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Kłopoty z wiedzą niejawną (tacit knowledge) w poglądach Michaela Polanyiego

100%
Zmyślony I.
Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa
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2012
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vol. 48
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issue 1 (191)
49-65
EN
The aim of the article is characteristic of some basic ordeals in reconstruction of Polanyi’s idea of tacit knowledge, as well as exposition of its typical ways of understanding. Paper consists of seven points: (1 – 3) contains an analysis of author’s texts in aspect of typical ways of usage of the term and some other meaning-related categories; in (4) some major methodological challenges facing its definition are picked out, while in (5) main ways of interpretation elaborated by author’s researchers are being expound; (6) focuses on relation between idea of tacit and explicit knowledge, while (7) highlights the role of tacit knowledge in process of problem- -solving.
2
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Michael Polanyi’s Idea of Tacit Premises of Science

100%
Zmyślony I.
Filozofia Nauki
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2012
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vol. 20
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issue 4
63-85
PL
Tacit premises of science constitute researcher’s cognitive scheme, i.e. a set of a priori conditions of knowledge acquisition and application. Couple of assumptions make Polanyi’s idea considerably different than Kantian or behavioural or structural interpretations of cognitive scheme. He sees it more in hermeneutical or habitual terms - as system of (a) skills (dispositions to act), which (b) defines the level of competence; (c) cannot be verbally articulated; (d) is embodied (and hence unaware); (e) innate or acquired through practice - in master-pupil relations; (f) undergoes constant modifications when applied; (g) conditions both theoretical actions (eg. categorisation, acts of assertion), as well as practical (manual skills, acts of perception). The article contains analytical reconstruction of Polanyi’s views originally dispersed throughout all his major works. First two points describe structure and functions of premises - expounded within context of his model of mind and key distinction between subsidiary and focal awareness. Third point analyzes their personal status, focusing on disproportion between their pure functional (habitual) status and linguistic description. Points fourth and five characterise diachronic and synchronic aspects of cognitive scheme as well as closely connected idea of master’s authority and consensus within community of inquirers. Point six contains reconstruction of Polanyian idea of incommensurability and stability of cognitive schemes. Cognitive schemes outline the boundaries of scientific communities. Different schemes are mutually incommensurable in various degree. Main thesis of this conception is following: premises function solely in tacit mode, i.e. in pure habitual (embodied; indwelled; incorporated) fashion. We derive their existence from „meaningful wholes”, i.e. outcomes of our actions. Typical examples of such actions are gestalt-seeing and diagnosing, bike-riding, playing chess, problem-solving, operating in laboratory, uttering, understanding and asserting (or rejecting) of statements. Structure of skilfully performed actions (both theoretical and practical) can be reconstructed in strictly verbalized, methodological directives („explicit rules”). No rule however can be applied automatically in all possible cases of experience. Hence application of all methodological directives requires always some tacit premises. Paradigmatic outcome of tacit premises are introspective gestalt-type appearances. According to Polanyi these personal, theory-laden phenomena, distinguish competent researcher from a laymen. Most of them are „intuitive”, i.e. consist purely phenomenal and aesthetic content. Some of them contain additionally conceptual and propositional compounds which can be verbalised. Difference between the subjective „meaning” - i.e. a purely phenomenal, introspective content of gestalt-type perceptions, and „orthodox”, linguistic meaning, conveyed by words, remains vital for understanding of whole Polanyi’s epistemology.
3
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Philosopher of Science or Theorist of Knowledge? Contribution to Studies on Philosophical Ideas of Michael Polanyi

100%
Zmyślony I.
Filozofia Nauki
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2008
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vol. 16
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issue 2
107-134
PL
Michael Polanyi’s philosophical ideas are interpret in various ways worldwide. In Poland the name remains (barely) listed among such philosophers of science as Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, whereas English or German authors regard him rather as a theorist of knowledge and place aside Gilbert Ryle, Charles Sanders Peirce, Hans-Georg Gadamer or Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The aim of the paper is to describe typical ways of how Polanyi’s ideas are being currently received and to report his main statements. It is proceeded in four steps. After short biography of the author briefed in first point, second one sums up the content of all his main works, depicting thereby the evolution of his views. In third point receptions published in Polish, English and German literature are screened and discussed, focusing on issues of rationality, personal knowledge, tacit knowledge and tacit knowing. Fourth point states a problem of alleged holism and eclecticism as interpretative characteristics of Polanyi’s philosophical views.
4
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Tacit Knowledge – Typical Ways of Interpretation

100%
Zmyślony I.
Filozofia Nauki
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2012
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vol. 20
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issue 3
65-82
PL
How the idea of tacit knowledge is being understood typically? The article reconstructs interpretations in context of three different disciplines: (1) linguistics, (2) cognitive psychology and (3) sociology of knowledge. Furthermore, it proposes (4) definitional criteria for a general notion of tacit knowledge. Abstracts 163 Within philosophical interpretation of N. Chomsky’s generative grammar, the term refers to knowledge of linguistic universals and grammar rules. This knowledge is tacit, since it manifests only through ability to (a) recognize grammar proprieties of expressions in natural language, as well as to (b) generate and understand practically infinite number of them. According to J. Fodor it can be identified with ability to speak (making verbal utterances), hence cannot be substantially distinguished from any other forms of embodied or habitual knowledge. According to alternative interpretation this kind of tacit knowledge (a) has propositional status, (b) is innate and (c) enable all possible grammar forms to be deduced from it. Within context of cognitive psychology tacit knowledge is understood habitually, i.e. as knowledge that manifest itself only through skilful action and cannot be linguistically verbalised. This idea derives form distinction between declarative and procedural memory, inspired by G. Ryle’s distinction between knowing how and knowing that. Habitual knowledge is (a) completely unaware or almost unaware, (b) cannot be fully made aware nor verbalised, is (c) person-related and (d) contextspecific. Third way of understanding was proposed by Harry Collins, who has recently (2010) introduced three own types of tacit knowledge - (a) somatic, (b) relational and (c) collective. According to his idea knowledge has basically tacit character, since it circulates „throughout the universe” as physically understood information („pattern”) inscribed on different physical carries („strings”). Relational tacit knowledge can be fully verbalized and implemented in human body or any physical automaton. Somatic tacit knowledge cannot be fully verbalised, since – apart of its quasi-mechanical dimension – it also includes improvisatory (ever-adaptive) aspect of human skills, it can be however transferred to animals (like riding a bike). Collective tacit knowledge cannot be verbalised at all – it is specific exclusively to social dimension of cognitive activities (like driving a car), i.e. cannot be transferred to any sort of animals or automata. Apart of descriptive reconstruction of listed ideas, the article propose four general criteria to define an idea of tacit knowledge sensu largo. According to author’s stand, the term „tacit knowledge” designates (a) all kinds of non-propositional knowledge or unaware propositional knowledge; (b) all kinds of a priori knowledge; (c) dispositional knowledge (skills; competence); (d) knowledge conceived as information acquired by any organic system through permanent interaction with environment.
5
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Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz's Notion of Conceptual Apparatus

63%
Zmyślony I.
Filozofia Nauki
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2009
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vol. 17
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issue 1
85-105
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