyses and discusses the Russo-Ukrainian armed conflict in light of peace talks conducted by the sides of the confl ict and international organizations, e.g. OSCE, involved in the process. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the peace process has not been completed and war still rages on in south-eastern Ukraine despite the Minsk Agreements having been negotiated. Negotiation process itself was not of chief concern. Primarily, this paper demonstrates results of peace talks and indicates critical problems with the implementation of the agreements (Geneva, Minsk 1, and Minsk 2 agreements). It seems that, most probably, status quo will be maintained in Donbas, which is unfavorable to Ukraine, Donbas and Russia.
EN
When viewing the geopolitical map of the world, the fact that, in 2017, there exist several areas where conflicting interests of superpowers clash, can be observed. These areas include e.g. Syria and Ukraine. As far as Russia’s and the EU’s confl icting interests are concerned, the area of common neighborhood constitutes the greatest challenge for both sides. The present paper examines the situation of eastern neighborhood countries, which can be labeled as the area contested by the EU and Russia. Another term which may be applied to the region the EU and Russia compete for is the contested neighborhood. The neighborhood encompasses six post-Soviet states located on the one hand between the EU and NATO, and Russia on the other. These states encompass Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine in Eastern Europe, and Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in South Caucasus. The discussion of the competition will be limited in time to the 21st century, especially to the period following the outbreak of the armed confl ict in Donbas between Ukraine and Russia (officially Donbas separatists supported by Russia), and the signifi cance of the conflict for the region. Individual sections of the paper will present the specific character of the EU and Russia’s common neighborhood, and soft and hard power applied by both superpowers. Furthermore, results of the competition of the powers in eastern neighborhood in the form of events of 2014, i.e. the Euromaidan and annexation of Crimea by Russia in particular, will be discussed.
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The aim of the present paper is an attempt at viewing the European Union’s and Russia’s policies towards Ukraine from the perspective of crises experienced by the country and the whole area of Eastern Europe, as well as regarding the issue of security. Russia – Ukraine war drives EU decision-makers into focusing merely on stabilization of the eastern neighbourhood. On the other hand, Russia destabilises the internal situation in Ukraine and eastern neighbourhood of the EU by supporting Donetsk and Luhansk separatisms. Eastern Europe is a neighbourhood mutually shared by the EU and Russia. As a consequence, the area is vitally important for Russia and, to a lesser degree, significant for the EU. The analysis will encompass the consideration of the following research questions: Will the Ukrainian crisis result in a change of geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe? Will Ukraine become an unstable area, an area experiencing a next “suspended conflict”? Has Russia’s policy towards Ukraine reached its objectives? Is the current EU policy a token of EU decision-makers’ lack of vision as regards the prospective EU-Eastern Partnership countries’ (especially Ukraine) relations?
EN
The analysis of Ukraine’s dysfunction and dependence, both in national and international dimension, presents a clear picture that the dilemma of whether we are faced with a consolidation of a truly liberal democracy or its non-liberal (hybrid) variety, is still valid. Debates in political sciences are dominated by the view that independent Ukraine ought to be considered a specific case of the so-called “hybrid state”. Such countries are characterized by stagnation, corruption, and a dominant position of elites, who offer few benefits to the state and have little public support. In addition, the following are clearly visible in Ukraine: little representation of public interests by state institutions; little political involvement of the society and little social activity in between elections; no respect for regulations of the state under the rule of the law; little public legitimization in elections; little public trust in state institutions/the institution of the state; inadequate operation of the state in general. Therefore, the fact that transformation processes which have been emerging in Ukraine, ought not be considered linear, should be acknowledged. Consequently, describing the character of these processes in view of their complexity and multidimensionality seems more relevant.
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EN
The paper aims at presenting determinants and instruments applied by Russia in its hybrid war against Ukraine. The aspect of information warfare will be emphasised in particular. This aspect seems significant due to the fact that Russia launched a wide scale and wellplanned information war in its struggle for power in Ukraine. As a consequence of information space in Ukraine not being consolidated around one particular entity (as opposed to the space in Russia), the war applies tools characteristic for propaganda and derives from models set by the Soviet propaganda. By means of diverse instruments, Russia moulds the image of the great Russia which looks after Russians, and manipulates information, creates false facts and draws on myths lingering in the consciousness of the post-soviet states. Russia plots, very much like Soviet Union did, a conspiracy theory accusing the West of being the origin of all cultural, economic and political threats.
EN
The objective of the present paper is to define the determinants and instruments associated with the information (hybrid) war between Russia and Ukraine. The paper focuses on measures taken by Russia, between 2013 and 2015, in relation to Ukraine. The paper does not aspire to discuss the issue comprehensively, but constitutes an attempt at outlining the problem, indicating determinants and characteristics of the information war (information war as an element of hybrid warfare). The consolidated Russian information space is subordinated to the interests of authorities and draws heavily from the tools characteristic for propaganda, frequently relying upon the Soviet model. In addition, this is done with the view of re-establishing the “Russian World” (Русский мир), which would be wholly subject to Russia’s political interests. Moreover, Russian propaganda goes hand in hand with military actions – a conventional conflict in South-Eastern Ukraine.
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