Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 19

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

WAR OF ATTRITION IN THE MIDDLE, 1969 - 1970

100%
Sorby K. R.
Asian and African Studies
|
2017
|
vol. 26
|
issue 1
127 – 147
EN
After the June War of 1967 the issue at stake was the return of territories occupied by Israel. The purposely ambiguous UN Resolution 242 became a controversial issue as each party stressed another part of the resolution. As the Israelis refused the equation “land for peace” and the withdrawal from all territories, the Arab states at Khartoum decided to adopt a unified position. The Arab states agreed to unify efforts to “eliminate the effects of aggression” – not eliminate Israel. Although they pledged not to negotiate with Israel, they looked to the superpowers – the USA and USSR – to resolve the dispute. The USA was all too willing to sit back and wait for the Arab states to come around. After all, the Arab States wanted their land back and all they had to do to get it back was to sign peace treaties with Israel. To re-engage the Americans, Egypt engaged Israel in the so-called War of Attrition artillery duels and aerial dogfights across the Suez Canal (solely within its own occupied territory). The US Department of State made an attempt to break the impasse announcing the Rogers Plan in December 1969. Both sides at first turned down the plan, but the escalation of war during the first half of 1970 and the threat of superpower involvement may have changed the situation. In July 1970 Egypt and Israel accepted the Rogers Plan.
2

ANWAR AS-SĀDĀT USHERS IN A NEW ERA IN SOVIET-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS, 1970 – 1971

100%
Sorby K. R.
Asian and African Studies
|
2021
|
vol. 30
|
issue 1
75 - 96
EN
The choice of Anwar as-Sādāt as a President of Egypt was confirmed by plebiscite on the 15th October 1970. His era marked a radical shift in the underlying aims of Egypt’s internal and external policies. In order to understand the nature of the goals, means and style of Sadat’s policy, with its consequences for Soviet-Egyptian relations, it is necessary to focus on his perception of international and regional politics, including, for example, the moves of the superpowers towards détente, the military balance between Israel and the Arab countries; and competition within the Arab world. Anwar as-Sādāt had his own methods of manipulating the constraints on Egypt and using his capabilities in developing foreign policy at the local, regional and global levels.
3

IRAQ - THE LAST PHASE OF ABDALKARIM QAASIM'S REGIME

100%
Sorby K. R.
Asian and African Studies
|
2008
|
vol. 17
|
issue 1
17-39
EN
The foreign policy of Iraq during the regime of Abdalkarim Qaasim was basically governed by the same forces that shaped the policy of the ancient regime and that consisted in the main in asserting Iraq's independence. The leading forces of the Iraqi monarchy could naturally see the value of Arab solidarity but they also appreciated the common interests with Iraq's non-Arab neighbours, Turkey and Iran. Obviously, the principal error was in over-stressing those interests at the expense of Arab solidarity at a time when pan-Arab excitement had reached a high pitch, and in ignoring the drive towards neutralism which had dominated the Arab world, in which 'Iraq remained the committed oasis in a vast neutralist desert'. The critics of such a policy stated that Iraq's need for weapons and technical know-how could be obtained from other powers and not only from the West, and adherence to Arab solidarity would provide the necessary strength. It is clear that the opposition to the ancient regime originated mainly from domestic issues, but it concentrated on foreign policy because it conflicted with an ideology that had become predominant in Arab politics.
4

LEBANON DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF SHARIL EULW (1964 – 1970)

100%
Sorby K. R.
Asian and African Studies
|
2012
|
vol. 21
|
issue 1
86 – 105
EN
The relative calm of the regime of Fu’ad Shihab (Fouad Chehab) began to wither away during the presidential term of his successor Sharil Eulw (Charles Eelou). In many respects the new regime was supposed to be a continuation of the former one. Political, social and economic reforms were carried out as specified under the regime of Fu’ad Shihab. More important, the role of the army and its Deuxieme Bureau in decision-making remained intact and a hard-liner Shihabist, Ilyas Sarkis, wielded great power as the head of the presidential bureau. The new regime provided a convincing argument that not even Shihabist policies were capable of ameliorating Lebanon’s inherent problems. These problems were structural and could not be solved by reforms. Furthermore, these reforms interfered with the confessional arrangements in the political system and were not easy to implement at a time of relative calm in the region. When major disturbances such as the June 1967 war, began to occur in the area, even these innocuous reforms became unacceptable to the traditional and sectarian forces in the country.
5

BRITAIN’S EFFORT TO CONTINUE ITS TUTELAGE OF EGYPT AFTER THE WW II, 1945 – 1947

100%
Sorby K. R.
Asian and African Studies
|
2018
|
vol. 27
|
issue 2
125 – 142
EN
In May 1945, when WW II ended, in Egypt a long-pent-up flood of nationalist sentiment became apparent. Not only the Egyptian politicians, but the public as well felt that Britain should at last leave Egypt entirely and accept the unity of the Nile Valley (Egypt and Sudan). Instead Britain was trying to bring pressure on Egypt to join a Western defence pact, while British troops remained on Egyptian soil as a constant provocation to the wishes of the Egyptians. Against a background of anti-British upheaval, the labour foreign secretary Ernest Bevin accepted the principle of total British withdrawal from Egypt, despite bitter attacks from the conservative opposition led by Winston Churchill. However, the opportunity for a settlement collapsed over Sudan. The British government had not accepted the notion of Egyptian-Sudanese unity because the British military held that, in the event of a withdrawal from Egypt, it was even more essential to retain control of Sudan.
6

THE 14th RAMAAN COUP IN IRAQ

100%
Sorby K. R.
Asian and African Studies
|
2008
|
vol. 17
|
issue 2
155 - 178
EN
The 14th Ramaan 1382 (8th February 1963) coup that finally put an end to the regime of Abdalkarim Qasim came from the Arab nationalist quarter; no other element in the political spectrum was prepared to undertake the task. The Communists and the left still tacitly supported Abdalkarim Qasim, and in any event they had too little support in the army officer corps. The Kurds had weakened the fighting capacity of the army, but they were in no position to overthrow the regime by themselves. However, there was no real unity of purpose among Arab nationalists beyond their common desire to be rid of the 'Sole Leader' (az-Zaim al-Awad) and to reorient foreign policy toward some kind of union with other Arab countries. This action was no palace coup. The Bathists and their nationalist allies only succeeded in gaining control of the government after a day of fierce fighting with the defenders of the regime, which cost hundreds of lives. At last the rebel forces broke through into the Ministry of Defence compound, capturing Abdalkarum Qasim and his colleagues on 9 February. They were immediately brought before a tribunal of Bathist and pan-Arab officers, sentenced to death and summarily shot.
7

THE SEPARATIST PERIOD IN SYRIA, 1961- 1963

100%
Sorby K. R.
Asian and African Studies
|
2009
|
vol. 18
|
issue 2
145-168
EN
On 28 September 1961 a group of Syrian army officers rebelled and announced Syria's secession from the United Arab Republic. A new government was hastily formed from conservative (reactionary) Syrian politicians. Jamal Abdannaoir initially contemplated intervening, but changed his mind when all resistance rapidly faded to the coup. It was a time for his many enemies both in the Middle East and elsewhere to triumph. Western governments were delighted, but equally the leaders of Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia did nothing to conceal their pleasure. However, pan-Arab emotion was a powerful factor in a further coup in Iraq on 8 February 1963. Syria's fragile government could not long resist the joint pressure from Cairo and Baghdad. Exactly one month after the Iraqi revolt, a military coup in Damascus swept aside all the men who had been in power since the break-up of the UAR.
8

ZAČIATOK NOVEJ ETAPY V SOVIETSKO-EGYPTSKÝCH VZŤAHOCH, 1970 – 1971

100%
Sorby K. R.
Vojenská história
|
2021
|
vol. 25
|
issue 3
128 - 148
EN
Jamāl cAbdannāṣir’s death on 28 September 1970 ushered in a period of uncertainty in Soviet-Egyptian relations. Though he had appointed Anwar as-Sādāt as vice-president, he had not designated an heir. His modus operandi had been to concentrate power in his own hands and operate through his personal secretariat. He left no political tradition and no obvious centre of decision making authority, but only power diffused among the army elite, the Arab Socialist Union, the secret police and the intelligence services. Moscow proceeded warily. The regular visits were ill-suited to penetrating to this enigmatic and changeable network of power. Moscow relied primarily on close ties with the official wielders of power. The new era was marked with a radical shift in the underlying elements of Egypt’s internal and external policies. In order to understand the nature of the goals, means and style of Sadat’s policy, with its consequences for Soviet-Egyptian relations, it is necessary to focus on his perception of international and regional politics, including, for example, the superpowers’ moves towards detente; the military balance between Israel and the Arab countries; and the inter-Arab world competition. Anwar as-Sādāt had its own methods of manipulating the constraints on Egypt and using its capabilities in developing foreign policy at local, regional and global levels.
9

THE ASCENDANCY OF THE BACTH IN SYRIA (1963 - 1966)

100%
Sorby K. R.
Asian and African Studies
|
2010
|
vol. 19
|
issue 1
48-70
EN
On the 8th March 1963 a military coup of the coalition of Bacthist, Naoirist and independent unionistic officers brought down the 'secessionist regime' in Damascus. When the army took over, it set up a National Revolutionary Council under the chairmanship of Lt-General Lu'ayy al-Atasi, who invited one of the leaders of the Socialist Party of Arab Resurrection (the Bacth Party) Ialaaddin al-Bioar to form a government of military and civilian ministers. One of the first actions of the new government was to issue a statement in which they declared that their aim was to lead Syria back to reunion with Egypt, this time in company with Iraq. At the same time General al-Atasi declared that the army had been purged of secessionists, including former ministers. Shortly after, minority members in the Syrian officers' corps increased again strongly in numbers at the expense of the Sunnites. A principal reason for this was that the Bacthist military leaders who were involved in the coup had called up numerous officers and non-commissioned officers with whom they were related through family, tribal or regional ties, to consolidate quickly their newly achieved power positions.
10

SYRIA AND THE CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON IN 1975 – 76

100%
Sorby K. R.
Asian and African Studies
|
2011
|
vol. 20
|
issue 2
193 – 213
EN
After 1970 the PLO, driven out of Jordan, made Lebanon its operational base. It did not want to enter the civil war, but it sided with any group that espoused Arab nationalism and wanted to liberate Palestine. It was a Maronite militia’s attacks on the Palestinians that sparked the fighting in April 1975, committing the PLO to the Arab nationalist side. The Lebanese conflict was also a struggle between a privileged class of landowners and merchants trying to preserve the status quo and a large mass of poor people (mainly Muslim) striving for more equality. The two main Lebanese parties of the conflict were the Phalanges, a largely Maronite force, and the Lebanese National Movement which was mainly Muslim. The Muslim side won the support of the PLO. One puzzling aspect of this civil war was Syria’s 1976 policy shift. At first President Eafi al-Asad backed the rebels both morally and materially. He managed to get the Christians to accept a cease-fire, but the Muslim Lebanese, abetted by the PLO, rejected his proposed compromise. This rejection made Eafi al-Asad change sides and his forces battered the Muslims and the PLO into submission by the autumn of 1976.
11

TWO JULY 1968 COUPS IN IRAQ: THE BACTH IS RETURNING TO POWER

100%
Sorby K. R.
Asian and African Studies
|
2017
|
vol. 26
|
issue 2
297 – 318
EN
In Iraq on 8th February 1963 the Socialist Party of Arab Resurrection (the Bacth Party) carried out an armed coup. It overthrew the regime of cAbdalkarīm Qāsim and came to power. Its short reign turned out as an unsuccessful experiment and ended on 18th November of the same year in a countercoup staged by the army. A difficult period followed in which the Bacth leadership worked to overthrow the existing military regime and restore its former position. The Bacthists returned to power by accomplishing two coups, one on 17th July and the other on 30th July 1968. In both instances, they prevailed by stratagem rather than through force. In the first they deposed the president by allying themselves with his closest aides. In the second they got rid of their inconvenient temporary allies. The two distinct groups which in an odd alliance finally carried out the first coup were the Bacth Party and a small group of dissatisfied supporters of the regime whose leaders were cAbdarrazzāq an-Nāyif and Ibrāhīm ad-Dā’ūd. The two men who held the fate of the regime in their hands belonged to a group of younger moderate Arab nationalist officers within the army.
12

IRAQ UNDER THE RULE OF CABDASSALĀM CĀRIF (1963 – 1966)

100%
Sorby K. R.
Asian and African Studies
|
2013
|
vol. 22
|
issue 1
89 – 111
EN
Despite Prime Minister cAbdalkarīm Qāsim’s refusal to join the United Arab Republic during his reign (1958 – 1963), the pan-Arab dynamic continued to be a persistent feature of Iraqi politics. This could be illustrated by the policies of his successor cAbdassalām cĀrif, who participated in a series of summit talks with the Egyptian president, and in 1964 the two countries prepared plans for the integration of their military and economic policies with the intention of achieving full union in 1966. In order to bring Iraq’s economic structure into alignment with Egypt, cAbdassalām cĀrif nationalized all banks and insurance companies as well as several large manufacturing firms. However, even as he cooperated with Egypt, he had to placate other factions of officers opposed to unification. He was forced to proceed with such caution that by the time of his death in 1966, little real progress had been made toward the full integration of Iraq and Egypt. Arab unity, so ardently desired by powerful leaders in Syria, Egypt and Iraq, remained an elusive dream battered by the crosscurrents of political instability, ethnic discord and personal ambition.
13

PREMATURE ATTEMPT AT LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN IRAQI POLITICS (1930 – 1937)

100%
Sorby K. R.
Asian and African Studies
|
2014
|
vol. 23
|
issue 2
205 – 225
EN
During the early 1930s a liberal left-wing group named “al-Ahālī” came to being. First, their members made their views public in January 1932. They proposed sweeping social reforms, but hoped to perform their plans by parliamentary methods, without having to resort to violent means. They did not call for a class struggle, and recognized the value of the institutions of the family and religion and supported patriotism (al-waṭanīya) against nationalism (al-qawmīya). The leading members of this association established the Baghdad Club, a cultural centre where the members treated different themes and drew into debate people from widely varying background. There were differences of opinion between them as to whether or not a political party should be established. Originally they saw their main task as general cultural work to combat illiteracy. However, the group became more radical in 1934 – 1935 and it was joined by some communists. It also established contacts with some of the older politicians who favoured reforms, such as Ḥikmat Sulaymān, who had been much impressed by the work of Kemal Atatürk in Turkey. By October 1936, full agreement had been reached between those, who prepared the military coup. With the overthrow of the government, the first short-lived coalition supported by the liberal and left-centre forces in Iraq was installed.
14

EGYPT MAY 1971 – ANWAR AS-SĀDĀT BECOMES THE COUNTRY’S SOLE LEADER

100%
Sorby K. R.
Asian and African Studies
|
2022
|
vol. 31
|
issue 1
82 – 101
EN
When Jamāl cAbdannāṣir died, the Egyptian regime lost its solid stabilization element. His personal charisma had been the regime’s greatest asset. His unexpected death on the 28th September 1970 ushered a period of uncertainty, as the new era was marked by a creeping retreat from the fundamental pillars of Egypt’s domestic and foreign policy at the time. In order to understand the nature of the goals, means and style of the policy of his successor Anwar as-Sādāt, it is necessary to focus on the latter’s perception of international and regional politics, including for example, the moves of the superpowers towards détente, the military balance between Israel and the Arab countries; and competition within the Arab world. Anwar as-Sādāt created his own ways of manipulating the constraints on Egypt and using his capabilities in developing foreign policy at the local, regional and global levels.
15

THE FIRST YEAR AFTER THE IRAQI REVOLUTION - cABDALKARIM QASIM BETWEEN COMMUNISTS AND NATIONALISTS

100%
Sorby K. R.
Asian and African Studies
|
2007
|
vol. 16
|
issue 2
205 - 228
EN
During the first year after the Revolution the Iraqi Communist Party and its front organizations were gaining strength and popularity so that the party was able to command the streets of Baghdad. The ICP interpreted the events as a bourgeois democratic revolution and demanded the creation of bourgeois democratic institutions and a functioning parliamentary system. In this phase the nationalists lost the struggle to win the hearts and minds of Iraqis to the ideals of Arab unity. Since the ICP had captured substantial sections of progressive opinion not only in Baghdad but in most of southern Iraq and in many parts of Kurdistan, the nationalists and their associates decided to promote their cause partly by relying on anti-communist or religious elements, but more crucially on members of the armed forces who were unhappy with the existing regime. The peak of communist influence lasted approximately one year. The bloody events at Kirkuk on the first anniversary of the July Revolution marked the beginning of the end of this phase.
16

UN SECURITY COUNCIL 242 – SOURCE OF LASTING ARAB BITTERNESS

100%
Sorby K. R.
Asian and African Studies
|
2016
|
vol. 25
|
issue 2
213 – 230
EN
The passage of Resolution 242 by the UN Security Council from the 22nd November 1967 was a major diplomatic achievement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It emphasised “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” and contained the formula that has since underlain all peace initiatives – land for peace. In exchange for withdrawing from Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian territory captured in the 1967 war, Israel was promised peace by the Arab states. The resolution provides the basis on which the peace talks between Israel and the Arabs could be conducted.
17

ZAČIATOK CESTY ṢADDĀMA ḤUSAJNA NA VRCHOL IRACKEJ POLITICKEJ SCÉNY (DVA ÚSPEŠNÉ PREVRATY VEDENÉ STRANOU BACT V JÚLI 1968)

100%
Sorby K. R.
Studia Politica Slovaca: časopis pre politické vedy, najnovšie politické dejiny a medzinárodné vzťahy
|
2017
|
vol. 10
|
issue 2
5 – 22
EN
The coup of the 17th July 1968, although not entirely the work of the Bacth, shortly brought the Bacth Party to full power and inaugurated another distinct change in the structure and orientation of government in Iraq. This time the Bacthists, having learned well the lessons of 1963, managed to stay in powerand to institute the kind of regime they had failed to achieve in 1963. To the surprise of many they brought a long period of stability achieved by draconian means. The regime established a one-party state that eventually developed an impressive institutional structure, and gradually concentrated power in the hands of one man, Ṣaddām Ḥusayn, to a degree not seen since the last days of the monarchy. The Bacth also reached a temporary settlement of the Kurdish problem that appeared more likely to remain intact than previous solutions, although it took a bitter and costly war to achieve. The party made a renewed and reasonably successful effort at economic and social transformation, going well beyond the achievements of previous regimes.
18

IRAQ 1963: THE SHORT RULE OF THE BA‛TH

100%
Sorby K. R.
Asian and African Studies
|
2009
|
vol. 18
|
issue 1
16 - 39
EN
In the circumstances of a military dictatorship, there was no alternative for a civilian group other than to persuade a faction of young officers opposed to ‛Abdalkarīm Qāsim’s rule to raise an open military rebellion, even at the risk of provoking civil war. The group that was ready to influence officers likely to take action was, of course, the Ba‛th Party. Its members had the reputation of not being afraid to face danger in their struggle against military dictatorship ever since their unsuccessful attempt on ‛Abdalkarīm Qāsim’s life in 1959. When they finally succeeded in carrying out one of these plots, of which the margin of success was not very great, on 8 February 1963, the army turned to them to govern the country. Once in power, they had a golden opportunity of realizing the goals of their party. Political developments in the period between February and November 1963 were extremely confused, and consisted largely of different groups manoeuvring for power against a background of indiscriminate murder and terror. However, by June, ‛Alī Ïāli‡ as-Sacdī had lost the Ministry of Interior, his faction had quarrelled with both Jamāl ‛Abdannāœir and the Iraqi Nāœirists, and fighting had broken out again in Kurdistan. He now faced increasing hostility both from other Ba‛thists in the army and from his Ba‛thist colleagues in Damascus, who were also becoming increasingly critical of some of his methods. On 18 November 1963 ‛Abdassalām ‛Ārif, with the support of the armed forces, moved to exercise personal control over the country.
19

IRAQ: THE RULE OF ABDARRAHMĀN ĀRIF AND ITS END (1966 – 1968)

100%
Sorby K. R.
Asian and African Studies
|
2015
|
vol. 24
|
issue 1
1 – 17
EN
The July Revolution of 1958 in Iraq brought Staff Brigadier Abdalkarīm Qāsim to power, in alliance with a loose group of Communists, Kurds, bathists, patriotic democrats and Arab nationalists from the outset. Over the following five years he lost the support of each of these groupings. His overthrow in February 1963 was carried out by a combination of bacthist and Arab nationalist military officers. Although the presidency was placed in the hands of Abdassalām Ārif, a non-bathist army general, the Bath party played the predominant role in the government which succeeded the rebellion. A campaign of severe repression against the Communist party was initiated. In November 1963, following attempts by the Bath party to entrench its hold on power, Abdassalām Ārif ousted the principal bathist leaders from the government and dismissed senior bathist military officers from their posts. To the extent that organised civilian involvement in government continued, it was a loosely organised grouping of Arab nationalists and nāṣirists who provided the regime’s civilian base. In April 1966 Abdassalām Ārif was killed in a helicopter crash and was succeeded by his elder brother Abdarrahmān Ārif, a man of weaker personality. His rule was of short duration: in July 1968 the Bath party returned to power again after a coup.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.