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EN
Recent research on speech perception and word recognition has shown that fine-grained sub-phonemic as well as speaker- and episode-specific characteristics of a speech signal are integrally connected with segmental (phonemic) information; they are all most probably processed in a non-distinct manner, and stored in the lexical memory. This view contrasts with the traditional approach holding that we operate on abstract phonemic representations extracted from a particular acoustic signal, without the need to process and store the multitude of its individual features. In the paper, I want to show that this turn towards the "particulars" of a speech event was in fact quite predictable, and the so-called traditional view would most probably have never been formulated if studies on language variation and language change-in-progress had been taken into account when constructing models of speech perception. In part one, I discuss briefly the traditional view ("abstract representations only"), its theoretical background, and outline some problems, internal to the speech perception theory, that the traditional view encounters. Part two will demonstrate that what we know about the implementation of sound changes has long made it possible to answer, once and for all, the question of integrated processing and storage of extralinguistic, phonemic and subphonemic characteristics of the speech signal.
Filozofia Nauki
|
2008
|
vol. 16
|
issue 1
27-40
PL
The aim of the paper is to consider the notions of economy, redundancy and optimality, with regard to language structure and its functioning in time and with regard to certain principles of the Universal Grammar. I argue that the notion of optimality needs not to be congruent with economy, and at odds with redundancy. On the contrary, if we hold realistic premises regarding the ontology of language (as Chomsky does) and think of language as a natural system existing in time, then we should expect similar principles of organization in language as in other natural systems (cf. system theories: von Bertalanffy, Laszlo, Kauffman). In that approach, connecting optimality with economy is untenable. That stance is contrary to Chomsky's Minimalist Program, in which economy has become the actual principle of the Universal Grammar. I discusses a major inconsistency in Chomsky's assumptions about the nature of the language faculty and trace its possible origin. Key words: language system; language faculty; systems theory; economy principle; redundancy; optimality; edge-of-chaos theory; Minimalist Program
Filozofia Nauki
|
2014
|
vol. 22
|
issue 2
97-115
PL
The paper is concerned with evidentials, i.e. information-source markers, in natural languages and their influence on our cognition, communication, and justification of our beliefs. In the first part, we present the functioning of different systems of evidentials in the world's languages and discuss in brief how the grammatical structure of different non-Indo-European languages compels their speakers to code the source of information (visual perception, non-visual sensory perception, inference, hearsay, etc.) in practically every declarative sentence. The second part of the paper addresses the issue of how some epistemological ideas connected with the problem of justification of our beliefs, such as internalism, externalism, justified basic beliefs, and epistemology of testimony, could be reinterpreted in the light of obligatory grammatical evidentiality.
PL
The paper discusses how evidentiality and conjunct/disjunct marking in grammar are related to reliabilism, a contemporary theory of epistemic justification developed within the Anglo-American analytic tradition. It is assumed that many problems and ideas concerned with theories of knowledge, and with justification of beliefs in particular, which are widely discussed in contemporary philosophical debates, are worth reconsidering in the light of what grammars of natural languages impose on the epistemic agent. Section two explains how the notions of knowledge, belief and justification are understood in the paper. The section also outlines the major problems concerning the internalist justification of beliefs. Section three presents an externalist view on the problem of justification: process reliabilism. The reliabilist theory of justification is set in the context of two grammatical categories: evidentiality and conjunct/disjunct marking (egophoricity). Since the two categories are still little known, section four offers a brief presentation of evidentiality and egophoricity in grammar, illustrated with data from two languages. Finally, section five addresses the problem whether the premises of reliabilism are reconcilable with ‘natural epistemology’ encoded in grammar. The final conclusion says that the externalist premises of reliabilism are certainly not congruent with grammatical evidentiality and evidentialityrelated categories, but they are not logically inconsistent therewith. Furthermore, since the reliabilist program declares interest in ‘folk epistemic practices’, the approach might greatly benefit from what ‘natural epistemology’ tells us about epistemic folk concepts and epistemic practices employed by speakers of diverse world languages.
PL
What kind of system is language? – On the revelance of General Systems Theory to language studies
PL
Dlaczego nadzieja nie może być cnotą epistemiczną – o racjonalności nadziei z perspektywy analitycznej Artykuł ma dwa podstawowe cele. Pierwszym jest krytyczna analiza twierdzenia, że nadzieja może być uznana za jedną z cnót epistemicznych czy też intelektualnych, jak to proponuje Nancy E. Snow (2013) w artykule osadzonym w ramach epistemologii regulatywnej. Drugim celem jest rozpatrzenie problemu racjonalności nadziei. Artykuł przedstawia dwie różne interpretacje pojęcia nadziei: jako postawy propozycjonalnej (hope-that p) i jako ogólnej dyspozycji (hope-in x) (część pierwsza). W części drugiej rozpatrywane jest zagadnienie tytułowe: czy nadzieja może być uważana za cnotę epistemiczną. W celu rozwinięcia argumentu przeciwko takiej interpretacji nadziei, przedstawiona jest krótka charakterystyka rozumienia pojęcia cnoty epistemicznej w obrębie epistemologii cnót. W części trzeciej analizowany jest problem racjonalności nadziei (jako postawy propozycjonalnej). Szczególną uwagę poświęcono cechom wspólnym, które łączą racjonalne przekonanie i racjonalną nadzieję. W części tej rozpatrywane jest pytanie o warunki konieczne, które musza być spełnione, aby nadzieję można było uznać za postawę racjonalną i uprawomocnioną. W artykule zakłada się, że skoro przekonanie, że p jest możliwe/ prawdopodobne, jest częścią składową nadziei, że p, kwestia racjonalności nadziei nie może być rozpatrywana zupełnie niezależnie od zagadnienia racjonalności przekonań. Przedstawiona jest argumentacja, dlaczego tzw. stanowisko standardowe co do racjonalności nadziei przedstawiane w epistemologii analitycznej nie spełnia wymagań epistemicznej odpowiedzialności i wymaga skorygowania.
EN
There are two aims of the paper. The first is to critically analyse the claim that hope can be regarded as an intellectual virtue, as proposed by Nancy E. Snow (2013) in her recent account of hope set within the project of regulative epistemology. The second aim is to explore the problem of rationality of hope. Section one of the paper explains two different interpretations of the key notion of hope and discusses certain features to be found in hope-that and hope-in. Section two addresses the question of whether hope could be interpreted as an intellectual virtue. To develop an argument against that view, a brief account of the notion of epistemic virtue is provided. Section three analyses the problem of rationality of hope and the parallels between rational belief and rational hope; the section focuses on what exactly makes a particular hope-that a rational and justified hope. Belief that p is possible/probable is part of the meaning of hope that p; therefore, it is assumed that rationality of hope cannot be considered in isolation from rationality of belief. It is argued that the “standard account” of the reasonableness of hope, which is found in the analytic literature, does not meet the standards of epistemic responsibility and needs rectifying.
EN
The aim of the paper is to analyse the evidential meanings encoded by selected Polish verbs of perception. Evidentiality is a category whose primary function is to mark the speaker’s source of information on which his/her claim is based; this may be direct observation/experience, inference from observable data, general knowledge, someone’s report, or other types of evidence. Cross-linguistically, the category of evidentiality may be defined narrowly as marking of the information source only by strictly grammatical means; alternatively, evidentiality may be understood broadly as marking of the information source plus additional epistemic values, and this can be done through grammatical and/or lexical means. The present paper adopts the latter understanding of evidentiality; within this broadened view, evidential strategies can be discussed more holistically. Perception verbs in Polish may be divided into different subgroups; from the evidential perspective, the division into object-oriented and subject-oriented verbs provides the most significant contrast to consider the problem of which forms of perception verbs encode evidential meanings. The next problem to be addressed is which evidential values are encoded by these forms. It is usually the speaker’s direct perceptual experience that is indicated by perception verbs; however, certain forms may encode indirect information sources, such as inference or someone’s report.
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