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Opis faktów a ocena - od mitu do oczywistości

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Wawrzyniak J.
Diametros
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2010
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issue 25
75-91
PL
Tematem artykułu jest rozróżnienie: opis faktów / ocena. Rozróżnienie to jest przedmiotem zainteresowania zarówno filozofii jak i teorii dziennikarstwa. W tekście rozważane jest jedno z założeń wspierających przekonanie, że dziennikarze powinni wyraźnie oddzielać opis faktów od ich oceny – założenie, że można oddzielić opis faktów od oceny. Przedstawiam różne interpretacje tego założenia. Wskazuję na istnienie związku pomiędzy tezą o możliwości oddzielenia opisu od oceny a przeświadczeniem, że ze swej istoty opis faktów jest czymś obiektywnym, a ocena lub wartościowanie subiektywnym, a następnie krytykuję to drugie przekonanie. Przedstawione argumenty nie mają na celu podważenia samego rozróżnienia "opis faktów / ocena". Tym, co staram się podważyć, są metafizyczne uzasadnienia i interpretacje tego rozróżnienia.
EN
The topic of the article is the distinction between descriptions of facts and their evaluation. This distinction is of interest to both in philosophy and in the theory of journalism. The article considers one of the assumptions supporting the view that journalists should clearly separate descriptions of facts from their assessment - the assumption that descriptions of facts can be separated from their evaluation. I present various interpretations of this assumption. I point out the existence of a relationship between the thesis of the possibility of separating descriptions from assessments and the belief that descriptions of facts are by their very nature objective, while assessments or valuations are subjective, and then I proceed to criticize the latter conviction. These arguments are not intended to undermine the distinction between descriptions of facts and their evaluation. What I am trying to undermine are the metaphysical justifications and interpretations of this distinction.
2
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The original and hybrid character of the Constitution of the 5th French Republic

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Wawrzyniak J.
Studia Iuridica Lublinensia
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2014
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vol. 22
EN
In the article, the distinctive features of the Constitution of the 5th Republic are abalyzed. A brief discussion on some of the constitutional institutions showed the originality and novelty of the political system that was adopted after 1958. Built in the spirit of the French republican tradition, the system was based, on the one hand, on a strong and central constitutional position of the President, a twofold executive, and a parliament limited in its competences, and on the other hand, on parliamentary accountability of the government and well-developed direct democracy institutions. The French example could be considered excellent evidence of how the powerful and historic constitutional institutions could be adopted in a modern democratic state even under a concise constitution of a hybrid charakter.
PL
Artykuł nie zawiera abstraktu w języku polskim
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W mocy tekstu

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Wawrzyniak J.
Investigationes Linguisticae
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2018
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vol. 40
62-84
PL
The text hereby presented is written in the form of an essay and, at the same time, it promotes this form – as a particular, cognitively efficient model of philosophical as well scientific investigations. It contains analytical deliberations on the sophisticated relations between  a philosophical text and its nominal author who is governed by the internal logic of the narration and who ‘vanishes’ while writing. There are also the issues of an author’s professional methodological responsibility for the writing as well as the creative-interpretational function of addressees taken into account. Some necessary references to the philosophy of science as well as the philosophy of language are present in the essay, too. And within this scope, an explanatory narration is identified with a parameterization of the world being explained or described; and the so-called description always remains preferential. A significant part of the article contains some remarks about the Polish education system in the context of both tradition and perspectives of the development of European culture. What is particularly stressed is the role of the humanities in the process of educating young people who should be responsible enough to take care of the axio-variety of human culture in the future. Therefore, the conceptions of the so-called area ethics and culture enrichment ethics are emphasized as well.  
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The Logical Discipline of Normative Argumentation. Some considerations on the axiological status of speech acts

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Wawrzyniak J.
Investigationes Linguisticae
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2006
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vol. 13
196-205
PL
This paper is intended to promote a way of is-ought derivation, rooted in neonaturalistic solutions which were worked out within the scope of both the ontology of values and meta-ethical applications of 20th Century linguistic philosophy. Normative, especially in the sphere of morality, reasoning is supposed to be the most significant component of the structure of social communication. The common practices of normative persuasion employ a variety of modes of argumentation, such as the usage of evaluations, norms, imperatives, performative utterances, prescriptions, and optatives. There is a wide range of kinds of emotive pressure produced by speech acts, behind which some intentions of perlocutionary effects are hidden, and which all have methodologically differentiated status. Therefore, the ability to recognize some tricks employed in such practices, as well as the qualified faculty of argumentation for and validation of one‟s own moral convictions seems to be an indispensable component of a subject‟s high cultural competency. The moral responsibility for social states-of-affairs generated by speech acts requires such competency. The neonaturalistic approach – itself representing cognitive meta-ethics and recognizing the pragmatic functions of speech acts as a social phenomenon – proposes a philosophical alternative to the cage of formalized languages (like various systems of deontic logic) for normative reasoning in order to find real, verifiable – not necessarily of contractual origin – value-referred premises for the inference of socially applied judgments of duty. The distinction between logical validation and moral (value-referred) justification of imperatives is emphasized at the same time. On this account certain philosophical interpretations of the categories of “fact”, “value” and “personal agent of valuation and cognition” are carried out and an example of is-ought inference is presented.
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The context principle and the idea of explaining meaning as from the outside

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Wawrzyniak J.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2019
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vol. 47
55-78
EN
The aim of my article is to show that accepting the context principle (CP) almost inevitably leads to a rejection of the project of giving a completely general explanation of linguistic meaning. I will argue that it is difficult to reconcile CP with any version of the project of giving such an explanation of meaning that does not appeal to semantic terms. I will begin with a short characterization of CP. I will outline the reading of CP which I myself embrace. Then I will briefly characterize the difference between the idea of explaining the meanings of linguistic expressions from outside of any language, and that of doing so from inside of a language. Then I will move on to the main point of my article, arguing that it is difficult to render the consequences of CP compatible with the idea of an explanation of meaning external to all linguistic content.
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Filozofia jako diagnoza. Barry Stroud o naturze filozofii i znaczenia

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Wawrzyniak J.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2013
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issue nr 23
119-142
EN
The main goal of this article is to outline Barry Stroud’s conception of philosophy. Philosophy, in his opinion, aims at understanding of various kinds of phenomena and our attitude towards them, but this understanding doesn’t manifest in a set of philosophical theses. A philosopher should become aware of a peculiar character of understanding which he wants to reach, and in consequence, admit that a metaphilosophical reflection is integral part of philosophical investigations. An understanding of the nature of philosophical investigations is not possible without pointing to their sources. Thus the task of a philosopher is to diagnose philosophical problems by showing from which earlier questions and theories they have arisen. On the other hand, philosophical reflection must be always confronted with the things which are accepted by all of us, otherwise understanding caused by that reflection wouldn’t refer to phenomena belonging to our world. Stroud thinks that a description of one’s conception of philosophy requires looking at the manner in which that philosopher approaches to a given problem. Acknowledging the rightness of his remark I consider his approach to philosophy using as an example his treatment of the question “what is meaning?”. I point out that Stroud looks into the source of the Wittgensteinian slogan “meaning of the expression is its use”. The main Stroud’s conclusion is that if a description of a use of a certain expression is to explain the meaning of that expression, semantical terms have to appear in that description. This statement could be abandoned, Stroud claims, only if we rejected the things which all of us acknowledge as obvious.
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Paradoks kłamcy

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Wawrzyniak J.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2011
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issue 15
161-179
EN
The aim of the article is to determine what role the liar sentence plays in our language. On the one hand, it seems to be well formed formula, and on the other, it does not seem to have any clear sense. At the beginning of the article I point what form an adequate solution of the liar paradox should take. In my opinion it could not consist in giving rules which do not allow to build such a sentence. The paradox remains unsolved until there is such a language in which it could be expressed. In the first part of the text I try to explain why Tarski’s solution is not satisfactory. If the semantical definition of truth is correct, the liar sentence could not lead to a contradiction because formulas which are not well formed could not be premises of any inference. From that follows that the so called liar paradox does not arise and that leads to the conclusion: ‘the reconstruction’ of the liar propounded by Tarski could not be correct. In the second part I present an approach to the liar which appeals to Frege’s and Wittgenstein’s conceptions of language. The conclusion of my consideration is that the liar sentence is nonsense, which means it is not given any sense – either its logical form is determined but we do not fix any definite meaning to some parts of it, or an attempt to determine its logical form in the standard way leads to regress ad infinitum.
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Czym są tak zwane tezy Traktatu? Drabina Wittgensteina

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Wawrzyniak J.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2017
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vol. 38
21-38
EN
The main objective of my article is the presentation and critical analysis of two possible interpretations of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. I juxtapose the so-called resolute reading with the metaphysical reading. The crucial dissimilarity between these interpretations is that they ascribe different roles to the sentences contained in the Tractatus. According to the metaphysical reading, these sentences – although they are nonsensical from the point of view of the Tractatus – attempt to express a certain view of reality and language, whereas according to the resolute reading, these sentences are mere nonsense and only seem to make sense; they exemplify nonsense and therefore show the nonsensicality of philosophical theories. I consider the objections against both interpretations and point out that although the resolute reading adequately presents and explains many questions concerning Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, it requires essential modifications. In the last part of my article, I suggest that the sentences of the Tractatus do not function as propositions but as rules of translation.
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Czy kompetencja językowa jest wiedzą?

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Wawrzyniak J.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2012
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issue nr 17
69-94
EN
The subject of this article is the nature of linguistic competence. My consideration starts with the question whether a competence in our native language should be conceived as a kind of knowledge. The answer is positive, and the main reason is the fact that while describing linguistic competence we use the words “to know”, “knowledge”. Looking at the problem in this way leads to the next question: what is the nature of this kind of knowledge? More precisely, the problem which I consider concerns the nature of cognitive relation between a speaker and his or her mother tongue, or rather one of its aspects, namely the meaning. My discussion of this question begins with the criticism of the conception which treats the knowledge of our native tongue as the knowledge of a theory of meaning of this language. After that, I examine the possibility of using the distinction between know that and know how to investigate and solve that problem. I indicate that linguistic knowledge is neither classically or narrowly conceived knowledge that (a collection of true and justified beliefs), nor such a practical skill like the ability to swim. On the other hand, in the first place, a knowledge of a language satisfies grammatical criteria of knowledge that, however, a content of that knowledge is not beliefs, but rather rules – rules which are constitutive not regulative. From that I draw the conclusion that a linguistic competence cannot be explained from outside of any language. Secondly, one cannot deny that knowledge of a language is a practical ability, but it is a capacity of a very special kind. One of essential features of linguistic knowledge, which I emphasize, is its ostensive character. It is revealed, among other things, in the fact that learning our native language and the world constitute one process.It is worth stressing that the discussed question has a great significance to analytic philosophy. Many adherents of this trend claim that philosophical knowledge, if it exists at all, is knowledge about meanings of expressions which are considered fundamental from philosophical point of view, and about relations between them. So, without determining the nature of linguistic competence it is impossible to understand the essence of philosophical activity.
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