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1
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Benjamin Libet's experiment and its critique between 2000-2012

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Strzyżyński P.
Filozofia Chrześcijańska
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2013
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vol. 10
83-102
PL
The article describes the results of Libet’s experiment and its resulting critique, as witnessed by the articles published between 2000 and 2012. As a result of his experiments, Libet concluded that conscious intentions of making a movement are preceded by brain activity registered as the readiness potentials (RP). In this interpretation, free will does not initiate the decision of making a move but is however capable of stopping this process. For this reason, Libet does not conclude that will is determined by biological processes. The resulting discussion in the literature concerns mainly methodology and conclusions drawn by Libet. The methodological points raised include an argument against the use of EEG as an accurate research tool and criticism of the method of timing the occurrence of the conscious intention of making a move. We note that subsequent modifications made to the original experiment, did however allow putting some of the methodological doubts to rest. On the other hand, the critique of Libet’s conclusions focuses on the problematic nature of correlation of physical movements with the readiness potentials. The most recent research also shows that the potentials might have a more complicated origin than previously thought. Libet’s interpretation is also criticised for its vagueness in defining intention and for not distinguishing it from wishes and desires. The last part of our article summarises the latest state of affairs as emerging from the analysis. We point out the difficulties in correlating potentials with movement, their interpretation and difficulties with the notion of veto, since it seems to require that contradictory intentions of making and refraining from a movement are present simultaneously. The article concludes that on the basis of the current research, the thesis about a biological determination of voluntary processes lacks a sound justification.  
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Robert Spaemann, Odwieczna pogłoska. Pytanie o Boga i złudzenia nowożytności, tłum. Jarosław Merecki, Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa 2009, ss. 339.

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Strzyżyński P.
Filozofia Chrześcijańska
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2012
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vol. 9
193-197
PL
Prace niemieckiego filozofa, Roberta Spaemanna, ucznia Joachima Rittera, ostatnimi laty cieszą się w Polsce pewną popularnością. Obok wydanego w 1996 roku, kluczowego dla myśli Spaemanna, zbioru esejów  Szczęście a życzliwość w następnych latach pojawiły się kolejne polskie tłumaczenia. Ostatnia w tym gronie jest Odwieczna pogłoska, której oryginał powstał w 2007 roku.
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Problem trafu moralnego i winy według Thomasa Nagela i Norvina Richardsa. Próba uzupełnienia krytyki Richardsa

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Strzyżyński P.
Filozofia Chrześcijańska
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2012
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vol. 9
71-89
EN
The article discusses the problem of moral luck described by T. Nagel and B. Williams. It also presents the critique of N. Richards. In terms of Nagel moral luck causes a paradox: we judge morally random acts and break the principle of estimating only those acts which are under the con- trol of the perpetrator. Richards criticizes the sole use of the criterion of effects of the act, without intentions. This criticism is extended and includes the objection of too far-reaching generalization of the role of luck made by Nagel.
4
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Michel Onfray, Antypodręcznik filozofii. Lekcje sokratejskie i alternatywne, tłum. Elżbieta i Adam Aduszkiewiczowie, Wydawnictwo Czarna Owca, Warszawa 2009, ss. 408.

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Strzyżyński P.
Filozofia Chrześcijańska
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2011
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vol. 8
114-116
PL
Antypodręcznik stara się faktycznie i celowo być antypodręcznikiem. Choć autorowi częściowo się to udaje, trudno być pewnym, czy w tej mierze i w tym zakresie, który sam zamierzył. Celem Onfray'a nie jest zniechęcenie do filozofii, ale raczej takie jej przedstawienie, aby pokazać jej związek z problemami codziennymi, a przez to zachęcić do bardziej pogłębionych, choć niekoniecznie akademickich studiów...
5
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Julian Baggini i Peter Stanley Fosl, Przybornik filozofa. Kompendium metod i pojęć filozoficznych, tłum. Dorota Chabrajska, Pax, Warszawa 2010, ss. 328.

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Strzyżyński P.
Filozofia Chrześcijańska
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2011
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vol. 8
111-114
PL
W polskiej literaturze filozoficznej brakowało  takiej  pozycji,  która w prosty, czytelny dla studenta pierwszych lat, a nawet osób młodszych, prezentowałaby pojęcia techniczne i metody filozofii. Czym innym jest przecież podręcznik metodologii, czym innym podręcznik wstępu do filozofii, a czym innym Przybornik filozofa...
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Problemy wolności wiary religijnej, ukrytości Boga i dowodów istnienia Boga na przykładzie koncepcji Johna Hicka i jej krytyki

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Strzyżyński P.
Poznańskie Studia Teologiczne
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2010
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issue 24
381-390
EN
The main point is presentation of J. Hick’s conception of religious faith freedom and her critics. On this ground article put questions to catholic’s theology. Hick say that faith is experiencing-as, and has almost infinite freedom. God can't to force to believe Him. From the other side. Hick consider that person like Jesus had huge awareness of God’s, that it was no place for freedom. Authors like Perret, Henze, Cheetham try to analyze Hik’s conception. They shows few contradictions and new problems.
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Wybrane konsekwencje trafu moralnego dla etyki, koncepcji społecznych i religijnych

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Strzyżyński P.
Teologia i Moralność
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2019
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vol. 14
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issue 2(26)
211-233
EN
The article presents the issue of moral luck and some of its consequences for the philosophy of law, social justice, political responsibility and some religious concepts. Recognition of the role of moral luck undermines the use of the concept of moral responsibility, guilt and merit. The consequences of recognizing that this challenge is justifi ed, reach those areas. They postulate, for example, the need to compensate social or property inequalities, insofar as they depend on the luck. Similarly, in the Christian concept of salvation as dependent off the will of God and man, there is the problem of the impact of luck. Release from moral responsibility for actions under the infl uence of luck, also puts into question the responsibility of politicians, whose decisions are often made in the absence of certainty.
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Krytyka koncepcji racjonalności bezdowodowego przeświadczenia teistycznego Johna Hicka.

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Strzyżyński P.
Filozofia Chrześcijańska
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2009
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vol. 6
85-96
EN
The main point of this article is John Hick’s conception of rational theistic belief without proof and its critics. By the analogy between sense experience and religious experience Hick build the inference leading to conclusion that the religious experience is like sense experience reliable foundation for rationally of beliefs. So although religious beliefs have non proofs, for instance for existence of God, they are rational. Critics, like C. R. Brakenhielm, T. R. Mathis, R. W. Perrett review this inference and conclusion. Especially are attacking analogy between sense experience and religious experience, by negation of possibility of the private language and possibility of solipsistic alternative for sense experience.
PL
The main point of this article is John Hick’s conception of rational theistic belief without proof and its critics. By the analogy between sense experience and religious experience Hick build the inference leading to conclusion that the religious experience is like sense experience reliable foundation for rationally of beliefs. So although religious beliefs have non proofs, for instance for existence of God, they are rational. Critics, like C. R. Brakenhielm, T. R. Mathis, R. W. Perrett review this inference and conclusion. Especially are attacking analogy between sense experience and religious experience, by negation of possibility of the private language and possibility of solipsistic alternative for sense experience.  
9
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Analysis of the Meaning of the Word ‘Coincidence’ in the Context of the Problem of Moral Luck

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Strzyżyński P.
Poznańskie Studia Teologiczne
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2021
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issue 38
253-272
PL
Celem artykułu jest wykazanie, które znaczenia słowa ‘przypadek’ można zastosować w kwestii trafu moralnego. W pierwszej części artykułu pokrótce omówiono istotę problemu trafu moralnego, rodzaje tego trafu oraz konsekwencje uznania roli trafu/przypadku dla moralności. Druga część zawiera definicje przypadku. W tej części zaprezentowano również argumenty za tym, które z przedstawionych znaczeń przypadku można wykorzystać w analizie zagadnienia trafu moralnego. W zakończeniu artykułu pojawia się sugestia ograniczenia znaczenia i roli tzw. paradoksu trafu moralnego.
EN
The aim of the article is to show which meanings of the word ‘coincidence’ can be used in the problem of moral luck. The first part of the article briefly discusses the essence of the problem of moral luck, the types of this luck and the consequences of recognizing the role of luck for morality. The second presents definitions of coincidence. This part also presents the arguments which of the presented meanings of coincidence can be used in the analysis of the problem of moral luck. In conclusion, there is a suggestion to limit the meaning and role of the so-called  paradox of moral luck.
10
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Moralność zwierząt - wokół Dzikiej sprawiedliwości Marca Bekoffa i Jessiki Pierce. Analizy wstępne

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Strzyżyński P.
Filozofia Chrześcijańska
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2023
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vol. 20
93-112
EN
The article analyzes the concept of morality proposed by Bekoff and Pierce in the context of animal morality in the book Wild Justice. Differences are shown in comparison to the understanding of morality in the human context. On this basis, it is suggested to use the name (proto)morality for animal behavior similar to the moral behavior of humans. Part of the article analyzes the concept of empathy used in the context of animals. The article also argues to use the third type of moral status of moral (proto)subjectivity.
PL
W artykule analizuje się pojęcie moralności zaproponowanego przez Bekoffa i Pierce w kontekście moralności zwierząt w książce Dzika sprawiedliwość. Wykazuje się różnice w porównaniu do rozumienia moralności w kontekście ludzkim. Na tej podstawie sugeruje się używanie nazwy (proto)moralność na zwierzęce zachowania zbliżone do zachowań moralnych ludzi. Część artykułu analizuje pojęcie empatii używane w kontekście zwierząt. W artykule argumentuje się też, aby używać trzeciego rodzaju moralnego statusu (proto)podmiotowości moralnej.
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