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The Saying/Showing Distinction in the Light of Early Wittgenstein's Criticism of Russell and Frege

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Dehnel P.

Filozofia Nauki

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2013

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vol. 21

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issue 3

123-141

PL

I argue that the saying/showing distinction was a leitmotiv of Wittgenstein's early criticism of some logical theories of Russell and Frege, although ascribing to Wittgenstein the general theory of ineffable truths on the basis of that distinction is at odds with his intentions in the Tractatus. Three points are noticed here. First, the saying/showing distinction functions effectively, and in fact is intelligible, only in the context of Wittgenstein's critique of Russell's theory of types; the consequences of this critique primarily concern his accounts of formal concepts as well as of logic that should look after itself. Second, Wittgenstein's aim in the Tractatus was to gain an insight into the functioning of our language, into how a proposition expresses its sense. This insight is attainable only from the inside of the language itself. This is what Wittgenstein could have meant when he said that the proposition shows its sense. Thirdly, in order to see something, one must previously know something. The claim that the propositions pŽq, p, and q, combined with one another in the form "(pŽq) . pŽq", yield tautology shows that q follows from p and pŽq (Tractatus, 6.1201). But to see this, one must know something, e.g. what p, q, and Ž mean, what implication, conjunction, or tautology are. Because one cannot know these things independently from other laws of logic, it is legitimate to say that also 'seeing' already presupposes the knowledge of logical rules.

2

Wittgenstein’s Verificationism

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Dehnel P.

Filozofia Nauki

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2019

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vol. 27

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issue 2

39-57

PL

The paper explores Wittgenstein’s discourse of 1929-1930 concerning the problem of verification in respect of both its textual sources and its significance. I first discuss the most important interpretations of the issue and then analyze Wittgenstein’s notes from that period along with his conversations with Schlick and Waismann. The results of the analysis imply that the empirical sense of verification intertwines with its grammatical sense. On the one hand, the question of verification appears in the context of phenomenology and so-called phenomenological language, referring to immediate experience; on the other hand, it is conceived of as a means of settling the sense of a sentence, or, which amounts to the same thing, of fixing the available uses of a sentence. Such an ambiguity is characteristic of the middle, transitory period of Wittgenstein’s philosophical development.

3

Wittgenstein jako filozof kultury

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Dehnel P.

Przestrzenie Teorii

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2020

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issue 33

41-58

EN

The paper raises the question of the extent to which Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be read as a philosophy of culture. The answer aims at grasping the conceptual bonds between three aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought: first, his taking both language and thinking to be expressions of a ‘form of life’ (or culture); second, his taking philosophical theories to result from some disorders that occur in ‘language games’; and third, his critique and rejection of the scientific and technical civilization. The paper advances the thesis that the task of bringing words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use – recommended by Wittgenstein – can be understood as a critique of scientism and culture dominated by scientific and technical rationality.

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The Saying/Showing Distinction in the Light of Early Wittgenstein's Criticism of Russell and Frege

Wittgenstein’s Verificationism

Wittgenstein jako filozof kultury