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EN
The author of the presented article focused his attention on the question of general principles concerning the division of juridic persons in the canonical legal order. He proved that within can. 122 CIC the legislator only discussed the problem of the division of public juridic persons but did not include any solutions concerning the division of private juridic persons. According to the author, there are two reasons behind this. Firstly, this approach to the problem results from the dominant doctrine of 1917 Code which put particular stress on the public nature of the canonical legal order. Secondly, it results from the fact that private persons have much autonomy in the canonical system. In his interpretation of can. 122 CIC the author points out that the ecclesial legislator clearly refrains from adopting mathematical criteria of division and makes final decision dependant on discretional competent power or executor established by this power. The author believes it is a right approach since using mathematical criteria of division would restrict the power in making appropriate actions. Before making a decision on the basis of criteria specified in can. 122, nr 1–2 CIC the competent power should also take into consideration the specificity of the position in which persons being divided are or will be.
XX
In questo studio l’Autore ha centrato l’attenzione sull’analisi dettagliata delle situazioni contenute nel. can. 16 §§ 1–3 CIC, ovvero sulla questione dei soggetti ablitati a compiere l’interpretazione autentica a modo di legge e sugli effetti retroattivi o meno delle sue singole forme, nonchè sulla problematica della rilevanza dell’intrepretazione fatta a modo di senetenza giudiziale o di atto amministrativo. Dall’analisi condotta risulta che la forma specifica dell’interpretazione dipende soprattutto dal suo autore. In conformità ai principia fondamentali dell’ ordinamento canonico, l’interpretazione autentica compete esclusivamente al legislatore o a chi il legislatore l’ha delegata. In linea di massima tale interpretazione ha valore di legge. Invece l’interpretazione fatta a modo di senstenza giudiziale o di atto amministartivo non è ro- conosciuto come inrterpretazione autentica. Potrebbe avere tuttavia tale valore nel caso della deci- sione emessa dallo stesso legislatore.
EN
In the presented study, the author by analysing the content of the definition of legal decrees and rescripts codified in can. 48 and 59 §1 of the CIC, pointed out that these regulations do not contain any explicit components differentiating these categories of acts. In his opinion, the assumptions contained in the definitions do not fully fit many system solutions formulated in other code regulations. The author of the article proved that the difference between the two categories of acts mentioned in the title becomes clear in their formal aspect because a decree in order to be valid should be issued in a written form. In the case of rescripts, however, the legislator departs from this requirement allowing oral legal effectiveness of this type of legislation. Nonetheless, according to the author, the difference between these two categories of acts is not substantial since, in this case, it only concerns the formal aspect of an act.
EN
The author of the presented article carried out a thorough interpretation of cann. 55 and 56 CIC. His analyses show that the conditions specified in can. 55 CIC are required in order to make a decree fair but are not necessary to make it valid. The author claims that despite the nature of these requirements one should not treat them disrespectfully in their administrative practice. This is because the written form of a decree guarantees its justice and gives its addressees the right to defense. First and foremost, however, a written record is necessary for evidential purposes. The author believes that a form equivalent to a notification described in can. 56 CIC complements other forms codified in cann. 54 and 55 CIC. It is his opinion that introducing this kind of solutions based on mechanisms of fiction is justifiable since issuing decrees often generates tensions between the parties involved. He understands that the functioning of such solutions ensures the effectiveness of these administrative acts even in specific situations.
EN
In the presented article, the focus of the author’s attention is the question of the differentiating criteria for public and private juridical persons. By analysing such premises as the purposes of the persons and the way they are fulfilled he proves that these criteria are of ambivalent nature. As the author believes, this results from the fact that in the canonical system the public area of the Church has its implications on the entire legal reality.
PL
Artykuł omawia kontrowersje dotyczące kategorii poszczególnych aktów administracyjnych, o których jest mowa w Kodeksie Prawa Kanonicznego z 1983 r. Autor ukazuje, że w kanonicznym porządku prawnym poszczególne akty administracyjne posiadają swą specyfikę. Taki charakter generuje wiele kontrowersji doktrynalnych dotyczących natury aktu. W artykule tym wykazano, iż poszczególne akty administracyjne są specyficznymi aktami prawnymi, odbiegającymi mechanizmami funkcjonowania od założeń generalnej teorii aktu prawnego. Mają one charakter dyspozytywny, skierowany na wywołanie określonych skutków prawnych. W Kodeksie występują niejednorodne zapisy co do formy aktu. Prawodawca dopuszcza, pod pewnymi warunkami, skuteczność zarówno formy pisemnej, jak i ustnej. Poszczególny akt administracyjny jest unilateralnym aktem konkretnym wydawanym przez władzę wykonawczą w formie zarówno pisemnej, jak i ustnej.
EN
The author of the article discusses the controversies arising around the category of particular administrative acts present in the Code of 1983. He proves that the ongoing dispute results mainly from the specificity of the nature of these acts. The inconsistency in opinions of various authors concerning the question of terminology, the specificity of particular administrative acts such as legal acts, the problem of the nature of the power making proper decisions as well as the question of the addressee of an act and its written nature. According to the author, particular administrative acts are unilateral definite acts issued by an executive power in both written and spoken form.
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