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EN
The central thought of K. M. Meyer-Abich is his conception of nature as a community not only of all living beings, but also of the “elements” constituting nature, and of “artefacts”. Instead of the environment (“Umwelt”) the author thus speaks of “the world as a community (“Mitwelt”)”. Meyer-Abich characterises his conception not as (merely) biocentric but rather as “physiocentric”. He uses the title of one of the key approaches in moral and political philosophy: communitarianism. He therefore talks of a “widened communitarianism” – that is of a communitarianism broadened to include nature and everything which is involved in it. This conception has consequences for Meyer-Abich‘s understanding of the relation between nature and culture: nature is in some way “extended” in culture and there is no clear dividing-line between the two. The author of the article takes a critical view, above all, to Meyer-Abich’s underestimation of the qualitative difference of the way of being of man and other forms of life (especially animals), which leads to the neglect of the essentially human standing in nature (which H. Plessner, for example, has described as “excentric positionality”). This is not only the condition for the possibility of the creation of a culture as a specifically human phenomenon, but also, above all, the condition for the treatment of nature itself as a whole. Meyer-Abich’s ideal of transforming man from an interplane­tary conqueror into a being grounded on the Earth (“Sesshaftigkeit”), is something that the author takes to be thoroughly noble, but nevertheless illusory.
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Tři pohledy na první světovou válku

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EN
Each of the philosophers whom the author focuses on in this article addressed not only the question of the meaning of the First World War, but also of war in general as a certain kind of phenomenon. Scheler and Patočka both share a generally phenomenological starting point and in particular they share an orientation that treats the war experience as one of transcendence (sacrifice, being “shaken”) of the everyday and its institutional bonds. In this respect, however, the two philosophers reflect wartime experience in an almost contradictory way: Scheler adores the engagement of war in the interest of nationalistically-understood goals, Patočka exalts the attitude of the „shaken“, consisting in „self-possession“ and in refusing „the appeals to mobilise“. Transcendence has, then, an opposite meaning in the two thinkers. Despite the generally problematic (especially nationalistically extreme) character of Scheler’s views, even here we find a stimulating reference to the nontransparency of a distinction between just and unjust wars and of its identification with aggressive and defensive wars. Patočka’s thought about being “shaken” does not, however, concern only wartime experience, but also plays an important role in a conception of the „spiritual man“, which had a significant resonance in the Czech intellectual milieu. Masaryk, against the background of the events of the First World War in their wider context of „world revolution“, formulated his own conception of the meaning of Czech history, consisting in the struggle between theocracy and democracy. This interpretation drew a critical reaction from J. Patočka. Masaryk was the only one of the philosophers treated here who, in his thoughts about war, reflected on the meaning of the First World War for political organisation and cooperation among nations in general. In his exaltation of the significance of democracy as the guarantee of the realisation of human rights, Masaryk can be seen as a philosopher who is close to the modern conception of moral and political philosophy (J. Rawls, M. Walzer, V. Hösle).
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Hodnoty jako vztah

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EN
C. v. Ehrenfels, one of the members of Brentano’s school, belongs, in the territorial sense, to the history of Czech thinking because of his work at the Prague German University, and because of his contact with T. G. Masaryk. Central to Ehrenfels’ philosophical interest was the problem of value. He conceived of value as always relational – as value for someone. In treating of value, human desire (Begehren) is of paramount importance, relating positively or negatively to the existence of the object in question. The author of the article deals with various aspects of Ehrenfels’ axiological conception, such as the relation of “proper” and “effective” value (Eigenwert; Wirkungswert). He goes on to examine the relation of human emotional dispositions, desires and behaviour, and he also draws attention to the problematic aspects of Ehrenfels‘ ethical theory, especially a certain biologism involved, which is apparent above all in applied ethics, in the conception of the relation between “white” and “mongolian” races and in sexual ethics.The author appreciates, on the other hand, Ehrenfels’ emphasis on the ethos of the individual, allowing pluralistic and decisionistic elements without leading to an endorsement of a non-commitment to others, or of wantonness in the ethical and moral sphere.
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