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Ius Matrimoniale
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2008
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vol. 19
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issue 13
163-178
EN
This article analyses the role o f religious feelings concerning the regulation of the relations between spouses and between parents and children. According to the author, the term “religious feelings” should be distinguished from the term “freedom of conscience and belief’ which belongs to the personal rights. The view that religious feelings are also the personal  ights but of the subordinate nature must be rejected. The violation of religious feelings could be conceded as a reason for the breakdown o f marriage. Examining such violations, the subjective aspects should be taken into account. Parents are allowed to violate the personal rights of children connected with the religion when they are exercising their own rights deriving from parental authority or the right to upbringing children in a manner consistent with their own convictions. The unlawfulness of such actions is excluded because parents are acting in compliance with the law. 
Zeszyty Prawnicze
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2013
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vol. 13
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issue 3
127-135
PL
THE TERM IN WHICH A PROFESSIONAL PROXY MUST MAKE THE REQUIRED PAYMENT FOR AN APPEAL AGAINST A RULING DISMISSING PROCEEDINGS Summary The aim of this paper is to answer the question whether the provisions of Art. 1302 § 2 of the Polish Civil Proceedings Code (k.p.c.) are applicable in the event of an appeal against a ruling to dismiss a case on grounds of non-payment of the court fee. Doubts have been raised on the admissibility of payment by a professional attorney within a term of seven days of the service of a court’s decision to dismiss a case. Under Art. 1302 § 2 k.p.c. the legislator has allowed for payment of the court fee due within a term of one week from the day on which notice is served on the court’s decision to dismiss the case. The position of the author of this paper is that the term of seven days provided for the remittance of the court fee due in the event of an appeal, as defined in Art. 1302 § 2 k.p.c., starts on the day notice is served on the court’s decision to dismiss a case. Any other position on the matter would be in breach of the legal principles at the root of an individual’s right of access to the law and his right to appeal, as guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, as well as in breach of the prohibition of reformationis in peius. The lodging of an appeal cannot lead to the dismissal of the civil recovery proceedings defined in Art. 1302 § 2 k.p.c.
Zeszyty Prawnicze
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2014
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vol. 14
|
issue 2
47-62
PL
THE CARETAKER’S FEE FOR THE CUSTODY OF MOVABLES IN FORECLOSURE Summary In compliance with the relevant Polish provisions, movables impounded by a bailiff are to be left in the custody of the person with whom they were found. In Article 855 of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure the legislator recognises the bailiff’s option to put impounded movables in the custody of another person, includinga creditor, who then performs the duties of caretaker of the impoundedmovables. The aim of this article is to present issues related to thecaretaker’s fee in foreclosure proceedings. When a movable item isentrusted to the custody of a third party a regulatory relation in publiclaw arises between the bailiff and the caretaker. The caretaker’s fee ispart of the costs of repossession, and are payable in the foreclosureproceedings. The costs of repossession, including the caretaker’s fee, may not be claimed in separate proceedings.
Zeszyty Prawnicze
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2013
|
vol. 13
|
issue 2
149-174
PL
RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL AND THE DIVISION OF JOINT MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY Summary The aim of this article is to answer the question whether a court ruling awarding a particular asset of the joint matrimonial property to one of the spouses automatically means the expiry of the right of first refusal. The author’s position is that neither the contractual nor the statutory right of first refusal is extinguished by a court ruling on the division of the spouses’ jointly held assets. A legal decision whereby a particular asset is awarded to one of the spouses does not mean the cessation of the right of first refusal. The court conducting the division of joint matrimonial assets does not rule on the spouse’ liabilities or debts. Hence spouses who share liabilities cannot apply to a court to have the right of first refusal revoked.
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