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1

FINDING AS A NOTIONAL ATTITUDE I.

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Raclavsky J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2005
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vol. 12
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issue 2
141-167
EN
Although finding does not seem to be logically and philosophically so much interesting as (intentional attitude of ) seeking, the present study gives exhaustive survey of logical analyses corresponding to (surprisingly many) kinds of finding (altogether with related issues). There are four basic groups of findings (all of them are expressed in natural languages in homonymous way): (I) finding by accidence; (II) finding after seeking which is typically relation between an agent and an intension; (III) finding after finding an instance of intension to which was an agent related by seeking; (IV) finding pejorativelly reported (agent is not really finding respective thing). Only type (II) can be considered as a notional attitude because it is a relation to an intension (a suitable candidate for ‘notion'); moreover, this relation is unique in the sense that agent is related just and only to one exact intension (thus its concept cannot be substituted by concept expressed by expression which is not coreferential in all possible worlds and time moments with the expression denoting original intension).
2

FINDING AS NOTORIAL ATTITUDE ii.

100%
Raclavsky J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2005
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vol. 12
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issue 3
260-277
EN
In the first part of continuation of our study we classify and analyze passive forms which belong to four kinds of findings. Further we investigate cases of unsuccessful finding; they do not trivially correspond to kinds of succesful finding. We can distinguish: (1) not-finding for the reason of not-seeking, (2) not-finding for the reason of not finished seeking, (3) not-finding for the reason of stopped seeking whereas a) an instance of the respective seeked intension is not existing, b) an agent was not enough skilful and the question of existence of an instance of the respective seeked intension remains open.
3
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Cmorej a Tichý o jazyce a jeho logické analýze

100%
Raclavsky J.
Slovo a slovesnost: časopis pro otázky teorie a kultury jazyka (Slovo a slovesnost: A journal for the theory of language and language cultivation)
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2006
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vol. 67
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issue 1
27-35
EN
Slovak logician Pavel Cmorej has recently opened up the question of the nature of logical analysis of natural language in a new way. He shows, for example, that attributing meaning to some meaningful language expression is an a priori and analytic statement, if a language is examined as a given. This is because a meaningful expression is best conceived as a pair consisting of a semi-expression and an assigned meaning. I show that these claims as well as many other observations are fully compatible with the late Czech philosopher and logician Pavel Tichy's specific concept of language as a code system.
4

REFORMULATING TICHY'S CONCEPTION OF BARE INDIVIDUALS

100%
Raclavsky J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2008
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vol. 15
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issue 2
143-167
EN
A bare individual was conceived by Tichy as an individual such as if the property the individual instantiates is non-trivial (contingent), it is possible for the individual to lack it (and still be the same individual); and for any trivial property (i.e. property with constant extension) that it cannot lack this kind of property. The exact readings of Tichy's original formulations of bare individuals are subjected to a detailed analysis to reveal that any of them is refutable by means of Cmorejian objection that there exist contingent properties which are partly essential (i.e. there exists an individual which cannot lack such property). To avoid such (valid) objection, the present paper attempts to rebuild Tichy's definitions into viable ones.
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