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Diametros
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2011
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issue 29
124-127
EN
Recenzja książki: Richard E. Nisbett, The Geography of Thought. How Asians and Westerner’s Think Differently... and Why, The Free Press, New York 2004.
EN
What experiences can be referred to when attempting to familiarize metaphorically oneself with the nature (essence) of the world? What is the source of thus emerging metaphors? The author suggests that there are two possible strategies of metaphorical representing the world as a whole: 1) pars pro toto, 2) intra pro extra. In other words, the source of metaphors can be either a more familiar part of outer reality or a dominant manner of experiencing oneself. Furthermore, the author introduce a distinction between two types of metaphorical language: 1) an intentional use of lexical constructions treated by user as metaphors, 2) a metaphorical expression of something without a conscious realization that a conventional metaphor is being used instead of a specific description. Concluding, the author considers the consequences of an “intra pro extra” hypothesis, as well as the possibility of its empirical verification; either in the case of individual differences or between-culture comparisons. He suggests that in some circumstances we experience ourselves more as “I am my body” while in others, we concentrate on the mental aspect of our existence, “I am my mind.” This dominant manner of experiencing oneself may pass onto a preferred way of metaphorizing entire reality.
EN
In W. James’s studies the author seeks an answer to the question: What is/For whom is it real? The largest number of interesting suggestions one can find in the 21st chapter of his Principles of Psychology. Many of them are linked with somewhat different, although equally interesting question – when, under what circumstances, are we willing to treat a given “object” as something real. James say, among other things, about direction of attention, about the relation to self, triggering of emotions, and about sensorial values of such objects. The author of the paper emphasizes the current character of the problem of the “perception of realness”. The intuitive solutions and proposals put forward by James can be empirically verified as well.
EN
The review of the book by J. Brockmana (Ed.) (2019): The Last Unknowns: Deep, Elegant, Profound Unanswered Questions About the Universe, the Mind, the Future of Civilizations, and the Meaning of Life
PL
Recenzja książki: Brockman, J. (Ed.) (2019). The Last Unknowns: Deep, Elegant, Profound Unanswered Questions About the Universe, the Mind, the Future of Civilizations, and the Meaning of Life. New York: Morrow (p. 352). ISBN: 978-0-06-289794-7
EN
Diversity of contexts of the feeling of unreality, regarded as a phenomenological symptom of dissociative processes, is presented and discussed in the article. Seeking for the common denominator of such experiences, the author aims to relate the psychopathological tradition and non-pathological appearances of the feeling of unreality in everyday life, in the classics, as well as in relation to the research on altered states of consciousness. With reference to the concept of "directed dissociation" (Edges 2004) and the so-called "three place dissociation" (a therapeutic technique used in NLP), the author emphasizes adaptive aspects of dissociative processes. Finally, he poses a question: how should we describe, identify and understand the state of "being in complete association" with (currently taking place) mental processes?
EN
False consensus means a tendency to overestimate the frequency of one’s views and preferences compared to others in the population. The factors that determine the strength of this tendency are still being explored. Research on a sample of 246 students examined the relationship between the level of intolerable uncertainty, measured by the Polish version of the Intolerance Uncertainty Scale (IUS-12), and the strength of the estimated and false consensus. It was assumed that people with less tolerance to uncertainty were more likely to overestimate the universality of their opinions. People with low (lower quartile) and high (upper quartile) uncertainty tolerance were compared using two indicators: the magnitudes of the estimated consensus and the false consensus. It was found that people with low uncertainty tolerance frequently overestimated their own choices: t(121) = -2.03, p = 0.022 compared to people with high tolerance; the second indicator confirmed the expected relationship only at the level of the trend: t(121) = -1.48, p = 0.071. Also, it was shown that people with low tolerance to uncertainty more often chose the less radical options of “probably yes” or “probably no”: t(121)
PL
Fałszywy konsensus oznacza tendencję do przeceniania częstości własnych poglądów i preferencji w populacji. Sprawą otwartą pozostaje wciąż pytanie, od jakich czynników zależy nasilenie tej tendencji. W badaniach, zrealizowanych na próbie 246 studentów, poszukiwano związku między poziomem nietolerowanej niepewności, mierzonej polską wersją Intolerance Uncertainty Scale (IUS-12), a wielkością szacowanego i fałszywego konsensusu. Zakładano, że osoby o mniejszej tolerancji niepewności będą bardziej przeceniać powszechność wybieranych przez siebie opcji. Porównano osoby o niskiej (dolny kwartyl) oraz wysokiej (górny kwartyl) tolerancji niepewności, posługując się dwoma wskaźnikami, tj. wielkością szacowanego oraz fałszywego konsensusu. Stwierdzono, że osoby o niskiej tolerancji niepewności bardziej przeszacowywały częstość własnych wyborów: t(121) = -2,03, p = 0,022 w porównaniu z osobami o wysokiej tolerancji, podczas gdy drugi wskaźnik potwierdził oczekiwaną zależność tylko na poziomie trendu: t(121) = -1,48, p = 0,071. Ponadto wykazano też, że osoby o niskiej tolerancji niepewności częściej wybierały mniej radykalne opcje odpowiedzi typu „raczej tak” lub „raczej nie”: t(121) = 2,01, p < 0,05 oraz przejawiały zdecydowanie niższą samoocenę: t(120) = 3,94, p = 0,000. Słowa kluczowe: tolerancja niepewności,
7
63%
EN
The objective of the research was to check whether False Consensus Effect (FCE), shown in much research, is also valid for ontological decisions. Test participants, faced with an ontological dilemma, made a choice three times, which of the 3 item set (Cracow City, Me myself, the Universe) refers to something most real. The research conducted first among psychology students (N=116), then replicated on mathematics students (N=126) and middle-aged people (N=106). Results: 1) All groups chose the Universe most seldom (4%-11% subjects), the remaining two “objects” were chosen with similar frequency, 2) FCE occurred in all groups and in reference to each choice, 3) with people who made inconsequent choices (16% of test participants), FCE was notably higher (p <.001) in comparison to people making consequent choices, 4) FCE with inconsequent people turned out to be higher (p <.01) even in comparison with “the smallest minority”, people who (consequently) chose the Universe.
Sztuka Leczenia
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2020
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vol. 35
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issue 2
15-27
PL
Cel. Celem pracy było porównanie emocjonalności dwóch grup pacjentów z problemem alkoholowym – rozpoczynających terapię oraz po 6 miesiącach terapii. Metoda i osoby badane. Badania miały charakter poprzeczny. Każda z grup pacjentów liczyła po 40 osób. W każdej z grup proporcja kobiet do mężczyzn wynosiła ok. 1:2 (kobiety stanowiły 36,25% ogółu badanych osób). Wykorzystano 3 narzędzia badawcze: Skalę Nastroju UMACL, Dwuwymiarowy Inwentarz Inteligencji Emocjonalnej DINEMO oraz Kwestionariusz Realność Uczuć (RU-04). Wyniki. Nie odnotowano istotnych różnic w odniesieniu do aktualnego nastroju w żadnym z trzech wymiarów. Odnotowano natomiast (wbrew oczekiwaniom) istotną różnice w odniesieniu do inteligencji emocjonalnej, tyle że na korzyść pacjentów rozpoczynających terapię (t = 2,62, p = 0,011). U pacjentów pozostających w terapii co najmniej 6 miesięcy stwierdzono z kolei większą intensywność uczuć osobowościowo specyficznych – tak negatywnych (t = –2,09; p = 0,04), jak i (na poziomie trendu) pozytywnych (t = –1,49; p = 0,14). Analogiczna tendencja wystąpiła też w odniesieniu do wielu uczuć osobowościowo niespecyficznych, takich, jak np. zazdrość, optymizm, smutek czy poczucie bezpieczeństwa. Wnioski. Należy sądzić, że po kilku miesiącach terapii u pacjentów następuje stopniowe odmrażanie uczuć, zwłaszcza negatywnych, i związane z tym pogorszenie samopoczucia. To proces pożądany, gdyż świadczy o poprawie kontaktu z własnymi uczuciami, choć przez pacjentów bywa odczuwany raczej jako dyskomfort i brak postępów w terapii.
EN
Objective. The aim of the study was to compare the emotionality of two groups of patients with alcohol problems – those who started therapy and patients after 6 months of therapy. Method and participants. The research was transversal. Each group of patients consisted of 40 people. In each group, the proportion of women to men was approx. 1:2 (women constituted 36.25% of the total number of respondents). Three research tools were used: the UMACL Mood Scale, the DINEMO Two-Dimensional Emotional Intelligence Inventory and the Reality of Feelings Questionnaire (RU-04). Results. There were no significant differences with regard to the current mood in any of the three dimensions. On the other hand, there were (contrary to expectations) significant differences with regard to emotional intelligence, but in favor of patients starting the therapy (t = 2.62, p = 0.011). In patients who remained in therapy for at least 6 months, a greater intensity of personality-specific feelings was found – both negative (t = –2.09; p = 0.04) and (at the trend level) positive (t = –1.49; p = 0.14). A similar tendency occurred also with regard to many personality-nonspecific feelings, such as jealousy, optimism, sadness or a sense of security. Conclusion. It should be assumed that after a few months of therapy, patients experience a gradual thawing of feelings, especially negative ones, and the related deterioration of well-being. It is a desirable process as it shows an improvement in contact with one’s own feelings, although it is perceived by patients rather as discomfort and lack of progress in therapy.
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