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EN
The author presents an argument in favour of Durkheimian – Saussurian theory of „social fact” as applied to language. The argument consists in pointing out two examples of morphological facts of Polish that are not easily accessible to native speakers and have not been explicitly verbalized, but are nonetheless invariably and rigorously implemented by all of them in their linguistic practice. This shows that the regularities are superimposed on them in a strongly anti-individualistic way. The first fact can be illustrated with the sequence walka ze zorganizowaną przestępczością ‘struggle of its being followed by the adjacent segment beginning in z + V (rather than by a cluster of consonants beginning in a frontal fricative). Polish has created an analogon of the necessary separation of the prepositions z and w from their right-hand syllabic homophonic partner in the adjacent context. The nature of the analogon can be described in the following way: we have to do with strict functional proportional separability of the right-hand non-syllabic homophonic partner of the preposition, on the one hand, and the rest of the expression the partner belongs to. Here is an example of such a proportion: zorganizowany : organizowany :: zoperowany : operowany. The second fact can be illustrated with the present tense form dozbierywuje (vs. * dozbieruje) of the verb dozbierywać. This shape manifests a strict parallelism with regard to the imperfective forms in -liwać, -liwuje, vs. * -luje, cf. rozstrzelać – rozstrzeliwać – rozstrzeliwuje. Both main spirants, [l] and [r], go here hand in hand. However, there is an additional regularity in play. The point is that the shape -r-ywuje depends on the presence of the preceding sequence which contains a root vowel, cf. przeorać – przeorywać – przeorywuje (here, the vowel is [o]). If this condition is not met, the final -uje does not appear; instead, next to -r-yw- regular endings of the main conjugation of verbs in -ać are used; thus, we have -a in the 3rd person sg, -am in the 1st person sg, and so on, cf.: przegrać – przegrywać – przegrywa – przegrywam.
PL
Twórczość światowej sławy lingwistki Anny Wierzbickiej niesie w sobie znaczny potencjał nowych idei, a zarazem dotyka konkretnego materiału wielu różnych języków. Do języków, które analizuje Wierzbicka, należy również język polski. Idee zawarte w jej pracach odnoszą się bezpośrednio do kontrowersji wokół tzw. hipotezy Sapira–Whorfa. Poza przedstawieniem zasadniczego stanowiska Wierzbickiej wobec tej hipotezy, autor artykułu wskazuje na jej różne prace istotne z tego punktu widzenia. Na koniec proponuje własną ocenę ujęcia Wierzbickiej oraz uzasadnienie tej oceny. Według autora Wierzbicka nawiązując do obserwacji i myśli z różnorakich tradycji refleksji nad językami w ich stosunku do umysłu i kultury uchwyciła zasadnicze rysy owych relacji. Po pierwsze to, że mówiąc tak, jak nakazują różne konkretne wspólnoty, żyjemy w sposób bardziej różny niż wynikałoby to li tylko z różnic dźwiękowych oraz różnic linearnego uporządkowania wykładników pojęć. Po drugie zaś, honoruje to, że każdy człowiek może się nauczyć dowolnego języka. Bo każdy język w ostateczności opiera się na identycznym zestawie wciąż powracających pojęć nieredukowalnych, wszędzie znajdujących swe proste wykładniki. Takie podejście autor nazywa „lingwistycznym relatywizmem względnym”, tzn. „relatywizmem w określonej ramie absolutystycznej”. Ważnym składnikiem koncepcji Wierzbickiej jest kategoryczne odrzucenie whorfianizmu w jego skrajnej wersji, a więc rewindykacja uniwersalizmu ludzkiego umysłu.
EN
The work of the world-renowned linguist Anna Wierzbicka bears a great potential for new ideas, and – at the same time – pertains to concrete examples in many different languages. Polish is also one of the languages that are examined by Wierzbicka. The ideas contained in her work refer directly to the controversy around the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Apart from the presentation of Wierzbicka’s stance on the hypothesis in question, the author of the present article points to her various texts that are significant from the point of view of this principle. As a conclusion of this article, the author suggests his own assessment of Wierzbicka’s perspective and provides the justification for this assessment. According to the author, Wierzbicka, when alluding to observations and ideas that come from various traditions of thought concerning languages in relation to mind and culture, captures the underlying features of these relations. First of all, she notices the fact that although we speak in a way it is dictated by various concrete communities, our lives are far more diversified than it might follow from phonological differences or differences in the linear structuring of the markers of notions only. Secondly, she accepts the fact that every man can learn any language. This is because every language is based ultimately on ever-recurring semantic primitives that are universally expressed in every language. The author calls such an approach ‘qualified linguistic relativity’ [lingwistyczny relatywizm względny, lit. relative linguistic relativity], that is ‘relativity within a specified absolute framework’. A categorical rejection of Whorfianism in its strong form is an important element of Wierzbicka’s idea, which constitutes a return to the idea of universality of human mind.
EN
The author, first, reminds the Reader of the main points of Leon Zawadowski's scholarly career, second, calls the Reader's attention to some of the principal linguistic-theoretical tenets of his works, third, offers an outline of certain events in his pedagogical activity, in particular, as a visiting professor in Warsaw (in the mid-sixties), fourth, presents personal reminiscenses of encounters with Zawadowski at, roughly, the same time, and reports on certain facts concerning the influence that Zawadowski's writing had on his own work in the fifties and sixties. The remarks on Zawadowski's contribution on the theory of language encompass: a short presentation of the fundamental linguistic-theoretical ideas outlined by Zawadowski, a high appraisal of the weight and style of his work, and a comparison of his theoretical approach with that of Wittgenstein as the author of the Tractatus, as well as with de Saussure's works. Both Wittgenstein and Zawadowski are classed among proponents of the knowledge-centered logocentrism in the theory of language (which is a position the author endorses), as opposed to de Saussure's and the later several claims made by Zawadowski, in particular, on account of his claim of the necessity of a unilateral approach to so-called "linguistic signs" in its contrast to de Saussure'a and Wittgenstein's ideas of the primordial status of bilateral units of language (as emerging from Martinet's "first level of (linguistic) articulation").
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EN
The author reflects upon a possible empirical interpretation of Wittgenstein's well known thesis 7 in his Tractatus, as applied to some problems encountered when dealing with TRS. The most general idea is that TRS is what 'shows', in Wittgenstein's sense, rather than what can be rendered in terms of words; the reason being the threatening infinite regress behind any attempt at reducing the phenomena of TRS to primitive concepts as represented by definite segmental units. Subsequently, the author touches upon certain more specific themes in the relevant domain. One of them is the problem of how to account for non-restrictive attributes or "appositions". The author stresses the fact that they do not yield to interpretation in terms of something p such that 'speaker said that p'. Another issue is that of an adequate interpretation of 'I'. The author shows irreparable inadequacies inherent in Wierzbicka's as well as in his own (previous) accounts of 'I'. According to his new proposal, 'I' is equivalent to 'someone' with the first subscript (in an arbitrary list of subscripts) appended to the organism / body of the current speaker; the latter just shows in Wittgenstein's sense.
EN
The author recalls the controversy over the definability or indefinability of he concept of knowledge, more exactly, of the concept 'knows that', and presents a catalogue of arguments in favour of its indefinability. The main part of the article is a critical discussion of T. Ciecierski's (2013) view of what he calls "nastawienia sądzeniowe" (roughly, "belief attitudes") as being based on what he is prepared to dub an "elementary" truth, viz. the would-be truth of the claim that 'know that' is doxastically definable.
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