This paper discusses Thomas Aquinas’ stance on the relation between intellect and human soul, where the former is a power and the latter its principle. Due to the fact that Aquinas understands soul as the form of a body, rather than its mover, the problem of how to separate and characterize intellective powers arises. For it is accidental intellectuality that enables cognitive and volitional acts, which are independent of body in their essence. To explain his own position, Aquinas employs the so-called “impediment argument” for the spirituality of the human intellect. He also employs the whole/part distinction when discussing the relation between intellect and soul as whole/part categories. As a result, his account can avoid Averroistic flaws without having to identify intellect with the soul or the whole human being (as argued by Albert the Great). M. Gogacz’s thesis that the intellectual accident of the soul is identical with the possible intellect seems to solve the problem of the accidental and potential character of this particular human power.
Celem artykułu było zaprezentowanie czterech zasad etyki Tomasza z Akwinu. Mądrość, kontemplacja, a także syndereza i sumienie można określić zarówno jako sprawności, ale także akty intelektu możnościowego. Pokazują one w sposób wystarczający w jaki sposób poznawcze zdolności intelektu służą do poznania rzeczywistości a także wynikają z natury ludzkiej rozpoznającej siebie a także dobro, które jest jej celem. Lektura tekstów Tomasza z Akwinu na temat mądrości, kontemplacji oraz synderezy i sumienia pozwala dostrzec jak wielką rolę odgrywają w postępowaniu moralnym oraz jak usprawiedliwiają Tomaszowy intelektualizm etyczny. To właśnie te działania intelektu determinują każdy akt woli i każdy wybór człowieka.
EN
The aim of the article was to present four principles of the ethics of Thomas Aquinas. Wisdom, contemplation, synderesis and conscience are either habits and acts of the possible intellect. Wisdom, contemplation and synderesis and conscience clearly show how the cognitive activities of the intellect serve to recognize reality, and, in a further consequence, allow actions resulting from human nature that recognize self and the good to which it is to aim. Remarks about wisdom, contemplation as well as synderesis and conscience, as responsible for moral actions of man, justify ethical intellectualism attributed to Aquinas, because the intellect determines any volitional acts and choices.
Augustyńskie wyjaśnienia natury duszy ludzkiej zmierzają do ukazania jej aktywności. Augustyn nie ma wątpliwości co do tego, by same te aktywności były utożsamione z duszą, gdyż ta identyczność pozwala na stwierdzenie zachodzenia faktycznych działań. Dusza działa doskonale, o ile działa w pełni, a więc na sposób, w jaki każde działanie ją stanowi. W obszarze działań intelektualnych dusza spełnia się w działaniu intelektualnym, w działaniu, które jest odzwierciedleniem natury Boga. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest próba ustalenia znaczeń różnych wyrażeń określających duszę (anima, animus, spiritus, intellectus, mens, ratio) w myśli filozoficznej świętego Augustyna. Pozwoli to na lepsze zrozumienie Augustyńskiej koncepcji poznania intelektualnego a szczególnie idei oświecenia, jakiego doznaje dusza w poznawaniu rzeczywistości.
EN
Augustine’s explanations of the nature of the human soul are aimed at showing its activity. Augustine has no doubts that the activities themselves are identified with the soul, since this identity allows for the occurrence of actual activities to be ascertained. The soul works perfectly as long as it functions fully, and therefore in the way that every action constitutes it. In the area of intellectual activities, the soul is fulfilled in intellectual action, the action that reflects God’s nature. The aim of this article is to try to determine the meanings of the various terms that define the soul (anima, animus, spiritus, intellectus, mens, ratio) in the philosophical thought of Saint Augustine. This will make possible a better understanding of the Augustinian concept of intellectual cognition, especially the idea of illumination that the soul experiences in knowing reality.
A man has a natural need for cognition of causes, particularly when he perceives reality, which is an effect of someone’s action. Aristotle, when describing a philosopher (the wise man), emphasizes that he’s a person, who has knowledge about all things (as far as possible) and cognitions of things, which are difficult to cognire and also knows causes, which are cognizable at most. But whether it’s possible recognition of causes and the paradigm of realistic philosophy nowadays, when we inherit principles of Cartesian Philosophy in our mindset and culture? When is everything unclear, inaccurate or mysterious regard as false? And when only mathematical clearness preserves state of knowledge and certainty? Therefore the problem of unclear cognition is so significant. This issue was prepared by St. Thomas Aquinas, who on that basis considered question of cognition of God. Descartes, however, completely negated this kind of cognition and built ‘boundary sign’ for the truth of the cognition. It seems that reinstatement of the right place of confused cognition and its protection in philosophy is possible inasmuch as it is still possible cognition of reality, i.e. cognition of thing-in-itself. A wonderment (admiration), which was the beginning of philosophy (because it express confused cognition of world) in post-Cartesian paradigm of reflection is unconvincing – the essence of the philosophy is purely and simply clear thinking. But emphasize the role of confused cognition is not a recognition it as sufficient and only way to perfect knowledge. Emphasizing confused knowledge is an objection to the thesis of the possession of only excellent knowledge and in the act, and objection to the claims that deny the potentiality and potency of knowing reality. If so, there would be no compromise statement that for the beliver the existence of God is obvious and for non-beliver non-existence of God is equally obvious.
The aim of the article is presentation the problems of possible intellect and agent intellect in philosophy Mieczyslaw Gogacz, founder of consequent version of thomism (Warsaw School of Thomism). His understanding of the intellect was dictated by the successive publications. Difference between intellects, was first shown in the context of fundamental metaphysical positions - realism and idealism. According to M. Gogacz realistic proposition is depends on the distinction between two intellects, and idealistic related with the acceptance of a single intellect with passive and active function, and identification of the faculties of the soul with itself. M. Gogacz presented the metaphysical description of the nature of the intellect, emphasizing its being, as well as the very essence. He underlined that the possible intellect should be defined as the possibility of the soul, which is it imperfection (intellect is principle of individuation of the soul), located in the soul, but not identical with its essence. Agent intellect in his opinion should be defined as an accident of the possible intellect. Distinction between possible intellect and agent intellect allowed to remark the difference between knowing confused and clearly, and to build the theory of “speech of the heart”, which describes the most important way of knowing a principle of being – act of being.
Tadeusz Klimski studied three ancient and medieval authors: Saint Augustine, Johannes Scotus Eriugena and Honorius of Autun, and devoted them his publications in „Studia Philosophiae Christianae”. He studied in their texts the issues of truth, proceeded from Aristotle who defined philosophy as „the knowledge of the truth”. According to T. Klimski, knowability of truth was by St. Augustine radically dependent on God, and in the philosophy of Eriugena truth was equated directly with him. Honorius of Autun in his works connected the truth with the essence of things, however, he has not seen existential aspect resulting from the definition of God as semper esse. According to T. Klimski, these philosophers, because they were neoplatonists they haven’t come to the truth with existence, with esse, as something most fundamental for the understanding of being.
Thomas Aquinas in his works sympathizes with the priority and thus superiority of intellect over will definitely. Presenting various ways of arguing he intends to point out the perfection of intellect, which becomes perfect in its act of cognition, it assures the proper action of will. Because of its object – truth about reality – as well as final and formal causation intellect moves will which aims to good. Only in the situation of such an object of intellect, which somehow exceeds human cognition potencies, will could acquire superiority over cognition. Thus a man only in an act of love of God is able to love by will that, which he cannot cognize. In other cases, particularly in case of natural cognition of sensual reality, in which man grasps an essence, cognition always goes before volition. Stressing superiority of intellect over will is not a matter of introducing into the consideration of their mutual relations additional topic. It is crucial problem, which allows proper understanding issue of freedom in Aquinas’ account.
The article is an attempt to respond the following questions: is there a difference between operations of potential and passive intellect? Could one call the potential intellect passive intellect? Are there any questions, statements or opinions in the history of philosophy which separate potential from passive intellect? The passivity of potential intellect is not a problem here, because its nature and its act is to be in the state of potency towards ist object. The subject of analysis tends to define teechnical terms "intellectus passivus" and to reach philosophical implications resulting from it.