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EN
German occupation of the Bohemia and Moravia on 15 March 1939 and the simultaneous apparent threat to Rumania began the switch in British policy of appeasement to one of containment of the III Reich. However, it did not affect relations between Turkey and the Great Britain. The prime minister Arthur Neville Chamberlain did not want to include Ankara in plans of establishing a “peaceful front” against probable German aggression in Europe in order not to antagonize Italy, which played a crucial role in British efforts to maintain security in the Mediterranean area. Only after Italian aggression on Albania (April 7th 1939), when it became clear that understanding with Benito Mussolini is unfeasible, did British government take a firmer stand towards Rome. It was decided that Greece, which was thought to be the most threaten of Italian aggression, would be given guarantees in case of hostile attack. Firmer attitude was possible also due to the fact, that Mediterranean strategy of the Great Britain had became more aggressive, which resulted as much as from change in personnel at the Admiralty House in October 1938 as from sheer incapacity to send the fleet to the Far East should war with Japan occur concurrently with war in Europe. In these circumstances British Government decided to deepen rapprochement with Ankara. Turkey was seen as a vital ally in case of war with Italy. From a military perspective Turkish army could have attacked Dodecanese Islands. What was more important Turkey could close Dardanelles to Italian shipping, which could have been a severe blow for economy of Italy (10 per cent of Ital¬ian trade and 23 per cent of Italian oil passed through this strait). From political point of view the Foreign Office recognised Turkey as a “Small Great Power”. It was thought that Ankara could have benevolently influenced the Balkan countries and as a Moslem country, bolstered Britain’s influence in its numerous Muslim colonies. Initially the British tried to persuade Turks to join them in announcing guarantees to Greece. However when Ankara refuse to do so, explaining that it cannot extend her obligations at least, when better dispositions existed for their own security, British Government decided to limit its efforts to signing the treaty of mutual assistance. On April 15th 1939 Turkey accepted British offer, which initiated a long-lasting negotiations. They were not only limited to the issue of mutual obligations, but also include such problems as: security in Balkan area and relations with France and the Soviet Union. The first phase of negotiations ended on May 12th 1939, when the British-Turkish Declaration of Mutual Aid was announced. It was a first, but simultaneously a crucial step to British-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which was signed on October 17th 1939.
PL
Wydarzenia w Libii i Syrii stanowiły, a w tym drugim przypadku nadal stanowią, wyzwanie dla tureckiej polityki zagranicznej. Ze względów gospodarczych i politycznych Ankara musiała zainteresować się sytuacją w obu państwach bliskowschodnich i dostosować do jej rozwoju swoje działania. Niniejszy artykuł analizuje postawę Turcji w pierwszych miesiącach tzw. Arabskiej Wiosny Ludów w odniesieniu do sytuacji w Libii i Syrii. Ukazuje najważniejsze działania podjęte przez rząd turecki, tłumaczy motywy, które kierowały jego poczynaniami oraz ukazuje najważniejsze zmiany zachodzące w stanowisku Ankary.
EN
Recent events in Libya and Syria have posed a challenge for Turkish foreign policy. Angora have had an interest in the situation in both countries for economic and political reasons and due to that fact was forced to adapt its actions to development of the situation. This article examines the attitude of Turkey in the first months of the so-called Arab Spring with regard to the situation in Libya and Syria. It shows the most important steps taken by the Turkish government, explains the motives that guided the actions of the Turkish decision-makers, and shows the most important changes in the position of Angora.
EN
Lausanne Peace Treaty did not solve contradictions between Great Britain and Turkey. Political relations between those two countries remained strained. The Kemalists could not forget that London had been the main supporter of Greece during the Liberation War (Kurtuluş Savaşı). On the other hand, the British thought Turkey to be a seasonal state and were alarmed when Kemalists had established a close link with the Soviet Russia. However, the most serious problem was a dispute over the possession of the vilayet of Mosul. The territory of Mosul was held by Turkey until the First World War. In 1918 it was occupied by Britain. In 1920 it was assigned to Iraq, which had become a British mandate. However Kemalists refused to relinquish their claims to the territory of Mosul, which was specified in the National Pact (Misakı Millı) as Turkish one. For that reason the question of Mosul remained in a state of deadlock, even after the Lausanne Treaty had been signed. Bilateral negotiations between Great Britain and Turkey did not solve the problem, and the matter was referred to the League of Nations. In December 1925 the Council of the League of Nations decided that the vilayet of Mosul was an integraf part of Iraq. Finally the dispute over that territory ended in June 1926, when the border treaty between Iraq and Turkey was signed. However the case of Mosul cast a shadow over relations between Angora and London at least until 1929.
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