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IS FREEDOM WITHOUT FREE WILL POSSIBLE? (Czy mozliwa jest wolnosc bez wolnej woli?)

100%
Gut P.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2008
|
issue 8
345-47
EN
The main aim of this presents paper is to critically explore the view according to which an understanding and grasping of freedom is possible in the absence of free will. In the first part the author puts forward crucial reasons on which the tendency to postulate freedom of man without free will is based. In the second part the links existing between notions of freedom and knowledge are considered. The third part of this paper deals with the difficulties that the theory of freedom without free will faces in confronted with.
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THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN FREEDOM ACCORDING TO LEIBNIZ

100%
Gut P.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2005
|
issue 2
53-72
EN
The article concerns the fundamental metaphysical problem of human freedom as it is discussed in Leibniz's philosophy. The essence of it can be expressed as follows: in what way the determinism developed by Leibniz goes along with his doctrine of human freedom in action? The article is divided into two parts. The first part contains analysis of Leibniz's theses encapsulating his determinism and those concerning his concept of freedom. The second part points to some major difficulties resulting from Leibniz's view. Leibniz starts with the conviction that there is no contradiction between the two following theses: 1) at least some human actions are performed freely (i.e. the agent might have done otherwise than in fact he did) ; and 2) each action has a reason which is known beforehand and this is the reason why the action is undertaken rather than not. This view was justified by Leibniz by means of (1) introducing divisions and distinctions between modalities, (2) by laying the stress on teleological determinism, and (3) by arguments in favour of the thesis that the world exists contingently. The analysis carried out in the second part demonstrates that Leibniz's view leads to some difficulties. Two of them are of great significance: a) the relationship between freedom and Inter-World Identity of the agent, and b) seemingly unavoidable link between freedom and indeterminism. Both these problems result from the fact that Leibniz's idea of freedom was based on his strong concept of individuality, and from universal analyticity of truth.
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