The paper is an analysis of Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice with regard to its phenomenological inspirations. They are revealed in the concept of habitus, which treats culture as a sphere of the body rather than the spirit. The body was rehabilitated in Western philosophy by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. There are numerous similarities between the two authors. The author of Phenomenology of Perception claims that understanding by the body — practognosis — is the fundamental way of being engaged in the world. Bourdieu stresses that habitus is habitation (Fr. habiter), i.e. intimacy with the world thanks to which many of our actions do not require intellectual consideration, thoughthey are by no means automatic. Merleau-Ponty’s concept of habitus as well as one’s own body (corps propre) discussed here are to overcome the oppositions of body–mind, awareness–unawareness, automatism–reflection and rationale–cause. Yet both authors are accused of antagonising these elements. In addition to citing selected examples of criticism, the paper also contains elements of Bourdieu’s theory of practice that lie outside the horizon of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy.
The author deals with the notion of practice in Michel de Certeau’s The practice of everyday life. The French philosopher — distancing himself from Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and Michel Foucault’s theory of subject and power — builds his own which is appealing but somehow elusive understanding of practice as the activity of making our lives livable within the constraints of social structures and cultural rules. She analyses his distinction between strategies and tactics and invites the reader to try out the perspective on popular culture as aspace of invention, economy of gift and ethics of stubbornness (rather than resistance) and finally to take astep back and rethink its usefulness for social and cultural sciences and lastly it’s sense for our existence.
Wittgenstein the saviour? The problem of rules in Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practiceThe text constitutes a thorough and exhaustive analysis of the impact of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice and especially on his notions of practical sense and logic of practice. The author first considers both philosophers’ attitude to objectivism. Then she proposes a reading of Wittgenstein’s theory that might prove useful and inspiring in the sociological field. In the final section, the author analyses the other, partly oppositional in relation to Bourdieu’s, theories of practice, proposed by Anthony Giddens and Michel de Certeau, putting them in the light of Wittgenstein’s analyses. Wybawca Wittgenstein? Problem reguł w teorii praktyki Pierre’a BourdieuTekst stanowi dociekliwą i wyczerpującą analizę wpływu filozofii Ludwiga Wittgensteina na teorię praktyki Pierre’a Bourdieu, a zwłaszcza na wypracowane przez Bourdieu pojęcia zmysłu praktycznego i logiki praktycznej. Autorka rozważa stosunek do obiektywizmu obu filozofów. Następnie proponuje takie odczytanie teorii Wittgensteina, które mogłoby okazać się pożyteczne i inspirujące w polu socjologicznym. W ostatniej części artykułu autorka analizuje inne, po części opozycyjne wobec teorii Pierre’a Bourdieu teorie praktyki, zaproponowane przez Anthony’ego Giddensa i Michela de Certeau i stawia je w świetle analiz Wittgensteina.
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