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1

Common Cause Abduction: Its Scope and Limits

100%

Dziurosz-Serafinowicz P.

Filozofia Nauki

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2012

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vol. 20

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issue 4

5-29

PL

This article aims to analyze the scope and limits of common cause abduction which is a version of explanatory abduction based on Hans Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause. First, it is argued that common cause abduction can be regarded as a rational inferential mechanism that enables us to accept hypotheses that aim to account for the surprising correlations of events. Three arguments are presented in support of common cause abduction: the argument from screening-off, the argument from likelihood, and the argument from simplicity. Second, it is claimed, that common cause abduction is a defeasible reasoning, i.e., common cause abductive hypotheses are not always more plausible than separate cause abductive hypotheses. Finally, it is outlined what factors should be taken into account in order to use common cause abduction in a reasonable way.

2

Subjective Probability and the Problem of Countable Additivity

100%

Dziurosz-Serafinowicz P.

Filozofia Nauki

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2009

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vol. 17

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issue 1

123-134

PL

The aim of this paper is to present and analyse Bruno de Finetti's view that the axiom of countable additivity of the probability calculus cannot be justified in terms of the subjective interpretation of probability. After presenting the core of the subjective theory of probability and the main de Finetti's argument against the axiom of countable additivity (the so called de Finetti's infinite lottery) I argue against de Finetti's view. In particular, I claim that de Finetti does not prove the impossibility of using Dutch Book argument for the axiom of countable additivity. Consequently, we can use Dutch Book argument for the justification of the axiom of countable additivity and regard de Finetti's lottery as a special case when the axiom does not hold, or we can justify countable additivity by Dutch Book argument and reject de Finetti's lottery as irrational. The second strategy, represented especially by Jon Williamson, is much more compatible with the idea of subjective interpretation of probability.

3

W obronie tak zwanych „pragmatycznych” uzasadnień probabilizmu

100%

Dziurosz-Serafinowicz P.

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

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2013

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vol. 49

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issue 2

49-78

PL

Celem artykułu jest obrona tak zwanych „pragmatycznych” uzasadnień probabilizmu, tj. tezy mówiącej, iż stopnie przekonania racjonalnego podmiotu powinny być zgodne z aksjomatami teorii prawdopodobieństwa. Analizowane uzasadnienia to: Argument z Zakładu Holenderskiego (AZH) oraz Argument z Twierdzenia o Reprezentacji (ATR). Oba te argumenty natrafiają na szereg problemów istotnie podważających ich wartość, a tym samym probabilizm (operacjonizm, wymuszony zakład, itd.). W niniejszym artykule wykazane zostało, iż odpowiednia reinterpretacja tych argumentów prowadzi do wyeliminowania najistotniejszych problemów.

EN

The aim of this article is to defend the so-called “pragmatic” arguments for probabilism, i.e., a thesis which holds that a rational agent’s degrees of belief should be modeled by the theory of probability. Two such arguments are analyzed: Dutch-Book Argument (DBA) and Representation Theorem Argument (RTA). Both of these arguments encounter a number of problems that seriously undermine their value, and thus probabilism (operationalism, a forced bet, etc.) The article shows that amongst the various interpretations of DBA and RTA we can find those that are able to resolve the main difficulties that beset those arguments.

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2 Filozofia Nauki

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Common Cause Abduction: Its Scope and Limits

Subjective Probability and the Problem of Countable Additivity

W obronie tak zwanych „pragmatycznych” uzasadnień probabilizmu