Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 6

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Content available remote

Podmiot i przedmiot poznania jako efekt syntezy transcendentalnej jedności apercepcji w sformułowaniu neopragmatycznym. Stanowisko Roberta B. Brandoma

100%
Żuromski D.
Diametros
|
2013
|
issue 37
169-192
PL
Jedną z charakterystycznych tez dla klasycznego amerykańskiego pragmatyzmu (w skrócie TP) oraz współczesnego neopragmatyzmu (w skrócie TNP), w odniesieniu do zagadnienia: „Jak umysł i język odnoszą się do świata?” jest ta, że idee podmiotu i przedmiotu poznania nie mają charakteru pierwotnego i autonomicznego. Owe idee były raczej traktowane przez przedstawicieli pragmatyzmu jako efekt pewnego procesu, który w porządku pojęciowym, reprezentowanym na przykład w analizie pojęciowej, lub ontologiczno-redukcyjnym był uznawany jako bardziej podstawowy. Współcześnie jednym z najbardziej oryginalnych i szeroko dyskutowanych neopragmatystów drugiego pokolenia, któremu można zasadnie przypisać TNP, jest amerykański filozof Robert B. Brandom. Zaskakującą rzeczą w jego koncepcji jest to, że formułuje on TNP odwołując się w swojej semantyczno-pragmatycznej wykładni do interpretacji słynnej tezy Kanta o transcendentalnej jedności apercepcji. Celem artykułu jest po pierwsze przedstawienie tezy pragmatyzmu w ramach koncepcji Brandoma oraz po drugie interpretacja, zgodnie z którą istnieją podstawy, aby stanowisko Brandoma określić mianem transcendentalizmu.
EN
One of the characteristic theses of the classical American pragmatism (in short TP) and contemporary neopragmatism (in short TNP) with regard to the question: "How do the mind and language relate to the world?" is that the concepts of the subject and object of knowledge are not primitive and autonomus. Rather, these concepts were construed by the pragmatists and the neo-pragmatists as a result of a process which, in the order of philosophical explanation, reflected e.g. in conceptual analysis or ontological reduction, was considered to be more basic. Today, one of the most original and widely discussed neopragmatists, who can reasonably be recognized as belonging to TNP, is an American philosopher Robert B. Brandom. What is surprising in Brandom’s theory is that it is formulated against the background of a semantic-pragmatic interpretation of Kant's famous thesis about the transcendental unity of apperception. The purpose of this article is, firstly, to present Robert Brandom’s theory as a version of TNP and, secondly, to provide an interpretation, according to which there is a reason to describe Brandom’s neopragmatism as transcendentalism.
2
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

The Interpersonal Level of Explanation of Mind and Cognition

100%
Żuromski D.
Filozofia Nauki
|
2020
|
vol. 28
|
issue 2
47-74
PL
What is the influence of the social and (to a lesser extent) the cultural on mind and cognition? The question will concern: (i) the nature of the relation between what is social and cultural, on the one hand, and the mind, cognitive ability, and cognitive development on the other; (ii) aspects of the mind, cognitive ability, and cognitive development affected by what is social and cultural; (iii) processes in which what is social and cultural becomes a part of individual cognitive functioning. This paper attempts to provide a conceptual framework within which the above questions can be answered. In the literature concerning the explanation of mind and cognitive abilities, attention is drawn to the importance of distinguishing levels of explanation. One of such approaches to multi-level explanation of the mind and cognition is the distinction drawn by Daniel Dennett between the personal level of explanation (e.g., level of beliefs, desires) and the subpersonal level of explanation (e.g., neural or computational). The purpose of this article is to argue that - recognising that the social and the cultural are one of the constitutive conditions of mind and cognition - we should posit a third level: the interpersonal level of explanation (ILE). The reason for postulating ILE is that there are specific domains in which interpersonal interactions affect elementary cognitive abilities and processes, which may thus result in their transformation into higher cognitive abilities and processes. The entire group of such domains will be defined as ILE, and at the centre of its explanatory potential will be the different types and forms of the said transformation. One of the main research objectives pursued at the ILE is to identify and formulate a taxonomy of transformative features and processes. Two models of such processes will be presented: the Vygotsky model and the Tomasello model. In the final part of this paper, the basic methodological assumptions of the ILE will be presented: the relative autonomy of this level of explanation, multi-level analysis, and the mechanism-based explanation. These assumptions will also be used to formulate general theses of the ILE.
3
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Czy neopragmatyzm jest transcendentalizmem? Rozważania na tle filozofii Richarda Rorty’ego i Roberta Brandoma

100%
Żuromski D.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2012
|
issue nr 20
37-63
EN
The subject of this paper is one of the central problems of philosophy, which isaptly stated by Hilary Putnam: “How does mind/language hook on to the world?”.This question presupposes a model of knowledge which may be called “the subject--object model of knowledge”. However, contemporary philosophers such as WilfridSellars, Hilary Putnam, Donald Davidson, Richard Rorty, John McDowell, JohnHaugeland and Robert Brandom criticize this traditional model of knowledge. I claimthat at least some versions of neopragmatism look at this problem implicitly assum-ing a transcendental point of view. This istranscendentalism without transcendentalstandpointand can be found in Marek Siemek’s works. This transcendentalismcan be considered in two ways. First, as a therapy – a standpoint that is characteristicof Rorty, who demonstrated that the subject-object model of knowledge is optionaland contingent. Second, as constructivism – this standpoint is represented by Bran-dom, who tries to show that this traditional model is not autonomus.
4
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Thinking and Morality as a Form of Cooperation in the Light of the Conception of Michael Tomasello

100%
Żuromski D.
Kultura i Edukacja
|
2017
|
issue 2(116)
69-81
EN
In his work A Natural History of Human Thinking, Michael Tomasello depicts thinking as a form of cooperation. Presenting at the same time a conceptual schema enriched with empirical data, he outlines a natural history of thinking in particular, indicating how the process of socialization and new, unique manifestations of human interaction alter the forms of thinking, from the ones we share with primates, through increasingly complex forms characteristic of the primitive man, to these of the contemporary man. In A Natural History of Human Morality Tomasello presents a similar structure, showing morality as a form of human cooperation in which, according to Tomasello, Homo sapiens, seen as “ultra-social primates”, developed new and uniquely human forms of social interaction and organization which, as a result, required new and also very specific for Homo sapiens psychological mechanisms in cognitive processes, social interaction and self-control. While in A Natural History of Human Thinking Tomasello’s main hypothesis is the Shared Intentionality Hypothesis, in A Natural History of Human Morality it is the Interdependence Hypothesis. Thus, this unique structure of abilities and motivation is the feature which distinguishes us from other primates. This essay aims to extract and outline this structure, focusing more on A Natural History of Human Morality.
5
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Towards Explanation of the Natural Origins of Content

100%
Żuromski D.
Kultura i Edukacja
|
2016
|
issue 2(112)
112-127
EN
How should we understand intentionality in the physical world? This question may be further divided into at least two other: How to understand intentional states in the physical world? (And if we refer to the entirety of such states as the mind then our question will take on the following form: How should we understand the mind in the physical world) and How to understand intentional content in the physical world? One of the most important projects in modern philosophy of mind and cognitive science consists in naturalisation of the content of mental states. The prevalent concept in the thus understood content naturalisation programme was the reductionist conception. In the article I present one of the proposals of content naturalisation by Daniel D. Hutto and Glenda Satne from the article The Natural Origins of Content. On the one hand, they reject the project of naturalising the content of mental states which is conceived as a reduction of semantic properties of contents of mental states solely to physical causative relations, properties or social mechanisms. On the other hand, Daniel D. Hutto and Glenda Satne present a research programme which does not seek a reductionist explanation of content but rather examines how the content emerged in the natural world – the natural origins of content. Although the authors describe the main framework of such a programme, they do not venture to answer the question whether such a theory even exists. In this article I am going to present the concept of Michael Tomaello most explicitly expressed in his Natural History of Human Thinking as a promising example of such a theory.
6
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Extending Cognitive Pragmatics: Social Mechanisms of Mind Transformation

51%
Żuromski D., Pacholik-Żuromska A., Fedyniuk A.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2022
|
vol. 58
65-91
EN
In this article we propose an extended approach in terms of Cognitive Pragmatics (CP) to the explanation of the development of the higher cognitive processes. Therefore, we explain in terms of CP how linguistic and pre-linguistic social practices shape the mind. CP, as we understand it here presents a broader transdisciplinary position covering developmental psychology, primatology, comparative psychology, cultural psychology, anthropology and philosophy. We present an argumentation for the thesis that CP provides an explanation to the origins and developmental mechanisms of some of higher mental functions unique to humans. Thus, we want to extend the notion of CP beyond its standard definition by emphasizing the transformative component of communicative acts. In our approach, CP first and foremost examines the cognitive mechanisms underlying social pre-linguistic and linguistic communication. Secondly, it explores how this communication reorganizes and transforms cognitive abilities and processes. We would like to extend the tasks of CP as well, because its goal is to not only describe cognitive processes that enable communication, but also to explain the social mechanisms of transformation of mind and cognition. We provide an example of said mechanisms of development of higher cognitive functions through the account of metacognition.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.