Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 3

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
The study evaluates the relevance and validity of certain tax instruments used in economic practice. This involves instruments such as the possibility of selecting the form of corporate income taxation; more convenient dates and forms of advance tax payments; technology-related tax breaks; and tax-risk reduction instruments such as binding tax interpretations and advance pricing agreements (APA). The analysis was made on the basis of data from three tax offices in Poland. The author reached the following conclusions: 1) changes in eligibility criteria for using tax instruments are inconsistent with the rules of tax certainty and the fact that tax collection must be as inexpensive and efficient as possible; 2) more convenient advance tax payment deadlines do not prove to be useful because taxpayers tend to take little interest in them; 3) legal regulations accompanying tax privileges tend to reduce the effectiveness of these privileges in stimulating economic processes. The number and variety of instruments included in the Polish tax system testify to its strong stimulating function but also its complexity, Zbroińska says. Changes in the tax law system designed to either introduce or withdraw individual instruments lead to the destabilization of business activity by infringing on the rule of tax certainty. Some instruments fail to produce the desired results because access to them is restricted. Examples include plans to restrict the use of flat tax rates, limit access to the new-technology tax break, and impose steep fees on advance pricing agreements. The uncertainty among businesses leads to their marginal use of tax facilities related to advance income tax payments, the author says.
EN
The article focuses on public finance as a mechanism for raising funds for public budgets, a mechanism made up of tax and lending contracts. The author applies an institutional analysis method in which the basic analysis unit is the transaction. The method classifies institutions and organizations and identifies the parties to transactions and transaction attributes. The parties to a tax contract are the State Treasury, local government authorities and taxpayers, and the contract involves the levying, setting and collection of taxes. Public agreements and market transactions with entities in the real economy and banks are made as part of a tax contract. The parties to a Treasury loan contract, on the other hand, are the State Treasury (on account of its demand for loan funds), buyers of Treasury debt securities and municipal bonds, and banks as either lenders or buyers of securities. Market transactions and public contracts are made between the government and entities in the real economy and banks. Such transactions concern the servicing of trade in Treasury securities. The author defines the institutional attributes of individual transactions, such as the nature of assets, and the frequency and uncertainty of a transaction. In the case of tax contracts, transactions with the highest level of institutional attributes include an agreement on the drafting and implementation of tax laws, the terms and conditions of eligibility for tax breaks, and tax collection. In the case of Treasury loan contracts, on the other hand, transactions with the highest level of institutional attributes include agreements on the sale of Treasury securities in all forms and agreements on Treasury guarantees and rating services. A comparison of the contracts shows that, in a Treasury loan contract, there are more transactions, contractual parties, transactions with a high level of institutional attributes, but also more opportunities for negotiation. Both types of contracts involve a fundamental transformation: competition steadily evolves into bilateral cooperation and a bilateral monopoly as the level of asset specificity grows when the contract is carried out.
PL
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie skarbowości jako mechanizmu pozyskiwania i gromadzenia pieniądza w budżetach publicznych, złożonego z kontraktów podatkowego i pożyczkowego. Zastosowano metodę analizy instytucjonalnej, polegającą na przyjęciu transakcji za podstawową jednostkę analizy, usystematyzowaniu instytucji i organizacji, wytypowaniu stron i atrybutów transakcji. Stronami kontraktu podatkowego są Skarb Państwa, jednostki samorządu terytorialnego, podatnicy, a przedmiotem nakładanie, wymiar i pobór podatków. W ramach kontraktu zawierane są umowy publiczne oraz transakcje rynkowe z podmiotami sfery realnej i bankami. Stronami skarbowego kontraktu pożyczkowego są Skarb Państwa, zgłaszający zapotrzebowanie na pieniądz pożyczkowy, nabywcy skarbowych papierów wartościowych i obligacji komunalnych, banki jako kredytodawcy lub nabywcy papierów wartościowych. Państwo zawiera umowy publiczne oraz transakcje rynkowe z podmiotami sfery realnej i bankami, na obsługę obrotu skarbowych papierów wartościowych. Określono cechy instytucjonalne poszczególnych transakcji: specyficzność aktywów umowy, częstotliwość, niepewność. W kontrakcie podatkowym, do transakcji o największym natężeniu cech instytucjonalnych należą: umowa na tworzenie i wdrażanie prawa podatkowego, warunki korzystania z ulg podatkowych, pobór podatków. W skarbowym kontrakcie pożyczkowym są to umowy na sprzedaż skarbowych papierów wartościowych we wszystkich formach oraz umowy na udzielenie poręczenia przez Skarb Państwa i usługi ratingowe. Porównanie kontraktów wskazuje, że w skarbowym kontrakcie pożyczkowym jest więcej transakcji, stron kontraktu, transakcji o wysokim natężeniu cech instytucjonalnych, ale też więcej możliwości negocjacji. W obu kontraktach dochodzi do fundamentalnej transformacji. Początkowe warunki konkurencyjne przekształcają się w bilateralną współpracę i dwu- stronny monopol, kiedy wraz z realizacją kontraktu rośnie poziom specyficzności aktywów. Transformacja polegająca na związaniu umów zachodzi, gdy warunkiem zawarcia umowy jest zaangażowanie specyficznych aktywów, wykorzystanych następnie w kolejnych umowach niższego rzędu.
EN
The paper aims to identify the transaction costs of the tax system and show that these costs can be used as an additional criterion of tax system assessment. The author uses an institutional analysis method and hypothesizes that the transaction costs of a tax system are not homogenous and that they include both indispensable and undesirable expenses. The former are required for the operation of institutions, while the latter result from political decisions that seek to use taxes for non-fiscal purposes; such decisions stem from the poor quality and unreliability of state institutions, the author says. Any form of state aid requires additional efforts from fiscal and supervisory authorities and adjustment from taxpayers, Zbroińska says. Zbroińska examines the budgetary effects of tax breaks as an indirect measure of the tax system’s transaction costs. The analysis of empirical data-finance ministry statistics on 2007 income tax returns-shows that the greatest transaction costs are related to the constantly expanding tax breaks for corporate bodies and controversial exemptions for individuals, the author says.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.