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Ohledání Kantova zdravého rozumu

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Glombíček P.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2009
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vol. 57
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issue 6
893-913
EN
The aim of the paper is to forestall certain one-sided interpretations of Kant’s notion of common sense. First, the very occurrence of the term in Kant’s work is widely underestimated, with attention being limited to his negative strictures towards the Scottish school. Second, common sense tends to be instrumentally over-interpreted for particular purposes in aesthetics or political philosophy. The interpretation proposed here, in contrast, begins by pointing out the positive use of the notion already in the first Critique. Furthermore a close reading reveals the epistemological justification of sensus communis in the third Critique, a justification that bases the Kantian notion on the Aristotelian idea of koiné aisthésis what makes the communal aspect of it an effect rather than a foundation. In effect, Kant turns out to be transforming previous uses of the notion of common sense into its current form.
2
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Lockův skromný návrh nauky o znacích

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Glombíček P.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2005
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vol. 53
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issue 1
67-83
EN
The article concerns Locke’s philosophy of language. After presenting Locke’s theory of meaning and his motivation for introducing it, the author summarises Locke’s taxonomy of signs and thereby shows that Locke is introducing a concept of the conventional sign as a symptom of belief (not as an icon for a thing or a state of things). On this basis, and on the basis of Locke’s division of the sciences, the article shows that the so-called doctrine of signs takes the place of metaphysics, i.e. of first philosophy. The author goes on to show, on the basis of a discussion of the words child and doctrine, that the aim of this doctrine is not purely theoretical, rather it is primarily educational: the doctrine itself is not well-supported by a theory that might serve as the grounding for other theories, instead it is above all a proposal for a new concept the concept of a sign which can aid the acquisition of knowledge.
3
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Obecný smysl u Arendtové a Kantův zdravý rozum

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Glombíček P.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2011
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vol. 59
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issue 3
351-376
EN
The article is concerned with the epistemological background of Hannah Arendt’s philosophy. It focuses on the notion of common sense that plays a central role in Arendt’s work. The origin of Arendt’s notion of common sense lies in her interpretation of Kant, and the author tries to state the inadequacies of Arendt’s interpretation of Kant with respect to the notion of common sense. The focus is not on the application to political philosophy but rather on Kant’s theory of judgement, and it is shown that whereas Kant’s aim was a unified theory of rationality, Arendt, mostly unintentionally, narrows the scope of the theory to conscious consideration of others in decision making. Textual evidence aside, the thesis of the article is supported by a reductive argument that distinguishes the purported theory of the meaning of judgements from Arendt’s approach, in order to show the latter’s conformist implication.
4
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Původ zájmu o common sense : vznik Shaftesburyho eseje "Sensus Communis"

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Glombíček P.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2019
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vol. 67
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issue 5
735-752
EN
The article explores the circumstances of writing and publication of the essay Sensus Communis by Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, so as to fix its place in Shaftesbury’s body of work. Shaftesbury himself did not employ the eponymous term elsewhere in his works and the author argues that its introduction in the essay did not present a significant conceptual enrichment of Shaftesbury’s doctrine. The introduction of the term is interpreted as a tool for answering Shaftesbury critics. First, Jonathan Swift’s A Tale of a Tub is proposed as a stimulus for Shaftesbury’s concern with raillery in his Letter concerning Enthusiasm. Second, Mary Astell is singled out among the critics of the Letter as the one who put forth the most elaborate analysis, including an argument from common sense against Shaftesbury’s test by raillery.
CS
Cílem autora článku je alespoň zčásti objasnit místo eseje Sensus Communis v Shaftesburyho díle, resp. ukázat, jak dalece jsou při vysvětlení v něm vyložené koncepce zdravého rozumu nápomocny informace o okolnostech jeho vzniku. Ve svých dalších textech totiž Shaftesbury s tímto pojmem nepracuje. Autor zdůrazňuje, že zavedení tohoto pojmu nepředstavuje rozšíření Shaftesburyho filosofie ze systematického hlediska. Za Shaftesburyho zájmem o vtip a posměch spatřuje vliv Swiftovy Pohádky o kádi a samotný esej vykládá jako reakci na kritiku Dopisu o entusiasmu. Zdůrazňuje zejména vliv Mary Astellové, jež ve své zevrubné kritice Shaftesburyho Dopisu použila také argument z common sense.
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Seneca jako zdroj raně novověkých koncepcí zdravého rozumu:

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Glombíček P.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2020
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vol. 68
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issue 5
679-696
EN
The author operates from the assumption that early modern philosophers’ reflections on common sense were substantially shaped by Seneca’s texts (which belonged to the common reading of the scholars of the time) in the course of their treatment of the Latin terms “sensus communis”, “bona mens” and “recta ratio” and the French and English counterparts of these terms. From this he concludes that it is entirely appropriate to take a closer look at Seneca’s own treatment of these terms to see if we can find material there that would help us better understand early philosophical reflections about common sense. The next part of the article attempts therefore to show what in Seneca’s treatment of such terms as “bona mens”, “recta ratio“ and “sensus communis” can justify, when they are explicit, the early modern references to him, and the suspicion of his influence when they are not explicit.
CS
Autor vychází z předpokladu, že raně novověcí filosofové byli ve svých úvahách o zdravém rozumu při svém zacházení s latinskými termíny „sensus communis“, „bona mens“ a „recta ratio“ a jejich francouzskými nebo anglickými protějšky podstatně formováni Senekovými texty, jež patřily k běžné četbě tehdejších vzdělanců. Z tohoto předpokladu pak následně dovozuje, že je zcela namístě podívat se blíže na Senekovo vlastní zacházení s těmito termíny, abychom zjistili, jestli tam nelze nalézt materiál, který by nám pomohl raně filosofickým reflexím zdravého rozumu lépe porozumět. Další část textu stati se pak pokouší ukázat, co v Senekově zacházení s takovými termíny, jako jsou „bona mens“, „recta ratio“ a „sensus communis“, opravňuje raně novověké odkazy na něj tam, kde jsou explicitní, a předpoklad jeho implicitního vlivu tam, kde explicitní nejsou.
6
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Povaha vlivu Karla Krause na Wittgensteinovu filosofii

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Glombíček P.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2023
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vol. 71
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issue 2
229-250
EN
The article concerns the influence of Karl Kraus, the Austrian cultural critic, on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It starts by pointing out the significance attributed to the influence of Kraus by Wittgenstein himself, and this is then compared with the inspiration he took from other authors. Then the mottos to both central books by Wittgenstein are identified as the key Krausian indicators. And, interpreting both mottos, the article comes to the conclusion that, for the most part, Wittgenstein was inspired by Kraus to conceive his own work as a linguistic satire. The end of the article uses examples of Wittgenstein’s use of comical elements to show satire as a key aspect of his philosophy.
CS
Text zkoumá vliv literáta Karla Krause na Wittgensteinovu filosofii. Nejprve upozorňuje na význam, který tomuto vlivu, ve srovnání s podněty jiných autorů, přičítal sám Wittgenstein. Následně identifikuje jako klíčovou známku Krausova vlivu, vedle jednotlivých paralel v textech obou zde zmiňovaných autorů, motta ke dvěma hlavním Wittgensteinovým knihám. A jejich interpretací dochází k závěru, že Wittgenstein od Krause přebral především jazykovou satiru. Nakonec proto článek prostřednictvím příkladů využití komiky ve Wittgensteinově díle navrhuje brát při interpretaci Wittgensteinovy filosofie v potaz její satirický aspekt jako jeden z hlavních autorových nástrojů.
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