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1

Russia and the Seym of Autumn 1720

100%

Kosinska U.

Kwartalnik Historyczny

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2004

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vol. 111

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issue 1

39-67

EN

The article deals with the attitude of Russia towards the Seym which sat in Warsaw on 30 September-5 October 1720, and which left its imprint in historiography due to the inner conflict between King Augustus II and the hetmans. In reality the side particularly interested in putting an end to the parliamentary session was Russia, and the question of the hetman command became a convenient façade for concealing other objectives: the preservation of peace in the Commonwealth and making it impossible for the latter to evade Russian influence, find new allies and independently withdraw from the Northern War. The author discusses the active part played by Russia in bringing about a breakdown of the Seym: support for the hetman oposition, exploitation of the pacifism of the Poles, the threat of installing into Poland a 100 000-strong army in case of a severance of the alliance and the dissemination of false information about the policy of Augustus II. At the same time she undermines the view embedded in heretofore historiography, about harmonious Russo-Prussian cooperation in anti-Seym undertakings. Russia regarded a collapse of the Seym attained not by breaking debates, but by blocking the election of the speaker of the house, to have been an optimal solution. She delayed for two years the eventuality of Augustus II introducing any sort of systemic changes in the Commonwealth, and by leaving the question of the hetman unresolved, forced the Wettin monarch to concentrate on domestic issues. In this manner Augustus was presented to the rest of Europe as an uncertain partner. Consequently Russia gained control over the Commonwealth and paved the path towards separatist negotiations with Sweden on her own terms.

2

The Russian Approach to the Negotiations between Augustus II and Sweden (1720)

100%

Kosinska U.

Kwartalnik Historyczny

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2005

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vol. 112

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issue 4

31-46

EN

A continuation of reflections about the course of the Polish–Swedish negotiations conducted in 1719-1720 (published in 'Kwartalnik Historyczny' 111, 2004, 3, pp. 23–44). The author examined the attitude represented by Russia towards the fact that Augustus II, her heretofore ally, had inaugurated independent peace talks with Sweden. Emphasis has been placed upon the negative reaction of Peter I, caused by an unwillingness to permit the Commonwealth to withdraw from the range of his influence and, at the same time, to realise earlier treaty promises, such as the return of Livonia or the payment of reparations for the Northern War. As a result, St. Petersburg deployed a whole arsenal of diplomatic measures in order to torpedo Saxon-Polish attempts at ending the war independently. The article discusses, i. a. the mechanisms of spreading false information, applied by the Russian embassy in Poland and devised as proof of the faithlessness of Augustus II vis-a-vis Peter and the Poles. The author focused her attention on depicting the role played by the supposed treaty of Dresden signed with Sweden on 7 January 1720 (actually, this was a Swedish project of a preliminary, never confirmed by Augustus II) during the negotiations carried out by Stanislaw Chomentowski, envoy extraordinary to St. Petersburg. The article demonstrates the way in which the Russians used the texts which 'leaked out' of the Swedish chancery to confuse the Polish diplomats, to delay the talks and, finally, to refuse to meet the demands made by the Commonwealth. She portrayed the weakness of Augustus II who, despite vehement dementi and testimonies showing that the charges launched against him were untrue, did not have an opportunity to halt the detrimental campaign pursued within the Commonwealth. The attitude represented by Russia towards Polish-Saxon negotiations with Sweden was indubitably one of the factors which made it impossible for Augustus II to put a formal end to the Northern War, and which considerably weakened his position on the eve of the negotiations held in Nystadt.

3

The Negotiations of Augustus II with Sweden in 1719-1720

100%

Kosinska U.

Kwartalnik Historyczny

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2004

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vol. 111

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issue 3

23-44

EN

The author discusses the course of negotiations between Augustus II and Sweden in 1719-1720, starting with the considerable divergence of opinions held by historians concerning the date and form of the convention which ended the war between the Commonwealth-Saxony and Sweden; she also wonders whether the pact ever took place. Subsequently, the article goes on to analyse consecutive projects devised in Dresden, Stockholm and Warsaw, indicating the main discrepancies. Augustus II demanded the unconditional recognition of his power in the Commonwealth (without any rights or titles granted to Stanislaw Leszczynski) and territorial claims in the Reich. The Swedish side called for the renouncement of all claims, a confirmation of the treaty of Oliwa, the recognition of the royal title of Stanislaw Leszczynski and grants of means of subsistence (the restoration of estates of a pension), and the membership of the Commonwealth in an anti-Russian coalition. Another essential factor was the protest expressed by the Polish lords who feared that a separatist treaty with Sweden would pose the threat of an outbreak of a war against Russia; they placed greater hope in ending the war at the side of Peter I, relying on him to realise the promise of transferring to the Commonwealth Samogitia captured from Sweden. The author demonstrates that even the project of signing a preliminary treaty with Sweden by Augustus II as the elector of Saxony remained unaccepted by the Polish lords. The problem of negotiations was delayed until the Seym convention of autumn of 1720 and the congress of Brunswick. Nonetheless, the divergencies of the stands represented by the interested parties had not been eliminated. The Seym convention proved futile, and the congress of Brunswick never took place. As a result, both in 1719 and 1720 no formal pact was signed between Augustus II and Sweden. The ineffectual nature of the negotiations with Augustus II indubitably became for Sweden one of the impulses for signing a peace with Russia in Nystadt.

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Russia and the Seym of Autumn 1720

The Russian Approach to the Negotiations between Augustus II and Sweden (1720)

The Negotiations of Augustus II with Sweden in 1719-1720