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Scientific Realism and the Future Development of Science

100%
Park S.
Diametros
|
2019
|
vol. 16
|
issue 60
61-71
EN
Nickles raises many original objections against scientific realism. One of them holds that scientific realism originates from the end of history illusion. I reply that this objection is self-defeating and commits the genetic fallacy. Another objection is that it is unknowable whether our descendants will regard our current mature theories as true or false. I reply that this objection entails skepticism about induction, leading to skepticism about the world, which is inconsistent with the appeal to the end of history illusion. Finally, I argue that we have an inductive rationale for thinking that will lead our descendants to regard our current mature theories as true.
2

UNVIRTUOUS PREDICTION OF THE PESSIMISTIC INDUCTION

100%
Park S.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2021
|
vol. 76
|
issue 8
581 – 595
EN
Pessimists predict that future scientific theories will replace present scientific theories. However, they do not specify when the predicted events will take place, so we do not have the chance to blame them for having made a false prediction, although we might have the chance to praise them for having made a true prediction. Their predictions contrast with astronomers’ predictions. Astronomers specify when the next solar eclipse will happen, so we have both the chance to blame them for having made a false prediction and the chance to praise them for having made a true prediction. The pessimists’ prediction remains unvirtuous until they specify when scientific revolutions will occur. This critical point applies no less to the selectivist’s prediction.
3

DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE VERSIONS OF SCIENTIFIC REALISM AND PESSIMISM

100%
Park S.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2019
|
vol. 74
|
issue 4
278 – 290
EN
Descriptive realism holds that T is true, while normative realism holds that T is warranted. Descriptive pessimism holds that T is false, while normative pessimism holds that T is unwarranted. We should distinguish between descriptive and normative realism because some arguments against scientific realism require that scientific realism is interpreted as a descriptive realism, and because scientific realists can retreat from descriptive to normative realism when descriptive realism is under attack. We should also distinguish between descriptive and normative pessimism because some arguments against scientific pessimism require that it be interpreted as descriptive pessimism, and because scientific pessimists can retreat from descriptive to normative pessimism when descriptive pessimism is under attack.
4
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Two Criticisms against Mathematical Realism

100%
Park S.
Diametros
|
2017
|
issue 52
96-106
EN
Mathematical realism asserts that mathematical objects exist in the abstract world, and that a mathematical sentence is true or false, depending on whether the abstract world is as the mathematical sentence says it is. I raise two objections against mathematical realism. First, the abstract world is queer in that it allows for contradictory states of affairs. Second, mathematical realism does not have a theoretical resource to explain why a sentence about a tricle is true or false. A tricle is an object that changes its shape from a triangle to a circle, and then back to a triangle with every second.
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