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Pozytywistyczny park jurajski

100%
Gizbert-Studnicki T.
Forum Prawnicze
|
2013
|
issue 1 (15)
50-59
EN
The purpose of the paper is to discuss ideas expressed in two recent papers published by J. Stelmach and B. Brożek. Contrary to the views of J. Stelmach and B. Brożek, it is argued that contemporary legal positivism cannot be defined by referring to methods by which legal questions are solved. Legal positivism is defined exclusively by separation thesis and social sources thesis, and not by any normative theory of interpretation. Legal positivism as a descriptive and general theory of law does not entail any legal methods. It is argued that the picture of logical, formal-dogmatic, normative and analytical methods pre sented by J. Stelmach and B. Brozek is inadequate. Therefore, the critique of positivism presented by J. Stelmach and B. Brożek is not heard and the myths of positivistic methods identified by them do not exist.
2
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Granice sporów interpretacyjnych w prawoznawstwie

63%
Dyrda A., Gizbert-Studnicki T.
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej
|
2020
|
vol. 2(23)
19-34
PL
Czy wykładnia prawa ma granice? Czy granice te są konwencjonalnie ustalone? Co sprawia, że dane „racje prawne”, postulowane przez kreślone normatywne teorie wykładni, są dopuszczalne w dyskursie prawnym, nawet jeżeli są nietrafne? W artykule argumentujemy, że pojęcie granic interpretacji prawa powiązane jest z ogólnym pojęciem granic prawa. Wskazujemy na zakres tzw. „interpretacyjnych sporów teoretycznych” dyskutowanych m.in. na gruncie pewnych wysublimowanych, „instytucjonalnych” wersji współczesnego pozytywizmu prawniczego. Granice interpretacyjne nie mają jednak wyłącznie charakteru granic „instytucjonalnych”. W naszym przekonaniu, granice te są także ogólnie wyznaczone przez truistyczne, powszechnie przyjęte przekonania na temat prawa i interpretacji.
EN
Does legal interpretation have borders? Are these borders conventionally established? What makes the given ‘legal reasons’, set forth by certain normative theories of legal interpretation, acceptable in legal discourse (even if the reasons are wrong)? In the present paper, we argue that the notion of the borders of legal interpretation is linked to the general notion of the borders of law. We indicate the scope of ‘interpretive theoretical disagreements’ in law, as discussed by certain new, ‘institutional’ versions of legal positivism. Interpretive borders are not fully determined by the given ‘institutional’ framework. In our view, these borders are also more generally determined inter alia by certain truistic (platitudinous) beliefs related to law and interpretation.
3
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ALEXY'S THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Teoria praw podstawowych Roberta Alexy'ego)

63%
Gizbert-Studnicki T., Araszkiewicz M.
Przegląd Sejmowy
|
2011
|
issue 3(104)
113-129
EN
One of the most important Robert Alexy's books, 'A Theory of Constitutional Rights' has been recently translated into Polish. This fact offers an opportunity to recall and to examine critically the main features of the theory presented in this work, with particular emphasis on the theory of legal principles and the notion of balancing of legal principles. The article begins with a discussion of methodological features of Alexy's theory of constitutional rights. It may be characterized as a dogmatic theory, and as such it possesses analytic, empirical and normative aspects. However, although the theory has been designed as pertaining to the German constitutional order, its analytic (conceptual) dimension ascribes an universal character to it. The conceptual scheme elaborated by Alexy may be used as a tool for analysis of any constitutional system. Then, the famous distinction between legal rules and legal principles is addressed. Robert Alexy is known as one of the most influential legal theorists in this particular field. He states that the principles can be best accounted for as optimization requirements, that is, the norms which require something be realized to the greatest extent possible, taking into account factual and legal possibilities. Rules, on the other hand, can be only complied with or not complied with. The distinction between the abovementioned types of norms is particularly visible in the case of normative conflicts. The conflicts of rules are resolved by means of second-order rules, while collisions of principles are dealt with in concrete situations by means of weighing (balancing). The article concentrates on the problem of rationality of legal balancing. As regards this issue we present Alexy's views defended in 'A Theory of Constitutional Rights' and in his later work. In particular, the problem of comparison between the degree of infringement of a principle and the level of importance of realization of a colliding principle is discussed. The problem of rationality of constitutional weighing is related to the legal-philosophical issue of the nature of constitution. Constitutions may be perceived as foundations determining the whole content of a legal order on question or as frameworks for legal systems. Alexy claims that his conception of basic rights is coherent with a correct version of the latter view. He contends that his theory of legal principles guarantees a sufficient protection of constitutional rights, due to the fact that disproportionate infringements of basic principles ought to be deemed unconstitutional.
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