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PL
W artykule przedstawiono stanowisko obozu „zamkowego” na emigracji (prezydenta, rządu i Rady RP) wobec wydarzeń w Polsce i bloku komunistycznym w 1956 r. „Zamkowi” politycy i publicyści dostrzegając pewne zmiany w kraju nie liczyli, że doprowadzą one do zmian zasadniczych. Dominował pogląd, że Polska nie jest państwem niepodległym, że okupacja sowiecka trwa nadal. Głosząc postulaty maksymalne (niepodległość, przywrócenie przedwojennej granicy na wschodzie) nie wiązali wielkich nadziei z ewolucyjną drogą zmian. Stawiali na obalenie, a nie na liberalizację systemu komunistycznego w Polsce i pozostałych krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. Uważali się za rzecznika interesów Polski, pozbawionej suwerenności i możliwości wyrażania własnej woli. Mimo ofiarności, zaangażowania i oddania sprawie nie mieli jednak możliwości efektywnego działania, nie zdołali wywrzeć bezpośredniego wpływu na wydarzenia w Polsce, a tym bardziej na sytuację międzynarodową. To raczej wydarzenia nad Wisłą stały się pośrednim impulsem do ożywienia prac rządu RP na uchodźstwie. Brak kontaktów z krajem, polityczna marginalizacja na arenie międzynarodowej i wewnętrzne spory sprawiły, że emigranci nie przygotowali realnego planu wyzwolenia Polski. W przeciwieństwie do innych ośrodków na emigracji (Radio Wolna Europa czy „Kultura”), „zamkowi” politycy odcięci od Polski i zrażeni wcześniejszymi doświadczeniami swoich oponentów z Rady Politycznej (sprawa Bergu) nie szukali kontaktów z krajem, mając także mniejsze pod tym względem możliwości finansowe i organizacyjne. Zachowując niezłomną postawę nie widzieli możliwości jakiegokolwiek kompromisu z władzami PRL. Czekali raczej na zmianę ogólnego położenia międzynarodowego. Próbowali też zainteresować (choć bezskutecznie) zachodnie rządy i międzynarodową opinię publiczna sprawą polską.
EN
Waldemar Sobczyk and Nasz Znak – Sabotage in the People’s/Peasants’ Movement Abroad In 1956 Sobczyk was recruited for cooperation with the intelligence of the People’s Republic of Poland (Polska Republika Ludowa, PRL). The secret service began subsidizing Nasz Znak, which changed its political profile. It criticized the policy of the government-in-exile, advocated cooperation between the govern- ment-in-exile and the country and praised the communist rule in Poland. The secret service’s activities intensified the controversies in the PSL and weakened its chairman’s position. Mikołajczyk became Nasz Znak’s public enemy no. 1. In the early 1960s the paper supported the initiative to create an organization competitive toward the PSL put forward by the activists expelled from the party by Mikołajczyk. Anti-Vatican, anticlerical and anti-German accents became a constant feature of the monthly. Consequently, in 1957 Sobczyk was excluded from the party. Suspected of spying for the People’s Republic of Poland intelligence, he was detained and investigated on several occasions by the Swedish police. Tadeusz Rozmanit, Henryk Polowiec or Klaudiusz Hrabyk were just a few authors who contributed to Nasz Znak apart from Sobczyk. In the mid 1960s, when the PSL chairman’s political activity subsided, the intelligence heads began to consider gradual liquidation of Nasz Znak. The paper aimed mostly at discrediting Mikołajczyk and destroying the people’s movement abroad ceased to be useful. The escape to the West of lieutenant colonel Janusz Kochański, who a few years earlier maintained contact with the agent, also contributed to the termination of the cooperation with Sobczyk. The last issue of Nasz Znak went out in 1967. Despite the termination of the cooperation he still tried to maintain contact with the PRL intelligence. He left for FRG in 1970 where he has lived ever since.
EN
The liberalization of the communist system in mid-1950s, disillusionment with the policy of the West, fears connected with West German revisionism, and dwindling chances of change in the situation of Central-Eastern Europe contributed to a differentiation of attitudes among the Polish emigrants. Some of them, notably the nationalists, voiced the need to seek compromise with Russia. This led to the emergence of a pro-Russian option alongside the still dominant pro-Western one. The thesis on the need of an alliance with Russia was propagated by Jędrzej Giertych in his journalism in the “Horyzonty” monthly published in Paris. This ideologically committed opponent of communism and a staunch Catholic was at the same time an ardent champion of an alliance with Russia, which in those circumstances meant an alliance with the Soviet Union, but he did not see it as a contradiction. He claimed that the biggest threat for Poland was Germany supported by the West. He hoped that in appreciation of sincere friendship and loyalty, Russia would restore to Poland the cities of Lvov and Vilnius. For him, alliance with the eastern neighbor was not of a temporary or tactical nature. Giertych consistently repeated that Russia was Poland’s natural ally, and Poland was Russia’s natural ally. Cooperation between the two countries was to be cemented by the Chinese threat.
EN
The article presents the attitude of Polish political emigration towards fi rst parliamentary election held in Poland after World War II. The election caused discussions in emigration press. The Polish government in exile did not hoped for any change of political situation in country after elections conducted under communist rule. Most of the political parties in exile took similar position. In the opinion of the emigrants a truly free election could be conducted under international supervision and after the withdrawal of Soviet troops and removal from power dominated by communists Provisional Government of National Unity.
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