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Filozofia Nauki
|
1995
|
vol. 3
|
issue 3
73-77
PL
Marian Przełęcki defends the semantical conception of truth against involving it in difficulties of the said controversy.
5
100%
Filozofia Nauki
|
2007
|
vol. 15
|
issue 3
5-12
PL
Referring to the session "Science and religion" (Filozofia Nauki 1/2006) - esp. to Jan Wolenski's contribution article "Return to the theory of double truth" - the author presents two ways of interpreting the meaning of religion statements. According to one of them, the statements may be shown to possess some kind of empirical content, due to their definitional connection with empirical terms of everyday language, and, in consequence, may bear logical relations to empirical statements. According to the other way of interpreting religion statements, they appear to be devoid of any empirical content and - s Wolenski claims - cannot be supported or threatened by any empirical data.
6
100%
Filozofia Nauki
|
1997
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vol. 5
|
issue 4
5-14
PL
An answer to the question whether belief is a proper object of moral appraisal is shown to depend on some assumptions concerning the notion of moral judgement and belief. Different categories of morally appraisable objects are discussed and two concepts of belief are distinguished: a feeling of confidence and an act of assertion. It is claimed that an appraisal of beliefs with regard to their rationality has a moral aspect and that moral beliefs are liable to a moral valuation with respect to their moral content. Both kinds of moral valuation are illustrated by the case of the racist view.
7
100%
Filozofia Nauki
|
1998
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vol. 6
|
issue 3-4
151-154
PL
Review of: Tomasz Bigaj "Matematyka a świat realny", Wydawnictwo WFiS UW, Warszawa 1997.
8
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

O stosunku do własnego życia

100%
EN
Author suggests that we should not treat our own life too seriously. Treating seriously can be analyzed, firstly, as treating as something important. But we should not think about ourselves as more important than other persons. The second analysis suggests life without sense of humor. But, irony and laugh is the only way to cope with tragic events. That is why the attitude of resignation and accepting one own weakness is, against moral ideals, acceptable.
9
Content available remote

O stosunku do własnego życia

100%
EN
Author suggests that we should not treat our own life too seriously. Treating seriously can be analyzed, firstly, as treating as something important. But we should not think about ourselves as more important than other persons. The second analysis suggests life without sense of humor. But, irony and laugh is the only way to cope with tragic events. That is why the attitude of resignation and accepting one own weakness is, against moral ideals, acceptable.
EN
Kolakowski opposes science and myth, conditional empirical reality, the realm of science and unconditional non-empirical reality, the domain of metaphysics and myth. The world of human experience owes its sense to mythical reality. Only it can satisfy the human need for purpose and order in the world, sense and value in human activities, and the permanence of values. This attitude is pragmatic and irrational. One can, however, adopt a rational attitude, requiring that statements be rationally justified, adopting a classical understanding of truth (as conformity between language and reality). Statements about value then admit of cognitive certainty, which, to be sure, transcends that of science, but is founded upon experience, intuitive ethical experience. Statements about values are also entitled to truthfulness (or falsehood). This understanding of value, irrespective of the existence or nonexistence of an absolute reality, guarantees the meaningfulness of life and human activity.
14
63%
PL
    
16
63%
Filozofia Nauki
|
1993
|
vol. 1
|
issue 2-3
295-311
18
63%
Filozofia Nauki
|
1993
|
vol. 1
|
issue 2-3
115-121
Filozofia Nauki
|
1998
|
vol. 6
|
issue 2
5-9
PL
  
20
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The Actual and Possible Worlds

50%
Filozofia Nauki
|
1993
|
vol. 1
|
issue 2-3
313-323
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