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Russell od realismu propozic k teorii neúplného symbolu

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Soutor M.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

2013

vol. 61

issue 2, Special No: Studie k filosofii Bertranda Rusella

63-94

The birth of analytic philosophy was fundamentally based on the arguments which G.E.Moore and B.Russell set against idealism. In the first section I shall explain how the notion of proposition as transcendent unity came from the criticism. Moore and Russell criticized Kant’s and Bradley’s abstractionism, which led them to refute the principle of analytic unity of apperception and its correlate, the synthetic unity. This led to the objectification of concepts and propositions. Subjective unity of judgment was replaced by objective unity of proposition. Objective sort of unity Russell defended against Bradley’s regress. This specific conflict between realism and idealism, nonetheless, cannot be merely a conflict of doctrines; I shall try to convince the reader that the conflict was primarily based on some normative assumptions, which leads us from questions after what is true to a project of revealing the values and ideals which a particular set of doctrines is supposed to express and affirm. The second part of the study is devoted to an explanation of the reasons which made Russell, during 1905 and 1910, to change profoundly his defence of realism. Naïve realism embraces decisively the ethos of reality’s transparency to cognitive agents; it fails, however, when used to analyse the notions of truth and knowledge since the relation of cognition is treated as absolutely straightforward in it. There was also the Theory of descriptions which eventually played an important role in Russell’s doubts about naïve realism. As I shall show, the theory was not compatible with realism of propositions, although Russell never argued explicitly this way and the secondary literature is rather silent about it. It was so since the refutation of non-existents must have meant also the refutation of objective falsehoods, which, reasonably enough, must have led to a radical revision of the notions of proposition and judgment. Russell should have come this way to the epistemological basis of his later logical atomism – and he did until he confused his position by accepting the ontology of positive and negative facts around 1918. The Theory of description did not play only motivational role with regard to the abandonment of realism of propositions but also a constitutional role as we shall see in the interpretation of the thesis that propositions are incomplete symbols.

Mnohorelační teorie soudu Bertranda Russella

100%

Soutor M.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

2013

vol. 61

issue 1

51-69

The multiple-relation theory of judgement was introduced by Bertrand Russell in 1910 as the upshot of a critique of propositional realism which, in revolt against idealism, he took over from G. E. Moore. The target of the critique is founded on a binary theory of judgement. Russell attacks the binary theory indirectly by a critique of the identity theory of truth which goes hand in hand with this conception of judgement. In the first part I interpret this critique and then, in the part that follows, I present the multiple-relation theory. In the remainder of the piece I will consider the question of which theory of truth adoption of the multiple-relation theory leads us to. I will also address the question of whether this theory avoids the problems of the binary theory of judgement. In answer to the first of these questions I propose, in the third part, the contextual theory of truth. I will defend this proposal against the thesis that it is actually a congruent version of the correspondence theory. As I will argue in the fourth part, those passages where Russell speaks of correspondence should be treated with caution – in fact, these passages should be positively disregarded. In conclusion I return to the multiple-relation theory as such, and I indicate the difficulty which arises when, in the framework of this theory, we seek to make sense of the synthetic unity of judgement.

Mnohorelační teorii soudu Betrand Russell uvedl v roce 1910 jako výsledek kritiky propozičního realismu, který v revoltě proti idealismu přejal od G. E. Moora. Kritizovaná koncepce se zakládá na binární teorii soudu. Binární teorii Russell napadá nepřímo skrze kritiku identitní teorie pravdy, jež jde s tímto pojetím soudu ruku v ruce. V prvním oddílu tuto kritiku vyložím a v tom, který následuje, představím mnohorelační teorii. Ve zbytku práce se budu zamýšlet nad otázkou, k jaké teorii pravdy přijetí mnohorelační teorie vede. Také zodpovím otázku, zda se tato teorie vyhýbá problémům binární teorie soudu. V odpovědi na první z těchto otázek předložím ve třetím oddílu kontextuální teorii pravdy. Tento návrh budu hájit proti tezi, že šlo o korespondenční teorii kongruenčního typu. Jak budu argumentovat ve čtvrtém oddílu, ty pasáže, kde Russell hovoří o korespondenci, je nutno brát s rezervou, ba dokonce je nezbytné tyto pasáže škrtnout. V závěru se vrátím k mnohorelační teorii jako takové a naznačím potíž, která vyvstává tehdy, když máme v této teorii zajistit syntetickou jednotu soudu.

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2 Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

2 Soutor M.

2 2013

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Russell od realismu propozic k teorii neúplného symbolu

Mnohorelační teorie soudu Bertranda Russella