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EN
This paper discusses some game-theoretical methods for measuring indirect control in complex corporate shareholding networks. The methods use power indices to estimate the direct and indirect control in shareholding structures. Some of these methods only estimate the control power of investors (firms without shareholdings), and only a few measure the control power of all firms involved in shareholding networks (which means investors and stock companies). None of them takes measuring the importance of mutual connections (edges in the networks) into consideration; thus we focus in particular on an extension of these methods in this paper to measure both the control-power of the firms involved in complex shareholding structures (represented by nodes in networks) and the importance (power) of linkages between the firms as elements of a whole corporate shareholding network. More precisely, we apply our approaches to a theoretical example of a corporate network. Moreover, we continue the considerations about reasonable properties for indirect control measurement. Some ideas of new properties are proposed. The paper also provides a brief review of the literature concerning the topic.
EN
The paper presents a method of assessing the value of individual elements of the multigraph, i.e., the value of its vertices and arcs, considering the fuzziness of its parameters. The need to take into account the specificity of the existing types of vertices (including logical functions specified on them) and the possibility of multiple relationships between two neighbouring vertices make it necessary to use a multigraph. The assumed basis for the evaluation of the individual elements of the multigraph was their marginal value, which is the so-called contribution of a given element to the entire multigraph, assuming that the given element affects not only the adjacent elements directly related to it but in a way, perhaps indirect, every other element of the multigraph.
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Indirect control and power

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EN
To determine who has the power within a stock corporate company can be a quite complex prob-lem, especially when control is achieved through alliances between shareholders. This problem arises especially in cases of indirect control of corporations, that is, in situations involving shareholders and companies with cross-shareholdings. The first to solve the problem of measuring power in the case of indirect share control were Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen in [10]. In the following years, numerous other models were introduced. In this paper, we critically examine the models of: Gambarelli and Owen, Denti and Prati, Crama and Leruth, Karos and Peters, as well as Mercik and Lobos, taking into account two well-known, illustrative examples, one with an acyclic corporate structure and the other with a cyclic structure.
EN
The authors of the paper analyzed 21 common methods of measuring a company’s intellectual capital, finding that none of them meet all 6 demands that a model indicator should satisfy. As a result, a new method was developed, which meets the conditions for a model indicator. Using the chosen expert method, a synthetic indicator of a company’s level of intellectual capital (WPKI) has been de-termined. The authors of the paper determine the WPKI indicator for public construction companies using the algorithm defining a hidden value.
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