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EN
The paper starts with the presentation of factors that probably stand behind analogies between the Roman Civil Law and the English Common Law (1). These factors concern the framework of the sources of law – the dominance of case-law, the dogma of unalterable good-old law (2). Then the text presents the phenomenon of domination of procedural rules over the substantive ones. Even the Eng lish legal historians, although reluctant to concede that Romanisation also took place in Albion, admit that to a certain degree “their” original writs and forms of action in common law functioned similarly to the formulary system of the Roman law (3). A number of parallels was detectable in the sphere of substantive law as well. Then the paper focuses on the law of obligations, especially the contract law (4) and the restitution law (5). Due to procedural reasons (“ubi remedium, ibi ius” rule), the separate branches of law of obligations were founded in the closed systems of nominate contracts, torts (6) and unjust factors leading to restitution respectively. It is emphasized, however that these analogies should not be deemed to be the examples of the reception of the Roman law by the English courts (7).
EN
The article discusses the problem of evolution and the premises used in applying the English concept known as promissory estoppel. The birth of this legal concept has been discussed on the example of the most important court cases, the so called leading cases, such as, among others, that of High Trees (1947) and Combe v. Combe (1951), in which it was lord Denning who adjudicated. In the article, the author also analyzes the general principles of invoking promissory estoppel. He indicates that in the course of a court trial it is necessary to prove the existence of a promise, on the basis of which the person who was promised something, while acting in accordance with the common sense, decided to withdraw and by undertaking certain definite steps ultimately suffered a loss, whereas withdrawal on the part of the person making a promise would be unjustified. The author of the paper made an effort to try to answer the question whether the abuse of right clause mentioned in Art. 5 of the Civil Code may be regarded as the Polish equivalent of promissory estoppel.
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