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1

REAL AUTHORS AND FICTIONAL AGENTS (FICTIONAL NARRATORS, FICTIONAL AUTHORS)

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Voltolini A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2021
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vol. 28
|
issue 1
60 – 75
EN
A suitable account of fiction must involve a conceptual distinction between (at least) the following figures, or roles: real authors, fictional narrators, and fictional authors. Real authors are the real original utterers of fiction-involving sentences in their fictional use, the one mobilizing pretence. They may coincide (although this would be rare) either with fictional narrators or with fictional authors. A fictional narrator is the protagonist of a tale that is narrated in the first person: the internal point of view on the tale. A fictional author constitutes the tale’s external point of view that vividly manifests itself when the tale is narrated by no protagonist. Fictional narrators, however, never coincide with fictional authors. For either one or the other is the fictional agent, the one-place factor of a narrow fictional context of interpretation whose contribution is to provide a fictional truth-conditional content to the fiction-involving sentences of the relevant tale.
2

(MOCK-)THINKING ABOUT THE SAME

100%
Voltolini A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2017
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vol. 24
|
issue 3
282 - 307
EN
In this paper, the author wants to address once more the venerable problem of intentional identity, the problem of how different thoughts can be about the same thing even if this thing does not exist. First, he will try to show that antirealist approaches to this problem are doomed to fail. For they ultimately share a problematic assumption, namely that thinking about something involves identifying it. Second, he will claim that once one rejects this assumption and holds instead that thoughts are constituted either by what they are about, their intentional objects, or by what determines their proposition - like intentional contents, one can address the problem of intentional identity in a different way. One can indeed provide a new solution to it that basically relies on two factors: a) what sort of metaphysical nature intentional objects effectively possess, once they are conceived as schematic objects à la Crane (2001, 2013); b) whether such objects really belong to the overall ontological inventory of what there is. According to this solution, two thoughts are about the same non-existent intentional object if i) that object satisfies the identity criterion for objects of that metaphysical kind and ii) objects of that kind belong to the overall ontological inventory of what there is, independently of whether they exist (in a suitable first-order sense of existence). As such, this solution is neither realist nor antirealist: only if condition ii) is satisfied, different thoughts can be about the same non-existent intentional; otherwise, they are simply constituted by the same intentional content (provided that this content is not equated with that intentional). Third, armed with this solution, he will hold that one can find a suitable treatment of the specific and related problem of whether different people may mock-think about the same thing, even if there really is no such thing. Finally, he will try to show that this treatment can be also applied to the case in which different thoughts are, according to phenomenology, about the same intentional and yet this intentional is of a kind such that there really are no things of that kind. For in this case, such thoughts are about the same intentional only fictionally.
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