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EN
The problematic gap between legal and social norms exists in copyright law. The consequences of this gap are severe and include: not following copyright rules, and a big conflict between artists and recipients of a culture. In this context, copyright piracy is prevalent in Poland and legal tools aimed to protect interests of artists have failed. Copyright law might have been in sync with analogue era, but not to digital world. Identification of roots of the discrepancy between social expectations and legally binding rules might be the first step toward rectifying of situation. This article demonstrates the conceptual metaphors as a possible reason for malfunctioning the copyright law. Some metaphors treat intangible objects as tangible ones (intellectual or artistic work) and might pose difficulties mentioned above. Additionally, Larsson defined a group of metaphors in legal system. Bound with them are metaphors outside of law. For example, if law treats intellectual property as tangible property, than metaphors outside the copyright legal system, such as piracy apply. Polish copyright law in the context of Lakoff – Johnson theory of metaphors is a framework of the study.
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Czy pragmatyka jest u Kelsena możliwa?

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EN
The main goal of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law is to build a science of law. Kelsen is looking for a valid conditions of legal science and find them in neokantian philosophy. However, in the last phase when he turns into linguistic paradigm, he can’t explain science of law through neokantian terms anymore. In this case the question arises, how to recognize law from other linguistic expressions. Normally one could recall context of such expression (pragmatical context). In Kelsen’s case this is impossible as he distinguishes between is and ought and postulates that we should study law only on ought sphere. Despite this I will try to demonstrate that the pragmatics is possible in Pure Theory of Law by transforming previous neokantian categories into pragmatic ones.
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EN
The legal liability is the issue of vast complexity and hence worth to analyze both on theoretical and practical level. The main goal is to analyze of one of the understandings of legal responsibility, imputation, proposed by Hans Kelsen. Therefore, first the concept of imputation will be described. Secondly, the mechanism will be revealed, which transforms imputation into legal responsibility. The conclusion includes the notion of incompleteness of Pure Theory of Law in application of law field.
PL
Odpowiedzialność prawna jest złożonym zagadnieniem, wartym przeanalizowania zarówno na poziomie teoretycznym, jak i w odniesieniu do konkretnych przypadków praktycznych. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest analiza jednego z ujęć odpowiedzialności prawnej, które zaproponował Hans Kelsen. Zostanie zatem opisana konstrukcja zarachowania, a następnie pokazany mechanizm przełożenia zasady zarachowania na odpowiedzialność prawną. Wnioski bazują na stwierdzeniu niekompletności „czystej teorii prawa” w zakresie stosowania prawa.
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(Meta)etyka a filozofia prawa

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EN
In this paper I have focused on methodological problems of ethics and legal philosophy. My main goal was to determine relation between meta-ethics and legal philosophy. In the first part I tried to describe historical context, how jurisprudence become independent form ethics. Then in second part I examined relations between main disciplines of ethics and legal philosophy pointing out that although there are some similarities, there is even more differences. Finally in the third part I explored relation between meta-ethics and legal philosophy. My conclusion was that the problems of meta-ethics also exists in legal philosophy but the level of significance is lower. The reason for it lays in the specific character of legal norms which existence depends on the will of competent authority in contrast to moral norms which need other, meta-ethical justification.
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