The purpose of this paper is to present the views of Isocrates on human excellence as a result of the educational process. The author examines some passages in Isocrates’ speeches, in which the well formed human virtue seems to be changeable and still dependent on the pupils’ social position. Apart from the fact that this virtue occurs as a faculty of seizing each opportunity to speak in a relevant way, it also appears to be once a kind of patience in bearing any success as well as any misfortune in the same manner, and, at other times, it presents itself as a type of activity of the mind, which seeks the best solutions to different problems of the State. It is argued that in the view of Isocrates, despite some relevancy in his model of human excellence, which must be adapted to the future social tasks of each of his pupils, human perfection always entails three most important values. Apart from speaking well at the right time and living agreeably with other people, this perfection is based, to a large extent, on some form of seriousness and a gravity of the mind, which remains totally independent of any opportunities of time.
In his Panathenaic speech, Isocrates contrasts his own teaching program with traditional models of Greek education, both the earlier one and the more scientific one that is favoured in his times: his aim is to form the minds of students in such a manner that they can seize any opportunity that comes along, that in the social intercourse they always remain indulgent and patient, and – what seems the most important here – that they become able to endure both luck and misfortune with courage and appreciate not the things obtained merely by chance, but the ones gained by their toil and effort (Panath. 30–32). And Isocrates’ respect to steadily working mind becomes even greater with time: the result of such a labour must be some prudence (“phronesis”) – the aim of every justly conceived education. Isocrates’ “phronesis” is not Platonic excellence of mind, permanent and always the same, it is the skill and talent of discovering how to adjust to changing public affairs, but at the same time it shall remain constant and unchangeable in its imperative good – the benefit of Athens and its citizens.
In Platonicis scriptis expressae ad vocabuli dicendique rectitudinem pertinentes animadversiones hac in commentatiuncula tractantur. Quae pars philosophiae Platonis in principiis congruentem se praebet cum placitis nostrae aetatis: Secundum utramque sententiam destinata sunt verba rebus indicandis et docendis alius ab alio hominibus. Quidquid eorum ope enuntiatur, vertit semper ad eum, qui sermonem excipit, nec non ad rem verbis edictis subiectam.
W odcinku platońskiego dialogu "Fajdros" poświęconym krytyce pisma wypowiadana jest myśl przeciwstatwiająca prostoduszność słuchaczy dawnej wyroczni wybrednym upodobaniom młodych: Młodym nie wystarcza wysłuchać prawdy, oceniają też osobę mówiącego (275b5-c2). Przedstawione rozważanie zmierza do uzasadnienia obecności w kontekście dialogu tej uwagi, pozornie odchodzącej treścią od platońskiej krytyki pisma: Dostrzegana ironia wypowiedzi, skierowana zarówno przeciw młodym entuzjastom mowy pisanej, jak i przeciw łatwowiernym słuchaczom wieszczych przepowiedni, godzi w istocie w każdą formę słownego przekazu uniemożliwiającą wymianę myśli między jego uczestnikami. Zwraca się przeciw wszelkiemu wypowiedzeniu myśli - zapisanemu bądż nie - stającemu się dla odbiorców niekwestionowanym orzeczeniem wyroczni. Platońska tzw. krytyka pisma dotyczy również mowy nieutrwalonej graficznie, a ograniczającej aktywność odbiorcy.