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  1. 3 Filozofia (Philosophy)

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  1. 3 Smreková D.

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1

RICOEUR O PRAKTICKOM ROZUME

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Smreková D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2015
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vol. 70
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issue 4
295 – 306
EN
The article deals with Ricoeurʼs idea of how we use reason in our praxis, i.e. with what in Kantian vocabulary is referred to as practical reason and in Aristotelian terminology as practical wisdom (phronesis). The question is whether this mode of reason, as incommensurable with the rigorous theoretical reason as it is, can be taken as valid. Can Ricoeurʼs approach, trying to reconcile the two incompatible conceptions mentioned above, be of help in resolving this question? Here we have to test the arguments in support of two Ricoeur’s ideas: 1) Practical reason is to be preserved as a specific mode of reason, which is irreducible to any other one. 2) The role of practical reason is not implemented by keeping its distance from practical experience (as demanded by Kant), but rather by being a prudent moral judgement in a particular situation. This, however, does not mean disregarding the morality of duty.
2

P. RICŒUR O VINE A ODPUSTENÍ

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Smreková D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2013
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vol. 68
|
issue 9
766 – 778
EN
The paper deals with Ricœur’s conception of forgiveness as related to guilt, which he articulated mainly in his “Memory, history, forgetting”. Forgiveness is paradoxical in itself: while related to something shameful, unjustifiable that one cannot forget, it also, according to Ricœur, gives one an opportunity to forgive. We forgive regardless of our feeling of being offended or humiliated, consequently the act of forgiving is grounded in something transcending mere exchange of forgiveness asked and forgiveness expressed. In his polemics with Jankélévich and Derrida concerning the unconditioned, resp. conditioned character of forgiveness Ricœur tries to decode its ground. The paper tries to shed light on what it means to forgive and why the guilt, even when forgiven, is still remembered, though not in its burdensome and paralyzing form.
3

O NEÚPRIMNOSTI A SEBAKLAMANÍ

100%
Smreková D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2011
|
vol. 66
|
issue 9
856 – 867
EN
The key issue of the contemporary discourse on self-deception is the necessity to explain the inner structure of consciousness or the state of mind which enable us to tell lies to ourselves or to be fooled by one’s own tricks. Two different approaches to the problem are analyzed: Sartre’s concept of bad faith as well as Davidson’s concept of self-deception. What these divergent conceptions have in common is their intentional approach. However, Sartre’s conception deriving from his ontological considerations (conceiving the consciousness in its unity) is seen as substantially different from Davidsonian rationalizing the phenomenon in question by claiming the division of mind. For Sartre a person of a bad faith is one disguising his or her freedom, i.e. the non-coincidence, which defines her or his being.
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