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Władysława Studnickiego ocena działań politycznych Romana Dmowskiego na podstawie książki „Polityka polska i odbudowanie państwa”

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Radziwiłłowicz D.
Miscellanea Historico-Archivistica
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2017
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vol. 24
163-174
EN
Władysław Studnicki’s views on the opportunity to restitute sovereignty through war between the occupying states were similar to those of Roman Dmowski. Although principal assumptions of Dmowski and Studnicki were similar, conclusions they have drawn from them were quite the opposite. While Dmowski intended to ally with Russia in oncoming war, Studnicki was counting on the Central Powers (Austria-Hungary and Germany). From today’s perspective, the dispute between Dmowski and Studnicki is a minor episode in the history of Polish political thought. It would seem, that the words of Konrad Studnicki-Gizbert from 2002, as presented in the foreword to Volume 2 of Selected works of Władysław Studnicki, become even more relevant today: „From the perspective of the 21st century, it seems that Dmowski’s concept was less realistic: creation of an independent Polish state could have been in the interest of Germany, as a measure of safety against Russia, while for Russia, giving up the Central Poland („the Kingdom of Poland”) meant moving further away from the West. There is an analogy in this respect between the situation of Poland and current situation of Ukraine: Poland may accept the loss of Lviv, but for Russia, breaking ties with Ukraine would be a serious blow; therefore, not Poland but Russia constitutes a threat to independence of Ukraine”.
PL
Poglądy Władysława Studnickiego na temat szans odzyskania niepodległości dzięki wojnie między państwami zaborczymi były analogiczne do poglądów Romana Dmowskiego. Chociaż podstawowe założenia Dmowskiego i Studnickiego były podobne, to jednak wnioski z nich płynące były przeciwne. O ile Dmowski zamierzał w zbliżającej się wojnie postawić na Rosję, to Studnicki na państwa centralne (Austro-Węgry i Niemcy). Z perspektywy dnia dzisiejszego spór Dmowski-Studnicki jest mało znaczącym epizodem w historii polskiej myśli politycznej. Wydaje się, że słowa Konrada Studnickiego-Gizberta z 2002 r., zamieszczone we wstępie do tomu drugiego Pism Wybranych Władysława Studnickiego zyskują właśnie dzisiaj na aktualności: „Z perspektywy XXI wieku wydaje się, że koncepcja Dmowskiego była mniej realistyczna: w interesie Niemiec mogło być stworzenie niepodległego państwa polskiego jako zabezpieczenia przeciw Rosji, natomiast dla Rosji oddanie środkowej Polski („Królestwa Polskiego”) było oddaleniem się od Zachodu. Istnieje pod tym względem analogia między sytuacją Polski i obecną sytuacją Ukrainy: Polska może pogodzić się z utratą Lwowa, ale dla Rosji zerwanie związku z Ukrainą jest poważnym ciosem; zatem nie Polska, ale Rosja stanowi zagrożenie niepodległości Ukrainy”.
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Generał brygady Kazimierz Rumsza – z armii carskiej do polskiej

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Radziwiłłowicz D.
Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski
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2020
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vol. 1
105-121
EN
Since its inception, the 5th Siberian Rifle Division was led by Colonel [płk.] Rumsza who operated under the orders of Colonel [płk.] Czuma, the commander of Polish forces in Siberia. In the light of the examined documents, Colonel Kazimierz Rumsza appears to be a man with two faces. On the one hand, he was an excellent commander, proving his worth in the extreme war conditions. On the other, a violent officer who humiliated his personnel and got involved in shady financial ventures. He was never proven guilty of embezzlement. However, his very presence in the group of suspects stigmatised him among the officers. He won back some favour after the lost September Campaign. During World War II, Rumsza did not play any significant role in the Polish Armed Forces. After demobilisation, he settled down in London. On 1 January 1964, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general [gen. brygady]. Kazimierz Rumsza died on 28 January 1970.
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Żołnierze 5 Dywizji Strzelców Polskich w bolszewickiej niewoli i ich repatriacja

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Radziwiłłowicz D.
Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski
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2017
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vol. 1
23-43
EN
The formation of Polish armed troops began in summer 1918, during the battles between troops of the Czechoslovak Corps (Radziwiłłowicz 2010, 107–126), “white” Russians and Bolsheviks in the Volga region and in Siberia. Earlier that year, small Polish troops began to form spontaneously, taking their names from the towns of formation; therefore, those were, among others, Omsk, Irkuck, Semipalatynsk “legions”. In October 1918, due to a Bolshevik offensive, Polish forces were stationed in Novonikolayevsk (now Novosibirsk) on the Ob river. A division with three rifle regiments, a light artillery regiment and a lancer regiment was formed in 1918 and 1919. The newly-formed troops made up a tactical unit which drew on the tradition of the 5th Polish Rifle Division of the 2nd Polish Corps, with the same number and name (Radziwiłłowicz 2009). More ambitious organisational plans were developed for a supra-division command structure: the Polish Army Command in Eastern Russia and Siberia. From the end of November 1919 to early January 1920, over a distance of nearly a thousand kilometres, troops of the 5th Polish Rifle Division divided into 57 echelons and evacuated by the decrepit Trans-Siberian Railway as the rearguard of the allied forces, through the area of a civil war, among the hostile population of Siberia. The capitulation of the 5th Polish Rifle Division at the Klukviennaya station came as a surprise, not only to its command. The behaviour of the Czechoslovak commanders blocking the railroad, when troops of the Soviet 5th Army and Bolshevik guerrillas attacked the stretched Polish echelons, was regarded as deliberate and aimed at the liquidation of the Polish division. The commander of the Polish division, Colonel Kazimierz Rumsza with a group of his followers, as well as over a thousand officers and privates, who had no illusions that Bolsheviks would observe certain wartime and moral standards adopted by both parties of the conflict, avoided Bolshevik captivity and its cruelty. This group made their way to Harbin in Manchuria, from where a small number of Polish troops were evacuated by sea to Poland (Radziwiłłowicz 2015). The remainder of the division, after surviving the hell of Soviet POW and labour camps, returned to Poland in 1921 and 1922 by repatriation transports. About 4 thousand soldiers of the 5th Polish Rifle Division did not survive the hardships of the camps and the cruelty of the Cheka.
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Armia Czerwona w 1920 roku. Organizacja, stany osobowe, działalność propagandowa ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem frontu polskiego w świetle wybranych źródeł i polskich opracowań wywiadowczych

100%
Radziwiłłowicz D.
Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski
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2021
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vol. 2
47-62
EN
The Polish-Soviet War, which took place between 1919 and 1920, remains one of the most dramatic, yet also one of the brightest pages in the history of the Polish military. Not only did the Polish army achieve a spectacular victory that ensured Poland’s sovereignty and unrestrained development, but also, according to many historians and politicians, saved Europe from the flood of communism. Apart from the famous Battle of Warsaw, the warfare that lasted from February 1919 to October 1920 included the Kiev Offensive, the Battle of Komarów and the Battle of the Niemen River. The war with the Bolshevists was not just a conflict over the borders, but also concerned the preservation of national sovereignty, threatened by the Bolshevists' attempts to spread the communist revolution throughout Europe. The intention of the Polish side, on the other hand, was to separate the nations occupying the regions to the west and south of Russia and to connect them with Poland through close federal ties. The fate of the war was finally decided in August 1920 at the gates of Warsaw. The Polish Army, following the operational plans of the High Command approved by Józef Piłsudski, the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army, pushed the Red Army east past the Neman River line with a surprising counter-attack. This battle saved Poland's independence and forced the Bolshevists to cancel their plans to spread the communist revolution to the countries of Central and Western Europe.
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